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## SEÑOR FERRER AND THE ANARCHISTS AGAIN.

JUST as the sympathizers in this country were issuing their manifesto to the disciples of Ferrer that a great celebration in his honor was in preparation to be held on the 13th of October, "in all the important countries of the world and some of the unimportant ones," an attempt was being made at Barcelona to assassinate Senor Maura, the late Prime Minister of Spain. The views expressed in this article receive an ominous confirmation from that event.

The assassin is a young man eighteen years of age.<sup>1</sup> Ferrer started "The Modern School" in Barcelona in 1901. The manifesto spoken of above, published on the 31st of July in the *New York Times*, speaks of Ferrer as the founder of "The Modern School" as a "challenge" to the Church and State schools supported by "a supine and superstitious government," and again quoting from an English journal, "a bull-fighting and bigoted government." The manifesto purporting to be the encyclical of "the Philosophical Anarchists," of "the Scientific Socialists," hardly restrained by their leaders and of the Grand Orient of France, of which Ferrer was a member in the highest place, employs the term, "The Modern School," as the title of a system of education covering each and all of the fabrics, big and little, in which certain principles are taught to the boys and girls attending them. "The Modern School" is a curriculum, a system in opposition to the "mediaevalism" of Catholic education. It does

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<sup>1</sup> I assume he was taught in one of "the series called the Modern School."

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not seem to be in antagonism with Protestant schools; though its fundamental dogma is materialistic atheism, it claims to be a secular system like the Board Schools or Council Schools in England, I suppose previous to the last Education Act. At any rate, through its exponents of a less menacing anarchism and socialism than the boy Roco, who fired three shots the other day at Senor Maura, or the man Matro Morral, who threw the bomb at the carriage of the King and Queen, and the incendiaries and revolutionaries who burned the churches and religious houses and plundered the great libraries of Barcelona on the 26th, 27th and 28th of July, 1909, we are informed that the system is only economic and secular.

In taking up this Ferrer case, I am prompted specially by the disruption of diplomatic relations with the Vatican by Canalejas and the exceptionally rude manner in which he has done it. I see in this the working of the terrible secret society which aims at universal rule and which, I will maintain, was behind Morral's bomb-throwing, the petroleum fires of Barcelona and Roco's attempt a few days ago. I attribute to it all the assassinations of Kings, Queens and Ministers, or attempts at assassination which have taken place since the Illuminati and Rosicrucians, its old original members, all varieties of a revolutionary brotherhood triumphed at the Constituent Assembly's Decree of the civil constitution of the Church in France.

The inexplicable commotion excited through France, England and America by the Dreyfus affair is traceable to this pernicious influence. Its effect was in all directions. An English Catholic science man<sup>2</sup> and an English Catholic journalist<sup>3</sup> were the harshest critics of that court-martial. Some Catholic acquaintances of my own in this country were of the same way of thinking. I wrote an article for the *Catholic World* expressing my poor opinions in opposition to those of the English science man just alluded to. I would have withdrawn it in deference to the advice of a friend, but was spared the necessity. What is the explanation of this portentous interest in an obscure French officer, one practically on the level of a subaltern or a quartermaster raised from the ranks in an English regiment, a person not connected with any of the historic houses, such as Rohan, Montmorenci or the like; an artilleryman not known as having invented any improvements in the sighting of guns or shaping of projectiles. Like the interest in Ferrer, it is abnormal.

This point I think too important not to be pressed. We are so dependent for information on what seems to be a controlled, and unlawfully controlled, press that I desire to know the source of this power. Let it be remembered that the character of the insurrection

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<sup>2</sup> The late St. George Mivart.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Dell.

in Barcelona was not known for weeks, though the execution of Ferrer came at the first moment as a hideous travesty of justice. I was written to about it by a friend; I was spoken to about it. To the friend, after some time, I sent Henry Labouchere's judicious article in *Truth*. Things, too, began to come out, but the impression was lasting, even among Catholics, that some wrong had been done to Ferrer. In the mass of non-Catholic life what must be the impression then? We have the answer in the statues to be erected, the addresses to be delivered, the new endowment of "The Modern School" all over the world in honor of this man whose real history is an unredeemed baseness. We have also the latest counter-blast to this hero-worship in the three shots fired by Roco.

I complain of the exceptional devotion to persons entitled to no homage and the refusal of it, or the reluctant concession of it to men eminently deserving of admiration. Let the reader contrast the eclat surrounding the life of Dreyfus from the moment of his sentence to that when he returned to the society of his family and relatives with the history of O'Reilles de Paladine with his Catholic recruits standing between France and the Germans on their march to Paris. For a moment he checked the tide, but it hung for a moment only and then swept on with irresistible force. Does any one to-day know about him or his recruits? Is any one ignorant of the story of the bordereau and the dossier which the Court of Cassation though condemning did not think necessary to the conviction of Dreyfus? That is the finding of the court-martial was upheld.

But the great city was invested; and the Catholics to whom their mother France was a stepmother lined the walls day by day and night by night. Among them conspicuously the De Munns, on one of whom an English Catholic, Mr. Dell, spumed his progressive and emancipated scorn because he had dared to complain of the attack of the French Government on the Church.<sup>4</sup> I say it was the courage and conduct of these Catholics behind the ramparts that saved France from dismemberment; surely it was not the capitalists of the Second Empire who returned from their hiding places to establish the third Republic by the aid of the clever men who escaped the fate of their fellow-Communists. France has forgotten the Catholics and surrendered herself to the Communists and obeys them and their sons in all the departments of State. All this is unnatural. Did Bismarck know of any power behind the Communists when he rejected a proposal to help the Government against

<sup>4</sup> Mr. Bodley, an English Protestant, possessing very accurate knowledge of the relations of the Church to the State before the violation of the Concordat, takes the same view as the Count de Munn. It does not touch the matter that M. Brunetiere and other Catholics thought they saw a way to an accommodation.

them by the rejoinder: "Let them stew in their own juice." There may come a day when Protestants and emancipated Catholics may find that an alliance with philosophical anarchism, scientific socialism, even in the veiled violence of Marx and Engel, Communism represented by the unsexed monster called the petroleuse, Young Italy, in the name of the Carbonari and of the Mafia, Young Spain as "The People's Club" and "Modern School," will not save the institutions on which they rest. We have had experiences of such disappointments, we have heard of revolutions devouring their own children.

I have spoken of Canalejas' outrage to the Holy See. It is a crumpled leaf from M. Combes' and from the seizing of the Nuncio's papers. "I am master in my own house," declared Napoleon on a somewhat similar occasion. Where are the Napoleonidae to-day? There is an excellent gentleman in Washington, but he disclaims their royalty.<sup>5</sup> I refer to the outrage because it synchronizes with the manifesto of the Ferrerites in the *New York Times*. These remarkable occurrences in the high political life are part of the inspiration in the assassin propaganda of the subterranean political life. I am going to prove it.

First, I assert that the conviction of Ferrer was right on the evidence and right according to the forms. The forms are impeached by the manifesto. It admits there was evidence, but so tainted by the conditions as to be of no value. This has been the impression ever since the press abandoned the formula that he was tried because he was suspected and executed on the suspicion. The Holy Father interceded for him. I am not aware that His Holiness was praised by the anti-Catholic press, and this is practically the press which is controlled by the secret society of which Ferrer was a dignitary; and which is the press possessed by capital, though at times it is permitted to urge insurrection on a labor shibboleth and to preach Prudhomism and Nihilism.

If the court-martial found him guilty of guiding a rebellion it was bound to sentence him to death. Executing him might not, in the opinion of judicious men, be expedient. There are some who would not permit capital punishment at all. At the same time there is a tendency to hysterical sentiment in well-bred women and among men who are amateurs in philosophy, politics and criminology. These women and men remind one of the philosophers of the eighteenth century and the fair precisians of the Hotel Rambouillet, nice people, without a grain of common sense; but these are the persons to whom, when an assassin is to be executed, the scientific socialists,

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<sup>5</sup> If there were among the Napoleonidae one able man now, he would save France. Though Henri Cinq spoke of the late Count de Paris as the Dauphin, the Legitimists would not accept him.

the philosophical anarchists, the patriotic nihilists appeal to use their influence in high quarters. For my own part, I think the worst thing you can do with a criminal is to put him to death; but before I could accept the total abolition of capital punishment as the law of the land I should wish the assassin to begin as the Frenchman said. If they would set the example of not inflicting death sentences, other rulers might follow suit.

We are informed in the manifesto that the American end of the movement is in the hands of the Francesco Ferrer Association, which was organized on June 3. "A world-wide movement has been begun and is assuming vast proportions" and "the campaign" is "to be formally opened" on "October 13, the anniversary of Professor Ferrer's death."

One, I suppose, need not quarrel with the dignity professor; it is conferred by usage on a man who teaches the manly art of self-defense; it is conspicuous in advertisements of quack medicine; it is assumed by the learned man who frames the horoscope of servant girls; but when you find him glorified as "The Founder of the Modern School" you wish to know what the modern school is and what sort of man its head professor is. It does not quite appear the modern school is confined to Spain. The Parisians patronize a series, if not more than one. As I understand, it is to be set up in the United States, in the South American Republics, in the British Colonies, but, above all, in Italy. It is to be part of the homage to be paid to Ferrer on the 13th of October and an enduring monument to his fame. We shall say something about the subject-matter of the instruction by-and-by. It is necessary, for the teaching is the seed of a lawlessness spreading through the world in the shape of riot, murder, incendiary fires as a propaganda; in murder, theft, embezzlement, breach of trust, company promoting of a fraudulent character, as exercises of individual or, at least, of private energy or skill. I do not say that these practices were unknown until Ferrer opened his schools in Barcelona—there is a claimant in France for precedence in this pedagogy, and unquestionably the enormous increase of crime in that country seems to bear witness to his success; but I see in this teaching some confirmation of the charge for which the court-martial at Barcelona sentenced him.

This manifesto of the *New York Times* is itself an instance of the complaint I made of the unfairness of the press in matters supposed to affect Catholic interests and institutions. I should be happy, indeed, if I could get people to believe that the political world in its administrative, legislative or executive sphere is not particularly complacent to the Vatican authorities; it never has been, in fact. But there has been for centuries a readiness to cry priest-ridden if

the external relations between the Vatican authorities and a particular Power appeared cordial. Whenever, therefore, there is some conflict between Rome and a particular Power, the world judges the former to be in the wrong, just as in the matters of education, marriage, divorce, public worship and the like, the judgment of the Holy See is regarded as an invasion of the State's dominion. If there be abuses in a Catholic State, Rome has no more to do with them than the chief city in the moon, the Holy Father has no more to do with them than the Angel Gabriel.

The manifesto in opening its attack on the Spanish Government makes a statement no one could defend who possesses a particle of honesty. The whole document, for that matter, teems with dishonest suggestions, implications from warped presentations of fact and here and there falsehoods bold as brass. "The contemplation of this picture [the number of illiterates] fixed in Ferrer's mind the resolve to implant the modern school as a challenge to a supine and superstitious Government. The Government took up the challenge and shot him."

He was not shot for founding the schools; he was not shot for nine years after they were founded, and he was not shot for challenging the monopoly of "the Church and State system of education," as the document expressly charges.

As a matter of fact, the schools were not interfered with; but I say—I care not how what I say is taken—tolerating them for a day was the abdication of authority in a moral and religious community. I believe there are people now who condemn the law officers, or whoever was responsible for the prosecution of Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant for the publication of a book which they deemed immoral. I know nothing about the lady, but Mr. Bradlaugh was, I believe, a man with strongly developed sympathies with the cause of civil and political justice. At any rate, the Lord Chief Justice, Colburne, was a strong, clear-headed man, with no mawkish sentimentality; and the sentence he imposed was severe. The justification offered by the accused was that the work was published in the interest of large classes, the poorest part of the population. Sir Alexander charged dead and charged rightly against such a plea; now this kind of doctrine would be simply a venial fault in comparison to the infamous doctrines concerning the relations of the sexes inculcated on boys and girls in Ferrer's schools.

After his acquittal of the charge of complicity with Morral in the bomb-throwing which killed some and wounded others in the cortege of Alfonso and the Queen, he might have been put upon his trial for his part in the rebellion of 1885 in the same province. There is no Statute of Limitations in treason. Ordinarily I do not say

that a person should be tried for an old treason because he was acquitted of a recent one. This would be like the old vindictiveness when the Star Chamber's arbitrary proceedings were helping to sow the seeds of the great Civil War and the Revolution of 1688, or the abominable *lettres de cachet*, which, at length, caused the attack on the Bastille to be the opening chapter of the Revolution, which, alas, appears to vindicate all the class tyrannies of the past.<sup>6</sup>

But the principles of a political and social character taught in the schools to the young people who were to be in a few years the parents of the next generation and the grandparents of the one succeeding it and of the future of Spain, were an attack root and branch on government and all the institutions by which it is exercised. On account of such principles the schools should have been shut up in 1906, when they had not been closed at the beginning, five years before; and as they were still the unrepented of principles of the rebel of 1885, in part at least, I submit that the public safety required him to be made an example of on that occasion.

Think for a moment of the sympathies of France and Italy for this man; and say can it be explained on any theory save that the press of both countries and the reading population are in favor of the subversion of society, as it stands, and the substitution of another order? No one can suppose, I hope, that the favorable judgment of the English-speaking world proceeds from knowledge, but then it is the fruit of false information. At the best, how is he any more than Dreyfus a commanding a figure, either in his exile from 1885 to 1901 or his character since as a schoolmaster in Barcelona? He had deserted his wife and abandoned his children, and, I suppose, to adjust fact to the principle, he took one of his teachers as a mistress.

When one thinks of the exiles of many lands through many centuries he cannot help contrasting them with Ferrer making a fortune by the will of "Mademoiselle" Meunier, of Paris. Exile for the haut politique and for a man's very love of the soil and scenes of the native land began early. Nearly thirty centuries ago the Jew wept when he remembered Zion. The great statesman of Athens, driven out by an ungrateful country, died rather than lead the hosts of "the Great King"<sup>7</sup> against her. One's patience is tried when he hears of this Spanish peasant spoken of by his admirers as "teaching his native language in hard circumstances in the French capital and after years of exile returning to the chief city of his native State to open schools for the young in a country so neglected by

<sup>6</sup> I don't mind the early years of the Revolution so much as the public robbery and oppression now.

<sup>7</sup> The description of historian and orator of the King of Persia.

the Church and State that ten millions of the people are unable to read and write, that fifty thousand conscripts are enrolled every year also unable to read and write, that twenty-four thousand schools are so insanitary that fifty thousand pupils die yearly, or if any of them survive they grow up unhealthy and deformed."<sup>8</sup> I must take issue with the manifesto's charge of neglect on the part of those having the control of education. War in Spain in one shape or another has been incessant since the campaigns of 1793 and 1794 against the French Republic for putting, as all Spain, high and low, cried out, "an anointed sovereign to death." At the same time education is free to the poor, and what is more, compulsory on children between the ages of six and nine. There are ten universities, and these are open to promising sons of the poor. Notwithstanding the wars of succession, of invasion, the insurrections of ambitious statesmen in support of one pretender or another, every town has a library, and some of the towns possess libraries famous among the scholars of Europe. Even Barcelona had libraries of continental reputation before Ferrer's Philosophical Anarchists were nearly successful in destroying them. The statements on education, therefore, are not only in the highest degree misleading, but they are irrelevant as a justification for Ferrer's system called "The Modern School." The attempt to murder the King and Queen, and thus to prevent the establishment of a period of settled government, must necessarily postpone the day when the local authorities shall have it in their power to enforce the attendance of the children. But surely the postponement is not to be attributed to what the manifesto describes as "a supine and superstitious Government;" but to the Anarchists who have made Spain, and particularly the vast extent of territory called "Catalan," constituting a third of the country, the scene of their activities.

We referred to the sympathy poured out on this man for his years of exile in Paris supporting himself in the hard life of a tutor. He was so well known when he arrived in Paris that he was the friend and associate of the wealthy Jew Nacquet and the friend and a leader of the anarchists, extreme socialists and nihilists of that city.<sup>9</sup> How he obtained such an ascendancy over an unmarried woman of middle age named Meunier, who appears to have been a devout

<sup>8</sup> It may be admitted that the system of education for the poorer classes is not successful, but there were difficulties. It was only a year ago that the most intellectual people in the United Kingdom obtained a university to which poor men's sons could go without danger to their faith, but without this the system was needless.

<sup>9</sup> What London used to be Paris now is, the centre of the conspirators of the world. The espionage is undoubtedly a fraudulent pretense when directed against these outlaws.



Catholic, I don't know. But she certainly did not let him starve, for she bequeathed him £32,000, and besides a large sum in trust for Masses. This fact of real life reads like a religious harmony in Eugene Sue's "Wandering Jew" when sentimental piety like distant music relieves the appalled mind as the Jesuit's "Prophet" has just accomplished another villainy.

When we read of the hardships of Senor Ferrer's exile the mind turns to those who have suffered in the cause of liberty and reason against injustice and oppression from the earliest records that are not dedicated to conquerors, such as we have in the Old Testament, such as we have glimpses of in the story of Greece and the story of Rome. For eight hundred years in Ferrer's own country men died, and dying left the immortal legacy of hatred of the invader, until he was driven from the land which he had made a desolation in the days of his fierce strength.

Ferrer returned to Barcelona a few years after his rebellion with the large fortune spoken of; that in trust, added to what was left him by this lady for himself, who, it is only right to assume, would have not left him a farthing of the money for Masses for her soul if she thought it would be dedicated to the Modern School.

In the year 1906 came what the *New York Times'* manifesto describes as "the trumped-up charge of being concerned in a plot to assassinate King Alfonso." The schools were not even then shut up. The horrible instructions went on while he was waiting the result of the prosecution. In the United Kingdom a seditious paper would be suppressed before the trial of its owners and editors for treason. The like justice would be dealt to a seditious club; I take it that "The People's Club" is still rampant in Barcelona, despite Roco's attempt.

I ask why was there not a search for pamphlets and codes of instruction made in the schools? Why were not the male and female teachers examined by what they call judges of instruction in France and police magistrates in Dublin?<sup>10</sup> There seems to have been a paralysis of authority which can only be explained by the dread of the secret society which rules the Latin States by the hands of assassins. I mean to offer a few suggestions with regard to the "trumped-up charge." It will be remembered that the whole English-speaking world was shocked, or at least its newspapers pretended to be shocked, when the attempt by Morral was telegraphed.

In Barcelona, a great commercial centre, the extremes of wealth

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<sup>10</sup> A private inquiry can be held in Ireland when there is an accused person. For a time this could be done even when there was no one accused. At any rate, it was lawful in Spain as in France.

and poverty as represented by capital and labor are in contact. It is no exaggeration to say that Marx's scientific socialism is the undeveloped war against capital there. There is a blood-hunger in that city, easily acted upon from inside. The secret society which is the inspiring spirit of the trained disorder, the disciplined lawlessness of Europe and, I fear, of America can in forty-eight hours decree an insurrection in Barcelona, a murder in Madrid or Lisbon, Paris or Rome—possibly in London and New York. That this is not a secret kept from the authorities in Spain, France and Italy must be the conclusion of every one acquainted with the underground politics of Europe since the Illuminati began the wire-pulling which electrified the world when the French Revolution raged through France and the Continent. One word more. Italy as well as every one of the three hundred States in Germany welcomed the French invaders, and, notwithstanding their excesses, a memory survived through Germany till Bismarck's rise, as though the time of French occupation was that of reason and justice, and through Italy as though the greatness of imperial Rome, coupled with the liberty of Republican Rome, had cast upon the land another hour of the Saturnian age. The secret society which has replaced the cults of the seventeenth century, though in the form of a benevolent association in the English-speaking world, is a different thing in its Belgian focus and among the revolutionists and secularists of France, Spain and Italy. The morbid activity of the Latin mind seems susceptible to the logic of the dagger and the bomb.

It is impossible to suppose that those who put Ferrer on his trial in 1906 for complicity in Morral's attempt to kill the King and Queen, could be ignorant that in his adhesion to the rebellion of 1885, he was under the guidance of the anarchical socialists of Rome and Paris and their agents in Barcelona. When he went to Paris in 1901 he was the friend of Nacquet, the writer of that rather vague and pointless vindication in a number of the *Nineteenth Century* rather ostentatiously referred to in the manifesto of the *New York Times*.<sup>11</sup> Nacquet belonged to the Grand Orient of Paris, of which Ferrer became a member and in which in due course he rose to high rank. If one-tenth of the charges made against the Grand Orient of Brussels be true—and what is true of this section of the secret society would be true of the French and Italian, judged by political results—

<sup>11</sup> W. Wray Shilbeck wrote, as editor of the *Nineteenth Century*, to the man in New York who is apparently the promoter of the Ferrer cult that the "well-known Roman Catholic" writer gave up the idea of replying to Nacquet, because he found there was no case to justify the execution of Ferrer. "The well-known Catholic" writer may be a myth. Only a short time ago the *Nineteenth Century* admitted that an atrocious libel on some nuns was destitute of all foundation, and paid damages and costs by consent.

there would be nothing new in Ferrer's being an accomplice of Moral before the fact, if not the inspirer of his deed.

From a Grand Orient and anarchical point of view much was to be gained by the assassination of the prince whose marriage was so likely to change him from the *roi faincant* existence he was expected to live to that of a King possessing the most kindly and earnest sympathies of the British Empire and with its influence at his back, together with such weight in the two German Empires as his relationship to a sovereign of so beloved a character as Francis Joseph would indubitably confer. He was no longer the helpless head of a discredited branch of the Bourbons; he was likely through his connections to become, and if he had commensurate ability he would become, a ruler strong enough to deal with the propaganda of the Grand Orient in the only effectual manner. With the Philosophical Anarchists, with the Nihilists, with the Socialists, who differ from the others only in name,<sup>12</sup> to think that the marriage of Alfonso would be an obstacle to the accomplishment of their purpose, the dechristianizing of the world and the substitution for existing states of some kind of universal, economic, materialistic commonwealth would be to decree the murder of the young bridegroom, and, as an incident, that of the Queen. They were in the way, that is all. The murderous hands on the royal house of Portugal were set in motion by the same society. These fatal tentacles reach to the extremities of the earth. The most innocent, the most charitable, the most virtuous, be he King or Minister, walks under sentence of death. De Rossi, slain on the steps of his office, was simply sacrificed because Mazzini and his associates wanted a revolution, not a redress, of their supposed grievances.

Looking at Ferrer's antecedents, the conduct of the Spanish Government is unintelligible to the spectator judging by ordinary rules. Making every allowance for the literalness of the doctrinaire of Liberalism, he cannot surely think assassination is included in the rights of man, or the desertion of a wife and the abandonment of children are privileges conferred by a high position in the Grand Orient. I think the most enthusiastic asserter of a man's right to do what he likes will not go the length of Herbert Spencer.<sup>13</sup> I think it would be inconvenient if each one was at liberty to rob, murder or commit adultery. I submit Madame Ferrer had a title to her husband's devotion anterior to and deeper than had the school-mistress he raised to her place. I submit his own children were

<sup>12</sup> No one denies there are Socialists who are the friends of law and order, as there are Freemasons ignorant of the inner councils of their fraternity.

<sup>13</sup> Spencer's philosophy is the gospel of the scientific Socialist—that is, the earlier philosophy.

more entitled to Mademoiselle Meunier's money, or a share of it, than the young ragamuffins of Barcelona. But, in truth, in connection with the man's illicit relations and disregard of elementary family and social duties, we observe even among his respectable English acquaintances such a laxity of opinion that we may pass over the Parisian and Catalanian liberality as of no account.

The man's avowed principles were dangerous to society. Why was he allowed to propagate them among the very persons—boys and girls—in whom they would grow into the terrible harvest of the whirlwind? If one had less experience of the depravity of certain men he might think Ferrer insane when in his school he lectured to children under the name of physical science on the naked facts of animal life and the vicious conclusions of a sociology in accordance with the view that there was no life but the physical. We know that this kind of brutal philosophy was rampant in the eighteenth century in France, but it was confined to the publications read by grown men and women belonging to society. Well, even these saw the outcome of the teaching when they mounted the steps to the guillotine or ate in foreign capitals the bread that is hardest to eat and mounted the stairs the most difficult to climb.

But, at any rate, Ferrer was very far from being afflicted with what we understand as madness. He loved his own safety. That article of war which the old mayor in one of Byron's plays so much approves seemed to have been observed religiously by Ferrer, namely, that which directs the leader to keep out of danger. We saw the same beautiful charity in Mazzini and other chiefs in exile. Ferrer could make money on the Stock Exchange as skillfully as any gambler on the market. Had he exceptional information? He could exercise the influence of friendship over a lady that appeared to be a pious Catholic and who enjoyed very considerable wealth. He could employ a judicious discretion in the application of money left for pious uses as though he were a British judge in equity in the eighteenth century dealing with what they called Popish and superstitious uses.<sup>14</sup>

We have said he was acquitted of complicity with Morral, and, as has been pointed out, he resumed the direction of his schools. In the spring of 1909 he went to London, taking with him one of the schoolmistresses, who was received among the well-to-do, moral people of the London suburb as though she were his wife. This affair is incomprehensible, for the people in Paris or elsewhere

<sup>14</sup> A Madame Meunier left £32,000 to Ferrer and left a large sum for Masses for the repose of her soul. It would appear that the latter was absolutely in Ferrer's discretion, I suppose the only way it could be bequeathed for pious uses in France. There is no doubt but that he appropriated it.

through whom he made acquaintance with the London families must have known, what the police knew, that he had left his wife and family destitute and had taken up this teacher in one of his schools.

Well, "the challenge" to the Church and State school system went on from 1901 to 1909 without his being shot at all, much less shot upon the moment. So much for the honesty of the men behind the manifesto in the *New York Times*. At the same time I cannot sufficiently impress on the reader that his schools would not be allowed to stand for a moment even after this acquittal, say in Berlin or in Amsterdam, of an attempt to kill the sovereigns and their consorts. I have said that in the United Kingdom he would have been put upon his trial for the earlier rebellion, and I can imagine the sense of loyalty and devotion to their Majesties with which the foreman for self and fellows would answer the Clerk of the Crown's or Associate's question: "Have you agreed to your verdict, gentlemen?"

How could these schools be allowed to taint the air in a Christian land? They taught the most debauched and dishonest views concerning conduct and the claims to property. Some of it is familiar enough; we have heard that property is robbery.<sup>15</sup> Why should children be told this at all or at least without explanatory limitations in a town filled with warehouses and private dwellings splendid in their appearance and furnished as wealth could do it? The poor are robbed by the rich.<sup>16</sup> To me it seems that a committee of robbers in the purlieu of a city could not assign as good reasons for burglary or robbery on the highway. This is not all, but I cannot enter on the theories illustrated by himself and one of his female teachers in practice. Now, this is the man whom the world-wide press championed when put upon his trial in 1906. The blindness of owls in daylight was as a penetrating power of vision in comparison with the darkness of the anti-Catholic press of England, the United States and the British colonies. The delicate hand of the Grand Orient supplied "the copy," for capital was great in the society and largely owned the instructors of the people. Capital's possessions escaped in Barcelona in 1909. Why?

I have already adverted to the lightness with which the attempt upon the lives of the King and Queen of Spain passed from memory. If there be any alive who can recollect the Orsini bomb thrown at the carriage of Napoleon III. they must remember it was not even a nine days' wonder. It would not have been this even were it not that Palmerston refused to surrender the Italian refugees on the ground that the offence was a political one, even though the Emperor was cultivating the most friendly relations with the British Govern-

<sup>15</sup> Prudhon.

<sup>16</sup> Mill, Marx, Engel, but Mill refers only to unreformed conditions.

ment. The incident was kept alive for the nine days because all England gloried in the maxim of political immunity asserted by her Foreign Secretary. I care nothing about this, *per se*—I may say that assassination is not a political offense, even though kings and presidents are the victims—but my point is: Why should the execution of Ferrer for a crime of which he was found guilty by a competent tribunal and for which he was executed nearly a year ago be more in the eyes and minds of nations twelve months after his execution than at first, even though then it was echoed and reëchoed by the press of the world? Why should the assassination of an entire royal family fade away in a day or two? an attempt to assassinate a king and queen sink almost without a ripple on the sea? the murder of an empress be a shorter incident of the hour than the announcement of an aeroplane display? the murder of the President of the greatest nation in the world an item for an annual? Is the press manipulated and by what influence? Is it Wall street? the Stock Exchange? the Bourse? or what?

When the Emperor Maximilian was shot in Mexico it was the astonishment of a moment, though the history was the most pathetic since the death of Conradin.<sup>17</sup> The Dreyfus affair was a matter of a half dozen years, notwithstanding the air of unreality about the agitation. The execution of Ferrer exercised the papers and will engage them for Heaven knows how long; the almost total extinction of the House of Braganza was as momentary as a shadow passing over a field in harvest time. This is hardly without cause. Now again, as was pointed out in this REVIEW by another writer, the attack on churches, monasteries and convents was the organized act of men led by a special and intense malignity. That is, as the writer put it, it did not appear to be the mere blind fury of destruction, which takes possession of a mob in a time of great excitement. He was right, for no other kind of property was injured by half-starved workmen in a city of great capitalists.

I am not making this special and ordered malignity an *ex post facto* proof of Ferrer's guilt as an accomplice of Morral's in the material of the trial, but I am distinctly entitled to use it as a retroactive suggestion with regard to an historical probability of his guilt then. I am not relying to any extent on the *prima facie* probability of guilt implied in the accusation, though I think, having regard to all the facts, there is such a probability; but I do say that a man only accused of attempting through another to kill his sovereign and the sovereign's wife, and of having through another killed and grievously wounded many bystanders, should not be made a hero.

<sup>17</sup> The fate of this last of the Hohenstauffens was so like Maximilian's as to seem a precognition.

There is nothing to a man's credit in being charged with a crime even though he be innocent, still less is there when the proof of guilt is lacking in completeness only, and leaves the reputation tarnished by the pregnancy of suspicion.

The manifesto further says: "In 1909 they profited by the mistake [the mistake was having been tried by the regular tribunal in 1906] and had him tried by court-martial. Anonymous depositions were introduced; the witnesses were not cross-examined. Ferrer was not allowed to produce any witnesses in his own behalf and the officer assigned to defend him was permitted only to make a speech in his defense and was arrested and imprisoned for doing even that."

When a country is in a state of rebellion the ordinary courts are suspended; and the trial of rebels, if there be a trial, is by what is called drumhead court-martial. It is quite true that at the time of the trial peace was restored, that is, order was reestablished. It must be borne in mind that Catalonia is so distinct and so isolated a province, so constantly disturbed by insurrection, that it is hardly wrought into the homogeneity of the general government in the same degree as the other provinces.

The insurrection that had taken place there in 1909 was a very strange affair. On other occasions there was some principle of policy or right involved. The Catalonians have even sustained the ambition of a successful native of the province, General Prim, if I mistake not, who rebelled in order to establish a government that would support the grandmother of the present King. If I remember rightly, it has been Carlist more than once and Republican more than once; it has, in fact, veered round to every point of the compass, but always under the influence of some political idea. I am not sure that its Carlism sprang from a sense of the claim of legitimacy as the principle was understood in France and under the name of Jacobitism understood as in Great Britain;<sup>18</sup> I rather think, in fact, that ever since the evil presence of Godoy cast its shadow on the throne of Ferdinand VII<sup>18</sup>, Catalonia tended to republicanism either as an autonomous province of a monarchical state or as an autonomous province of a republican Spain. If I am correct in this resumé, and I think I am, one sees no such influence in the incendiary riots of 1909 and the abortive attempt of Ferrer to induce the local authorities to set up a provisional government.

After order was restored Ferrer fled. Numbers were in prison, arrested during the riots of the 26th, 27th and 28th of July. It would strike one that if he were acting like a good citizen he should

<sup>18</sup> The Irish, though Jacobites of an intensely devoted character, were attached to the Stuarts as the representatives of freedom of religion and Home Rule in the sense of the great Parliament of 1689, very much like the Home Rule of Grattan's Constitution.

be aiding the authorities by his counsel, that he would be amongst them and be seen with the officers and be recognized by the common soldiers as a friend of law and order. He was the head of schools in which there were two thousand pupils; and he was a man of wealth even in that city of great merchants and rich Jewish money-lenders.

It must be asked why he left London for Barcelona so hurriedly as to be compelled to cancel several engagements in the former city. I have no doubt that he was in correspondence with people in Barcelona; and was kept well posted with regard to the movement in opposition to sending additional troops to Africa which was agitating all Spain. Whether the opposition to the object of the war was right or wrong is immaterial, because the whole country after the first reverses accepted it and united in condemnation of the excesses in Barcelona. I am not aware that any placards were posted up in this city charging the Government with sacrificing the troops for the benefit of a few mine owners. You would expect such placards. But, as I say, when support of the policy of the Government became universal, Barcelona was collecting petroleum and arms, meeting after working hours in bye streets and admiring Ferrer's schools in the full flush of their activity.<sup>19</sup> At any rate, the opposition there to the war was not because it was sacrificing the recruits for a few rich men.

I have pointed out under the circumstances that a court-martial was the only mode of trial possible, unless he was removed from the province, a proceeding which would be ground for complaint as arguing a determination to convict him if it were at all legal. The *locus in quo* of the rebellion is the natural jurisdiction and the convenient one. Every advantage from character is there. His benefactions to the starving poor, his aids to charitable institutions, his largesses to his pensioners, his free schools and free food and clothing to the pupils, the example he set of domestic virtue shown by reverence to his wife and the way he assisted her in administering the moralities of the parental board, his solicitude about his children in early youth and his open hand in launching them on the road to fortune, it was in the local venue such things could be enthusiastically told. But the manifesto informs us he would not be allowed to examine a witness.

Well, he could have examined witnesses if he dared, but any one except a fool would have known that his doing so would only be riveting the chain more closely, making the case of the prosecution

<sup>19</sup> In writing at another time, he speaks of his schools as empty, but the ground of his claim in one respect, at least, to public sympathy is that in the short time of nine years he had two thousand pupils, and this argues a great success against the State.



stronger. Had he called witnesses he would have revealed why he had left London in such a hurry and much more. In fact, the place was simply overrun by the agents of the secret society, who threatened the witnesses for the prosecution with Russian methods as the witness Domenech was threatened; and therefore ample protection would be had for his witnesses. An infamous man, red from scenes of riot and murder, whose life had been a varied and unresisting violation of all the laws by which States are sustained and families reared for the observance of moral, social and religious duties, could hardly call witnesses to swear to the blamelessness of his conduct. It was in his power when contradicting a witness who swore to his presence among the agitated groups when arms were being distributed among the people to say where he was at the time, if not where the witness swore he saw him, and the Court would be only too happy to send for a witness to the alibi. He was in hiding for a month; I submit he could have escaped as easily as in 1885, but I suggest that an overweening confidence in the power of the *imperium in imperio* which had taken him out of danger in 1906 and which subdued France when Dreyfus was released in spite of sentence<sup>20</sup> may have kept him waiting in the place until he could boldly return to his teaching and the resumption of his correspondence with the Grand Orient and the assassins of Europe.

The civilized world, as we call it, that is, the realms east of the Vistula and north of the Mediterranean, is infested by learned criminals, dabblers in physical science and a study of intellectual adventure called sociology. Ferrer was one of those, and the man Crippen who came nearest to him in newspaper interest in these late weeks would seem to be another. At any rate, Ferrer's admirers lay such stress upon the method of "The Modern School" that I notice this method as totally unfit in the least objectionable part of its application for young boys and girls. A Marx, a Haeckel, an Engel and an Anatole France cannot advance any science, moral or mental, for this reason, that established facts stand in their minds as ideas indistinguishable from hypotheses possibly incapable of verification, but these men are pillars of the Modern School. For instance, such an idea as that there can be no progress unless the institutions of law, police and legislation are flung into the melting pot for a new birth is not exactly the dictum that young boys and

<sup>20</sup> Why honorable men high in the service should lend themselves to the manufacture of evidence against an obscure officer I cannot think. The dossier and bordereau passed at first. There is a mystery in this matter that time may make clear. That there was jugglery with those documents I consider probable. Suicide and disgrace show there was something of the sort, but I am not convinced the court-martial was wrong—the impeached documents could be left out—neither did the Court of Cassation reverse its judgment, only its sentence on Dreyfus.

girls might grasp as an universal, although they might, if directed, realize the satisfaction that a law against theft could for them be profitably abolished, a particular policeman taken off the beat or a particular criminal justice compelled, as King Lear suggests in the sociological inspiration of his insanity, to change places with the man before him in the dock. A word before I pass from this point.

Even in the most advanced class of public school, the school that covers the humanities of an university and a good part of its exact and physical science, the pupils may readily enough confound the value of ascertained results and ingenious speculations. This, I submit, is very likely to be the case in the philosophy of history, which is in reality, as I long ago pointed out, the sociology of the past untrameled by the comparative statistics which cause so much confusion in our judgment of the very time in which we live. To estimate a period and its capabilities the factors must be numerous, like those that go to form individual character and its presage, but infinitely more complicated.

In Ferrer's school kings might be necessarily a persistent evil, because Spain has been falling into decay and has been left behind in the race of prosperity and progress ever since her rulers overcame the elements of conflict which compelled them to be men and not kings merely. This is the very thing the man in the street would say now; and not only the man in the street. But think of all it means, the interaction of a thousand influences, moral, political, religious, geographical, educational, racial. All these forces springing from the soil of the country and the soil of the national heart are concrete in the king and the great fact he symbolizes, namely, the march of mankind from the troglodyte with his sling looking from Pyrenean heights for the goat that was to feed and clothe him to the Carthaginian with his masses of men, his elephants, his wagons, his horses, forcing his way toward the Massilian bay round which he was to pass on his way to Rome—to Philip in the great and gloomy palace of the Gridiron dreaming of an empire over two hemispheres, and so on through cycles of change. But this is barely the surface-corner of the mighty thought which Ferrer and his like disfigure for the misleading of the young.

Beneath the underlying facts of progress is a bedrock of moral and physical fact to which we never can descend if led by the *ignis fatuus* of the speculative mind. Yet if it could be reached what possibilities might be discovered! the potentialities of genius and the limits of genius, so exquisitely presented in the Psalm that tells us that man is lesser than the angels, yet lord of the moral and material universe. These ideas would be called mediaeval by persons who make man a sociological monkey, who has given up arboreal

habits and taken to bomb-throwing and fire-raising as the latest steps of the onward. In fact, according to the manifesto, a glory immortalizing Ferrer is his fight against mediaevalism and the conventional restraints imposed by it.

Though I fear I have exceeded my fair claim to space, I must say a closing word on the evidence. More than fifty witnesses were examined and openly, except a few whose dread of the Secret Society's violence was the horror of a nightmare. One can understand this kind of feeling; it is in effect as appalling as the shock from an explosion which has scattered death around or from the consequences of hunger and exposure for days such as we read of in the case of derelict boats or crews that for too long a time remained outside the line of passing ships. Is there no fear of giving testimony in parts of the United States? Why, in England witnesses not long ago had to be protected, witnesses for the defense even; I mean within a year or two ago. In Ferrer's case the witnesses for the defense had the shield of the society which, I suggest, overawed the ordinary Court in 1906 and the Government as well.<sup>21</sup>

I referred to the testimony of one Domenech<sup>21</sup> who, though threatened, gave it publicly. It proved, if believed, that Ferrer had given a false account of how he spent the evening of the 26th, the day of the 27th, the day of the 28th of July. Peace was restored the 29th. Domenech was one of the conspirators, but then he was corroborated in every particular he had deposed to by more than one credible witness to each separate fact, but all witnesses to the entire.

First, I take Ferrer's account of his doings as taken down during the examinations of witnesses by way of testing their statements or volunteered and sworn to by him. He saw something like excitement on the streets on the evening of the 26th; he went to the railway station to go to his home in a suburb, but found that the railway service had failed. He had to proceed on foot and arrived at a late hour of the night. As a matter of fact, he did not arrive until the morning of the 27th, for he could not on the other evidence.

Domenech's testimony is that he accompanied Ferrer on the 26th of July from the Hotel International at 9.30 P. M., that they went to two centres where the revolt was being organized and the mode of working it discussed. As though he was suspected, one of those counselling said significantly they dealt with traitors by Russian methods.

The difference between Domenech's testimony and Ferrer's story

<sup>21</sup> When I submitted that the anarchists should give that tribunal credit for exceptional liberality to the defense, I meant it as a retort to them for contrasting the result before it to that before the court-martial. It was giving the accused the benefit of the doubt, like a Scotch "not proven."

as appearing in interlocutories or formal narrative on oath is so great that one or other is absolutely false or both false. Ferrer leads the Court to suppose that he went home from the railway station, but we find Domenech corroborated by a detective who saw Ferrer moving about among the gathering crowds and then proceeding to the International. This would be before 9.30 in the evening and after going to the railway station.

A soldier swears that on that evening he tried to seduce him from his allegiance. Ferrer cross-examined him, beginning by denying that he had ever been at the place of the alleged meeting with the soldier at all. The soldier was unshaken, then Ferrer remembered he had been there, that there was some such conversation, but that the witness mistook his meaning. He was seen active among the crowds by another witness. Another saw him leading a crowd of rioters as the evening advanced; two witnesses swore he gave them arms. In passing I may observe that witnesses swore they saw persons going round with petroleum and directing what was to be done with it. This is the very condensed transcript of a mere summary of Mr. Belloc's in the January number of the *Dublin Review*; but it is conclusive. I reserve for closing the evidence of the Mayor of Premia, confirmed by all the official persons on the afternoon of the 28th, when it seemed, as the rebels were in possession of the town, that the insurrection would be successful.

On the 28th, despite his statement that he remained at home "from the evening" of the 26th until the 29th, we find Ferrer in Premia on the 28th. I pause for a moment to remind the reader that "the late hour" of the 26th when he got home was in reality an early hour of the 27th. He dined at the Hotel International, and, as Domenech swears, they left it at 9.30. Even then if he had gone straight home I apprehend he could have reached it in a short time, for I do not think a man dining in the evening at an hotel with the intention of walking after dinner would select one at a long distance from his home. The name of the International may suggest a reason for the selection, but the interval between 9.30 and "the late hour" is filled in by the activities sworn to by so many witnesses in which he was engaged. The detective lost trace of him after he left the hotel, and was unable to learn whether or not he was expected to sleep there; but he must have been directed to shadow him, for there could be no other reason for the pursuit and going back to the hotel.

These are more or less small particulars mingled with grave ones, but they go to Ferrer's "credit," as lawyers would say. He implies that he went home because the streets were crowded with excited groups; disappointed at the railway station he walks home. *Aliunde* we have it that his dress was noticed by witnesses who did not know

him, but who described it so accurately that he was traced by it by witnesses who identified him at the trial after a month. He was clearly a prominent figure. All this, I should say, was likely to have occurred before his dinner; but the important point is that later on he was seen here and there among the groups, advising, encouraging and arming them, instead of leaving the town in the evening like a respectable man of cautious temperament who was afraid of excited mobs. Ferrer squeamish about mobs!

He is seen then by nineteen witnesses at Premia on the 28th. In the flush of triumph he asks the Mayor to proclaim a provisional government. He is heard making this demand by all the official witnesses in the place. This the Mayor refuses to do. There is an altercation at the trial between him and the Mayor. The matter is too clear, but he denies that he made the demand, after being beaten bit by bit from his position that he had not left his own residence from the evening of the 26th. The Mayor closes the controversy by saying that a man would deny anything who denies this. No case could be more complete.<sup>22</sup>

I declare solemnly that the power which shut out all this matter from the press while endeavoring to fill Europe and America with the idea that Ferrer had been shot on the testimony of nameless witnesses, that he was allowed no right of cross-examination and refused any advocate save an officer, was the power that silenced the press for days with regard to the destruction of religious houses and the outrages and insults offered to religious men and women and to the dead in monastic, conventual and parish church graveyards. The power that muzzled the press must be that which controlled the petroleum fires and the looting of the religious houses and the libraries of European reputation. No property was injured save church property in a city where workingmen borrow from Jews rich beyond the dreams of avarice and maintain by their labor the palaces of business men said to be in a manner magnificent as those of the merchant princes in the great days of Venice.

If this be the case, if capital be above religion, patriotism and law, one must look forward to a new irruption of a yet unimagined race of Barbarians more terrible than that which at the end of twelve centuries walked through the desolated fields and over the fallen cities of the Western Empire.

GEORGE McDERMOT, C. S. P.

San Francisco.

<sup>22</sup> The Mayor was Mayor of the village of Premia, at the head of the maritime road, which would be a strategic position if the provisional government were proclaimed. This fits into the attempt to wreck the monarchy by Morral's bomb so exactly that Alfonso's refusal of the Holy Father's intercession is accounted for.

## THE NEED FOR CATHOLIC HISTORY.

THESE is, or rather has been, a spirit abroad observable in almost every department of human learning, which is very difficult to define and for which we have certainly as yet no name. Just as feudalism was only called feudalism long after it was dead, while the men who lived under its influence simply took it for granted, and we have to guess from their acts what their inner bias really was, so for this spirit which runs, or rather has recently run through the whole of modern learning, we have no name, we are still so steeped in it that we can with difficulty analyze its process or define its elements of weakness and falsity, though with every passing year we increasingly feel those elements to be present.

In the place of name or definition let us consider a few of the undoubted effects of this spirit and a few of its undoubted and most evident manifestations. There is first of all the exaggeration of authority.

The modern reader has heard that word "authority" so often misused and so much more often assailed by the very spirit of which I speak, he has so often been warned by Catholic criticism that the disease of our time is the contempt for authority, that he will perhaps rub his eyes on reading such a sentence and be on his guard against so foolish and superficial a paradox. I am guilty of no such petty literary trick as paradox in writing the above phrase. The prime note of the spirit of which I speak is most distinctly the exaggeration of authority, and, coupled with that exaggeration, what commonly appears in the exaggeration of anything: false use. Authority—intellectual authority—which this spirit has exaggerated, has alas! been put by it to a false use. The Catholic Church has always and most rightly insisted that the bases of final intellectual action, quite as much as those of just moral action, must ultimately be referable to authority; and it is perfectly true that the modern spirit of which she very properly complains has a contempt for authority in its strict and only natural sense. None the less or rather because of that contempt does that modern spirit of which I speak exaggerate authority, and in exaggerating falsify it. Let me define what I mean by that exaggeration and to give examples of it.

It will everywhere be observed, but nowhere more than in the two provinces of physical science and of history, that the modern reader is treated to affirmation rather than to proof. It is true that the extension of learning makes the elements of a proof often more difficult of attainment by the general reader than they were, and that the extension of the numbers of those who would learn makes the common

acceptance of a piece of proof more difficult still. But these difficulties are but concomitants, which permit the charlatanism of false authority to work unhindered; they are not in themselves the causes of the abuse. The causes of the abuse are deeper and are moral causes. Consider certain effects of this abuse of authority. Any hypothesis which reasonably explained some set of observed phenomena, and which had been provisionally accepted by "scientists," is or was until recently universally put forward before the vulgar, not as an hypothesis, but as an ascertained fact. The masses of men who had received superficial instruction in physical science (for instance) held as gospel that the hypothetical "atom" of chemistry was something actually existing, evident to the senses, and also something eternal and unchangeable. They firmly believed that the sun was slowly cooling; that lines of volcanoes represented lines of fissure in the "crust" of the earth; that volcanic activity acted as a safety valve for the "molten interior" of the globe, and so forth.

You have or had the same thing in history. A mass of European institutions were ascribed by the dominant school (wholly upon hypothesis) to German barbarism, but this purely hypothetical origin was not taught as an hypothesis; it was taught as an historic fact. Again, the decline of the Roman Empire in material things was connected with the advance of the Catholic Church; there was no attempt to establish a chain of cause and effect, and the mass of readers (who had no opportunity of discovering by direct reading how much more luminous, universal and clear, not to speak of its vast extension, philosophy became as the Catholic Church advanced) were told upon *authority* that the process of thought leading from Cicero to St. Augustine was a process of decline.

Innumerable examples might be cited: the evolutionary hypothesis for instance in that form which all specialists, or very nearly all specialists, now admit to be exploded, was taught to the masses as immutable and irrefutable truth. The Church in defining her authority to teach us transcendental truths has always pointed out that, by the very nature of such truths, they could not be known save through such an authority as she claims, and, but for revelation, could not be known at all. In these affairs of physical science no such necessity was present; the simplest mind could easily have grasped if all the main facts had been put before the public in their due proportion: the plain man was quite competent to decide these on the full evidence; but he was not given the full evidence: the evidence was selected and distorted in favor of a particular scientific bias, and against all doubts or questioning, was set up nothing more than the authority of certain names and their repeated appearance in the press. Thus a whole generation believed that organic forms had proceeded

from a common type by infinitely small gradations. There was no proof of so monstrous an hypothesis; it was all a draft upon future evidence, and under the action of research the Darwinian contention has wholly broken down. But, I repeat, a whole generation believed it unquestioningly: they believed it not because they had read and weighed the evidence, but because the human mind has an appetite for authority, and in this case accepted authority in a sphere where it had no claim.

The same sort of thing was apparent in English economics with their orthodox free trade school; it was apparent in the monometalic theory of the same generation (to quote but one small department of enquiry); one saw it in the conventional history which was taught for too long in the primary schools of France, and one sees it in the conventional history that is still taught so very insufficiently by the universities of England.

Side by side with this abuse and exaggeration of the principle of authority—this postulating of an authority that was no authority at all, but merely notoriety—went something cognate to it and proceeding from the same root, something if possible more immoral and more abusive of the human intellect. This was the deliberate suppression of evidence.

In the field of the evolutionary hypothesis just quoted, for example, the pedigree of the horse was perpetually cited as a paradigm. How many textbooks have not included some such sentence as this: "We have a beautiful example in the descent of the horse," etc., etc. Now three facts of capital importance were suppressed when this popular example of the Darwinian theory was put forward: first, that there was no true unity of type; the pedigree in no way corresponds throughout with what we call a horse; secondly, there was no unity of locality—the development was sporadic; and, thirdly, that the pedigree, even if true, was *not* an "example" out of many—it was unique. One of the links in the pedigree is based upon a very small animal, another upon an animal many of whose characteristics were not those of a horse. Secondly, the examples are taken from very different spots, none of one type being found on the American Continent and none of another on the European. Thirdly, the most important point of all, the horse is the *only* full example out of myriads which the apologist can put forward; but the general reader was not informed of these three things; he was given a piece of special pleading, and he was given it in the guise of an impartial statement.

You have just the same thing in the history which is written under the same bias. You are told everything that can support the anti-Catholic and what may be called the anti-traditional position; you are



not told what can support it. The harsh treatment of the Jewish usurers in the thirteenth century and at the end of the twelfth is an unflinching theme; but their immense (and ill-gotten) wealth in the preceding generation, their continual interference with their poorer fellow-citizens during the period of their dominance, their activity and strenuous opposition to the European civilization around them, is omitted. The non-Roman origins, legendary and not provable, but probable, of the house of Wessex is an untiring subject; its devotion to the Church is forgotten.

Yet another characteristic attaches to this school, and one that we should expect from the manifestations of its spirit which have just been mentioned. It refuses to meet criticism with criticism, or fact with fact. It has attempted to meet that reaction against its falsehood which is now rapidly gathering strength by nothing better than ridicule or silence. The present writer, for instance, alluded in an historical work to the descent of Charlemagne from the old Gallo-Roman nobility and his headship of the Roman family of Ferreolus of Narbonne. He was taken to task by the *Nation*, an academic newspaper of distinction in this country, for making an "amazing" statement. All French scholars are, of course, aware of Fustel de Coulange's great work, and the descent of Charlemagne is now a fixed and proved matter. Yet in the world that is still steeped in the authority of the German school an illusion to so trite a piece of information is treated as "amazing." When full proofs were furnished to the newspaper in question, those proofs were indeed printed, but no further discussion upon the matter took place. This is but a small example, and it is only given here because it has fallen within the author's private and personal experience; but the same kind of thing is going on everywhere as the reaction against the school of learning to which I have alluded proceeds. The new facts and the new criticism are not met: they are denied or ignored; and this attitude is particularly conspicuous in the field of early Church history, where recent research makes steadily and increasingly for the Catholic position and against the guess-work of the German schools.

Now the conclusion to which one is led when one considers this spirit is bias and its falsity, but especially when one considers its former power over the learned and its still almost universal grip of the half learned mind, is that Catholics in particular, whose creed and tradition is consciously or unconsciously the object of attack, should possess themselves as soon as may be of a *standard history* that will give them a due perspective of the European story: it is more important to be fixed in a just perspective of history than of physics, just as it is more important to be a good man than a healthy one.

History is the object lesson and the guide of politics, and if your history is false in tone, your civics will follow suit. There is no department of human learning where a false (not a legendary) spirit does more harm.

We already have, indeed, a great mass of work dealing with particular points directly connected with quarrels attaching to the Catholic faith. The Anglican community business has been thoroughly dealt with; the Galileo fable is, for us at least, exploded; we can discover the truth from our own authorities about the dissolution of the monasteries, about the quarrel with Thomas a'Becket, about the rise and historical nature of the Papacy, the early sources and original establishment of episcopacy, and so forth. We have upon these and a hundred other matters which concern us particularly excellent monographs and an increasing body of research. But what we have not got is a standard history, or a series of standard histories, which shall give the young student and the general reader a true view of Europe and of its development.

Europe and its development are a Catholic thing. The strongest unbeliever interested in historical truth—an Asiatic student, let us say, or any one remotely removed from the quarrels of Europeans—would at once recognize that whether its divine claims were true or false, the Catholic faith was the formative soul of European civilization. He would see that wherever it was preserved, there the European tradition in art, law, marriage, property, everything, was preserved also. He would perceive as a Catholic phenomenon the stupendous revolution whereby the mass of Roman slaves developed first into serfs possessed of land and capital, next into men economically free, and next into independent citizens, politically free as well, and lastly into the units of conscious democracies.

He would grasp the significance of the fact that the reaction towards servile conditions which we term "Capitalism," or "the industrial system," arose in societies which had lost the faith, first flourished there, was resisted in those which had kept the faith, and will never be permitted in these to achieve its full purpose of human degradation. There is no aspect of the European story which cannot be set in terms of our European religion, the religion and the philosophy that have made us. Yet that minority of Catholics who speak the English language have not as yet in the English tongue a literature which can make them familiar with these general truths. It is the gravest possible lacuna in our general intellectual equipment: it is one which we should as soon as possible attempt to fill.

H. BELLOC.

London, England.

BISHOP NICOLSON'S VISITATION OF THE HIGHLANDS  
IN 1700.

THE so-called Reformation, which was established by law in Scotland in 1560, did not affect the Highlands till many years later. The ministers being at first few in number, established themselves in the more desirable districts, whilst on the other hand some of the priests of the old order administered the rites of religion to the people until about the year 1600. It was the want of missionaries and of priests in the Highlands that was the principal cause of the decadence of the old faith, for the priests having died off, the missionaries from the colleges abroad not knowing the Gaelic language, and there being no Bishop to see that priests were provided, the people fell little by little into a cessation of religion as it might be called. The people of the Highlands and islands were in ignorance rather than in heresy, to which they were naturally averse, both from the attachment they feel for all that is ancient and from the dislike they have for all that is novel.

A very important step towards the improvement of the Catholic religion in the Highlands was taken in 1677, when Mr. Alexander Leslie was appointed visitor and was ordered to send to Rome a full report of the number of Catholics and of their needs. Mr. Leslie estimated the number of Catholics in the Highlands at 12,000, with three or four priests, all of them except one from Ireland. From other sources we know these priests to have been Fathers Francis White, George Fanning, Francis Macdonell and Robert Munro.

Another great step in advance was made in 1694, when the first Vicar Apostolic was appointed in the person of Bishop Nicolson. As has so often happened in the history of the Church, men of remarkable ability have been found for posts which appear to have been called into existence at the very moment when these men were at hand to fill them. Such a man was Bishop Thomas Nicolson; such also was Bishop James Gordon, his coadjutor and later his successor.

Bishop Nicolson's episcopate began with trouble. Consecrated in 1695, he was delayed a year and a half in Holland waiting for a favorable opportunity of crossing to England. At last he arrived in London in November, 1696, only to be cast into prison, where he was detained for six months. In July, 1697, he arrived in Edinburgh and undertook the duties of his office. In September of that year he wrote to Propaganda: "I have not yet been able to visit the Highland districts, where I fear the labourers are few and the harvest abundant. . . . An attempt was lately made to estab-

lish schools in the Highlands, but less successfully than we anticipated, for the whole of that country is full of garrisons, and the missionaries are not permitted to live in one place, which is greatly to our disadvantage. Experience has taught us that in certain districts of the North, where the protection of a great noble or a less hostile attitude on the part of the people have made it possible for priests to reside, matters go much better, for every day a certain number are reconciled to the Church."

In the year 1699 Bishop Nicolson commenced his visitation of the Highlands and in 1700 he completed it. Two almost identical accounts of it exist, the one in French and the other in Italian, both evidently prepared by the secretary and companion of the Bishop and under his orders; they form, in fact, the official report of the visitation.

After stating that many most ancient customs survive amongst the Highlanders, who are divided into clans, each under its chief, the report says: "They have a great care of their genealogies, and the Lairds have genealogists from father to son, who write what concerns the clan. They are much given to follow the military profession; their character, the roughness of their land and their manner of life render them well suited to it. There is not the humblest peasant but has his sword, his musket, his targe and a large dirk, which is always to be seen hanging at his side. Besides these arms the gentry use helmets and breastplates. By nature they are of very lively spirits and they are wonderfully successful when they have a little education. Even the common people seem to be far more open and confiding than those of the Lowlands. Indeed, what makes them seem to be less so, when they first come amongst strangers, is their want of experience and their ignorance of a language and of customs different to their own.

"It is not my place," says the writer of the report, "to describe here all those customs of theirs which are different from ours, consisting as they do in their manner of life, of dress, etc. Suffice it to say that they are very coarse feeders, never eat more than twice at most in the day, use over their short dress a plaid which also serves them as a covering at night, whilst their bedding is very hard. This, however, does not apply to persons of rank, who in their food and clothing often enough follow the customs of civilized countries. Nor does it apply to the islesmen, who dress in the manner of the Lowlanders when they are at home, but when they go out on any expedition they wear Highland dress. The costume of the women seems to us more extraordinary, for they wear the plaid girdled like the men except that the plaid descends to the ground and is fastened in front of the breast with a brooch of copper."

The report then repeats the statement regarding the attachment of the Highlanders to their ancient customs and their dislike of novelties. The arable land is said to be of small extent, but to give a good return, and that with little labor. Snow lies but a short time in the seaboard districts and in the isles. The horses and the flocks, which are very numerous, are outside all the winter, exposed to the weather night and day. Stables and byres they have none, except the gentry, who have stables for their saddle horses. It continues: "All these districts are very difficult to reach except by sea, on account of the mountains and rocks which surround them. It is only strangers, however, and those unaccustomed to the hills who have any great difficulty in traveling through them, for the inhabitants themselves have little difficulty. It is an extraordinary thing that they prefer to go forty miles, for example, always climbing up and down, and are less tired thus than if they had to go the same distance on a level road, where there was neither hill nor dale."

The following are mentioned as the districts where there are most Catholics: Strathglass, Glengarry, Knoydart, Morar, Arisaig and Moydart, with the islands of Uist, Barra, Canna, Eigg and Rum. In the previous year the Bishop had visited Strathglass, twenty miles beyond Inverness, and had there confirmed the majority of the people. Since then he had sent word to the missionaries in the other Highland districts and in the isles to prepare their people for his arrival this year.

"We started from the Enzie, in Banffshire, 24th May, 1700, going by boat in order to attract less notice, and to avoid passing through Moray and Inverness. There was a strong wind in our favour, so that we soon covered the sixty miles; but as the tide, which is very strong here, was against us, we were terribly tossed about between the force of the wind and of the tide and were in great danger. At midnight we arrived at a friendly house, the Castle of Lovat, six miles from Inverness. The next day the Bishop, who had been very seasick, took a rest, and I went into the town to call upon an excellent lady, the widow of the late Lord Macdonald. This nobleman had contributed more than any one else to bring back the Highlands and islands to the faith, being, as he was, one of the most important men in the Highlands and full of zeal. Close to Lovat and on the banks of the river is Beaulieu Abbey, of which the abbot's house is almost entire, along with the ruins of the cloister and a rather fine church."

On May 27 the Bishop and his party arrived in Strathglass, which is described as twelve miles from Lovat. He greatly admired the valley of the Glass river, one of the most beautiful in all Scotland, with its fine arable land along the riverside and the wooded hills

rising on each side. Timber was then in such abundance that all the houses were built of it. "They are called Creil houses, because the larger timbers are interlaced with wickerwork in the same way that baskets are made. They are covered outside with sods or divets. All the houses on the mainland, where we have been, are built after this fashion, except those of the lairds and principal proprietors. Strathglass is partly inhabited by Frasers, whose chief is Lord Lovat, and partly by Chisholms, under the Laird of Strathglass. These latter are all Catholics. The usual visitation was made here and those were confirmed who had not been last year."

It was on leaving Strathglass that the party began to feel that they were really in the Highlands owing to the difficulties of the road. They knew that there was a good road from Inverness through the Great Glen to Invergarry, and from thence to Loch Arkaig and Arisaig; but this they dared not take, because there were no less than five garrisons posted along it to keep the Highlanders in subjection. It was, moreover, just the time when Parliament was assembling and when the ministers, who for some time past had not ceased to excite the authorities against the Catholic religion, had compiled lists of the names of the priests for presentation to Parliament, which was expected to order a violent persecution. In consequence of this the Bishop felt that he should endeavor to gain the outer isles as soon as possible, avoiding the high roads in order that his journey might cause no alarm. The result was that after leaving Strathglass they had to cross some fearful hills without ever seeing any trace of a road, and this during four days; two were needed to go from Strathglass to the Braes of Glengarry and two more from there to Knoydart.

The distance from Strathglass to Glengarry they calculated at twenty-three miles, but each of these they thought was as bad as a league and more. They had horses to carry the baggage, but the Bishop was obliged to go on foot most of the time, especially amongst the rocks and boulders, where it was often necessary to creep on hands and feet, and in the swamps, which were almost continuous. The account goes on: "Our ordinary lodgings on the journey were the shielings or little cabins of earth four or five feet broad and six feet long, into which one enters by crouching on the ground, nor can one stand upright when arrived inside. These shielings the Highlanders use as a shelter in the hills and forests, where they pasture their flocks, as also to store their dairy produce. In the Braes of Glengarry we were met by some gentlemen of the district, a few of whom were confirmed as secretly as possible because the garrison, which occupied the castle of the chief, was not far off."

The Bishop only stayed one day in Glengarry, leaving word with

the priest to have the people ready against his return. This he was obliged to do in the other districts also that he traversed, for he was in a great hurry to reach the isles as soon as possible. He had been informed that the seas which he had to cross were very dangerous, and indeed even to-day, with a good steamboat service, the journey is not lightly to be undertaken. The description of the seas is quite accurate: "We knew that they were very dangerous, not only because they form part of the vast ocean, but more especially because of the different currents, several of which one sometimes encounters at the same time, each contrary to the other, and these beat up against one another with tremendous force. It is thus only during three months of the year that one can cross to these distant islands in safety in the open boats, which are the only ones they have in that country."

To reach Knoydart from Glengarry the party had to cross a most difficult mountain, where it took them five or six hours to do the last mile. On this occasion the Bishop told his companions as they were going along that although he had crossed and recrossed the Alps, he had never experienced anything like the difficulties of this journey. On the second day towards evening they reached Loch Hourn, quite tired out, and were greatly disappointed to find there nothing but an old shieling almost falling to pieces and green grass to lie on.

Loch Hourn is described as an arm of the sea which stretches fifteen or sixteen miles inland and separates Glenelg from Knoydart. Boats came here from all parts for the herring fishing, and it was here that Mr. White, a well-known missionary of the previous generation, had brought back an abundance of fish by blessing the Loch with holy water. Great was the surprise of the Protestants who were present in their fishing boats and who, after a long dearth of fish, experienced the good effects of the blessing.

The following day our travelers went seven miles down the loch and were met by Lord Macdonell, who conducted them with great civility to the house of one of his vassals in Knoydart, where "we had the ordinary prayers," evidently an obscure manner of speaking of Mass, for the report goes on to say that on the 9th, the feast of St. Columba, they again had the ordinary prayers, with Confirmation afterwards, "and this we did wherever we went." Before leaving Knoydart they paid a visit to the old laird, who was nearly ninety-five years of age. He had greatly distinguished himself in the wars of Montrose, and being cousin to Lord Macdonell, had succeeded him in all his property. The fine old soldier received the Bishop with the greatest respect and forced him to stay some days in his house, where about forty persons were confirmed, the rest being put off until the return of the Bishop from the isles. "On the 23d,"

says the report, "we arrived at Eilean Ban, on Loch Morar. This is a fresh water loch, fourteen miles long, having the district of Morar-mhic-Alasdair on the north and that of Morar-mhic-Dughail on the south. Here, after consulting with Mr. Cahassy, whose infirm state of health obliged him to stay on this island, with Mr. Rattray and some other priest, the Bishop sent all of them back to their own districts except Mr. Morgan and Mr. Maclellan, whom he decided to take with him to the isles to serve as interpreter and to help in the functions."

The island on Loch Morar and the loch itself are of very great interest for many reasons. The loch, though only half a mile from the sea, has the extraordinary depth of 1,017 feet, a greater depth than exists anywhere in the German Ocean. The picturesque little island was later the site of a Catholic seminary, whilst in 1746 the celebrated Simon, Lord Lovat, was there captured and led off to his trial in London.

But to return to our travelers. On the 15th of June they went to Keppoch, in Arisaig, where at that time there was the Catholic school. Arisaig is described as less hilly and more pleasant than Knoydart, Morar or Moydart, which are all much the same in regard to rocks and mountains, whilst Arisaig is much more level and abounds in corn. The chief of Clanranald, being by chance on the mainland, came to receive the Bishop with great kindness and courtesy and placed at his disposal one of his boats, with his best sailors to take him wherever he wished in the isles.

The following archæological notes had best be given in the words of the report. Kilmarui (*i. e.*, the Cell or Church of St. Malrubber) is close to Keppoch, in Arisaig. In this chapel there are several tombs of a hard bluish stone, on which there are some ancient figures very well carved, but without inscription for the most part. One would not have thought that the people of these countries had as much skill in sculpture as these tombs show them to have had. There are some on which a priest, wearing the ancient form of chasuble, is engraved; others have only figures of arms, such as large swords, or else figures of birds and other animals. There are similar tombs on Eilean Finnan (where the lairds of Moydart are buried), in Eigg, in Uist, Barra and in several other islands off the north of Scotland. In this respect Icolmkill, anciently called Hy, is very noteworthy. Here was the celebrated abbey of which Bede speaks in several places, founded by St. Columba, abbot and doctor and apostle of part of Scotland. This abbey was held in the greatest veneration until the so-called Reformation, when it was pillaged and destroyed. The tombs of the ancient Kings of Scotland and of all the chief families in the Highlands were here, and the Highlanders



think with considerable probability that after the decadence of religion, when the abbey had been profaned and ruined, the chiefs each brought back to the churches on their own lands some of the tombs of their forefathers. I also saw two stone crosses well carved with strange figures; one is in the cemetery of St. Columba, in the Isle of Canna, and the other at Kilcohan (*i. e.*, Church of St. Colgan), in Knoydart, where is the burial place of the lairds of that country.

On June 18 the party embarked at two o'clock in the morning. The wind was not in their favor, yet by use of oars they gained the Isle of Eigg towards the middle of the day. "This is a small island, which yields a fair quantity of grain and has excellent pasturage, though it is only three miles long. Of the inhabitants, all of whom are Catholics, 140 were confirmed. The houses of this and, indeed, of all the other islands are not constructed of wood, like those of the mainland (for in the isles there is no wood except what has been imported), but the walls are extremely thick. The two faces of the wall are of stone and the space between is filled in with earth in the manner of an embankment or rampart against the cold winds which blow from the ocean in winter. By order of the chief of Clanranald we were treated with great civility by his factor or deputy, a very intelligent man."

Next are described the atrocities committed by the captain of a man-of-war named Porringer, who had been sent to the isles to harry the coast and draw the men back from following the royal army. This recalls to mind the terrible fate that befell the inhabitants of this island years before, when they were almost all suffocated in the large cave at the narrow mouth of which their enemies the Macleods had kindled large fires. The floor of the cave is still strewn with the bones of the murdered inhabitants.

In Eigg the Bishop and his party found themselves in dangerous proximity to the garrison at Castle Tirrim, the ancient fortress of the chiefs of Clanranald, so the weather being favorable they left Eigg, and coasting along the Isle of Rum disembarked in Canna. Here they found that as in the case of Castle Tirrim, the residences of the principal Catholics had been used to quarter soldiers in.

Canna is described as a small island five miles in circumference, very fertile for its size and with abundance of pasturage, whilst the harbor on the southeast afforded safe anchorage. "At the entrance to this harbor there is a very high rock, in which it is thought there must be a mine of iron or adamant, since as the ships pass under it the compass turns towards the rock." One hundred and fifty years later this same rock is thus described: "In the vicinity of the harbor is an eminence called Compass Hill, which is said to disarrange the

compass so much as to cause it to whirl round, so that when placed near it no faith can be placed in its magnetic value."

The inhabitants of the Isle of Canna were found to be all Catholics, and 100 were confirmed both on the outward journey and on the return from Uist. The priest at that time was Mr. Hara, whilst Mr. Morgan as dean visited this and the neighboring islands occasionally. The party left Canna at 11 o'clock in the evening, for the wind was favorable, and being near midsummer it was light all through the night. They had not gone far when a great calm came over the sea, so that they were surprised to find the water as smooth as glass instead of the dangerous crossing they had feared.

"About midday of June 23, which was Sunday, we landed at Loch Eynort, in Uist, where Mass was said in a tent we erected on the beach. Towards evening we went to the house of the laird at Ormaclate and were received with many marks of respect by the lady in the absence of the chief of Clanranald, whom we had left on the mainland. Uist is part of the long island which the ancients called Aebuda, or Hebrides. It is really composed of several islands, which follow in this order from north to south. The most southern is Barra, separated from South Uist by about eight miles of sea. It was in South Uist that we landed. Next comes Benbecula, separated from Uist by a mile of sea when the tide is high, but when it is low tide one can cross the ford dry shod. Another ford separates Benbecula from North Uist, whilst further north again is Harris, which belongs to the Laird of McLeod, and then Lewis, which belongs to Lord Seaforth."

The writer of the report had no occasion to cross to North Uist or he would have learned that the ford of which he speaks without comment has many and great dangers of its own. Except to those very well acquainted with it, it is difficult to find, and if the exact course be missed, night may come on whilst the traveler is in vain trying to pass through pools which he knows well are not on the right track, and of which the depth often forces him to retrace his steps. He will then try to pass another way, only to meet the same fate, and thus the precious hours pass by until he discovers to his horror that the tide is rising and slowly cutting him off from all hope of escape. But such as would learn more of the terrors of the North Ford are referred to Niel Munro's delightful tale, "Children of the Mist."

"South Uist and Benbecula together are about twenty-six miles long from north to south and five broad. On the west, towards the great ocean, the country is very flat and the land is arable and more fertile than is usually the case in the seaboard of the mainland. On this side of the island also are the houses and the villages, whilst in

the middle there is a lake stretching almost continuously for twenty miles right down the centre of the island. On the east there are nothing but steep hills and deep gorges, which serve for pasturage in summer. In this island, as likewise in all the others, there is a great abundance of fish, and in one river there are salmon. There is a great quantity of wild fowl, duck and geese, besides enormous quantities of sea birds. There are also eagles and falcons, of which the nests are to be found in Uist and Barra. There are deer in the hills, but neither hares nor foxes. There are no trees in the isles, not even in gardens, and when any are planted they do not grow above the height of the walls on account of the cold winds which blow from the vast ocean. It seems, however, that there used to be trees in some of the valleys, but now all the wood is brought from the mainland."

Not indeed all, for more than might be expected is washed ashore on the west coast by the waves of the vast ocean, to which it has either been committed to lighten the weather-beaten ship or been torn from her after she has succumbed to the terrible force of the Atlantic storms. No doubt the fact that the Gulf Stream strikes the outer isles accounts in great measure for the large quantities of timber that drift ashore there. From earliest times this wood was a welcome and a free gift of nature to the hardy islanders, but some thirty years ago the British Board of Inland Revenue cast their covetous eyes on this small source of income, and now no man may touch the wood until he pay the price fixed by a government official. One would have thought that life in the outer isles was hard enough without such added grievances, often sorely felt and so thoughtlessly inflicted.

"In South Uist all the people are Catholic except about forty persons, who attend the minister's chapel. At twelve stations, such as presented themselves were confirmed, the numbers reaching over 800. We were greatly pleased with the kindness of the chief of Clanranald and of his lady. They sent their horses and men to take the Bishop wherever he wished to go, and they welcomed him at their house with every sign of respect and affection when he retired there once or twice after his hard work. The same warm-hearted respect was shown us by the laird of Benbecula, a learned and pious man and uncle to the chief."

The party arrived in Barra on the 10th of July. It is described as six miles long, productive of good crops of corn, with excellent grazing. The lord of the isle, who was very zealous, received the Bishop with great respect. "The people, who are excellent, really deserve a good priest, but we only had one of the Franciscans escaped from Ireland to place there until God should provide otherwise.

"In Barra there are the ruins of two or three churches and of a priory at Kilbar. There are six other inhabited islands which belong to Barra, and there is a chapel in each. Of these Vatersay is the largest, with a circumference of five miles, whilst there are fourteen other smaller islands that are only used for pasturage."

Having returned to Uist on July 19, the Bishop spent a few days confirming such as had not received that sacrament at the time of his first visit, and on the 24th he left in a boat placed at his disposal by the Laird of Benbecula. It is a matter of regret that the writer of the report, who has so many interesting observations to make, did not tell us more of the customs he found current in Uist. Perhaps at that time many of these, which seem to-day so strange, were still in practice on the Highland mainland, though now it is only in the isles that they are found. Here one still sees in use saddlery, cart traces and saddles made of bent, the long grass that grows on the macha along the seashore. Here much of the land is turned with the "cascrom," the old-fashioned foot plough, or with the wooden horse plough, which is still preferred to its iron competitor. Here one may still enjoy the "ceilidh" as in the evenings, and especially the Sunday evenings, one strolls in at the open cottage door to take one's seat at the end of the row of visitors. No host rises to welcome the new arrival, for all are welcome and have ever been, whilst each joins in keeping up the round of tales and anecdotes that have been so often told and told again. None but those who have visited the outer isles, and especially South Uist, can realize the charm of the old-world surroundings that have changed so little in the course of centuries.

After a short visit to the Isle of Rum, which had only a small population, of whom twenty-four were confirmed, the Bishop and his party got back to Arisaig, on the mainland, on the 29th of July. "After our return from the isles we began the visitation of Arisaig, Moydart and Morar, and in the eight stations in this neighborhood 700 persons were confirmed. Next we drew up rules for the Catholic school that is in Arisaig, and then we went to the Eilean Ban, in Morar, where we met the neighboring missionaries, and after consultation with them we drew up some disciplinary regulations. Thence on 14th August we went to Knoydart, where 214 persons were confirmed. On 24th we reached Glengarry, after a most fatiguing journey of a day and a night, exposed to the weather at Inverquoich, where there was neither cottage nor shieling.

"Glengarry is a fertile and pleasant district, over eighteen miles in length. The River Garry flows through the deep valley, starting from Loch Quoich, and discharges itself into Loch Garry, from the far end of which it flows on again till it reaches Loch Oich, near

Invergarry Castle. In Glengarry there is a large population, all Catholics. Mr. Rattray usually attends to them, but the rumors of a new war, the suspicions of their neighboring garrisons and the animosities that remain after the last war are not extinguished nor even allayed, so that after having confirmed those only who were the best disposed, we left on August 28th with the intention of returning when the spirit of unrest should have subsided."

The evidently hurried departure from Invergarry was no doubt well advised. Four years later the worthy Mr. Rattray, alias Munro, was taken prisoner by the soldiers of the garrison already mentioned, who surrounded the house where he was lodged. Besides being very old and infirm, he was at the time sick of a severe fever, which prevented him from moving to safer quarters, having pretty sure notice some time before of the danger that threatened him. The soldiers, finding that he was not only unable to walk, but even to ride, losing every sentiment of common feeling and humanity, threw him across on horseback like a sack of corn, and in that manner conveyed him to the castle of Glengarry. Being arrived there, they cast him on a low floor, refusing him in that rigid season of the year (January) either covering or even a little straw to lie on. In this situation he continued tortured by a continual fever, accompanied by other complaints, for two days, without ever during that time getting as much as a glass of water. On January 17 it pleased God to release him from his sufferings. (Abbé Macpherson's MS.) Little wonder that Bishop Nicolson, who had already been twice imprisoned, was unwilling to run the risk of a third similar experience.

"On 29th September we returned to our starting point after a journey of over 400 miles. During the whole three months that the visitation lasted the Bishop worked so hard that there were only three days, according to a careful diary that he kept, when he was not engaged from morning till night, either traveling from place to place or preaching, confirming and catechizing the people. Although he gave Confirmation almost every day, still it was his invariable custom never to do so without preaching himself as a preparation. His words were at once interpreted to the people by one of his suite. He scarcely gave himself a moment's repose, notwithstanding the very great fatigues of so difficult a journey."

The rest of the report is concerned with purely ecclesiastical matters and summarized the experiences the worthy Bishop had gained and which he later put to such practical use in his "Statuta." These were long the law and the directory for the priests on the Scotch mission, and there is little doubt but that the visitation of 1700, of which the foregoing account has been given, was the turning point

in the fortunes of the Catholic Church in Scotland, which has ever since continued to increase both in the numbers of her children and in the style and the decoration of her churches. Nowhere is this more truly the case than in the Western Highlands and the islands, where the Catholic churches are the pleasantest objects that the eye rests on, bespeaking peace and culture in those wild and storm-swept districts.

ODO BLUNDELL, O. S. B.

Fort Augustus, Scotland.

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## ONE OF DANTE'S TROUBADOURS.

### I.

#### THE SORDEL OF THE CHRONICLERS.

*Sordels fo de mantoano, d'un castel que a nom Got, gentils catanis, e fo avinens hom de la persona, e fo bons chantaire, e bons trobaire, e grans amaires.—Old Provençal Chronicle.*

**S**ORDEL—a soft, uncertain, two syllabled cadence—we find the name on the illuminated pages of the Provença chroniclers; Sordello, stronger for the added vowel, we spell it out through the soft starlight of Dante's middle realm, and Sordello it remains through all the six cantos of Browning's marvelous unscrolling of the incidents in the development of a human soul. It was in the high suntide of the mediæval period that the historic Sordello first came into prominence. When he died it was sundown of the ages of faith. He was contemporary at birth with Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and Innocent III., and at death with Duns Scotus, Roger Bacon and the founders of the English House of Commons. The jongleurs have told his tale after their fashion, intermingling fact and fancy, presenting first-hand and second-hand information with the impartiality of a delightfully naïve credulity. The sad-eyed exile of Florence has taken up the theme and sketched it in his strong, simple way, illuminating the lines of truth and beauty and shrouding in merciful shadows the years of weakness, the hours of cowardice, the moments of shame. And finally Browning comes with his insistent "and you shall hear Sordello's story told," unfolding the development of the soul of the poet, inventing a brilliant episode, startling us by the boldness of an unforeseen conclusion. But the real Sordello lives in no one of the three. The chroniclers were simple and obvious; they failed. Dante was balanced perfectly between crass obviousness and the eerie-suggestiveness of the ultra-esoteric. He did not succeed. Browning wrote for the atten-

tive reader in a style full of elisions and abrupt transitions. But Sordello's story remains untold. The mediæval gossips give us their legends; they are the hearsays of the period. Dante abridges these accounts for us, emphasizing the good and eliminating the evil. This is the idealization of a kindred spirit. Browning generalizes the incidents, so that what was the story of one man becomes the history of all mankind, the key to the tragedy of all idealism and the comedy of all realism.

There are three accounts concerning the birth of Sordello. According to an old Provençal manuscript in the Vatican he was the son of a poor knight named El Corte. Another version, based upon a line in Rolandino's chronicle, makes him a member of the family of Salinguerra. The third, Aliprando, in his rhyming history of Milan, avers that he was of noble birth, belonging to the house of the Visconti. All three agree that he was born in Goito, near Mantua, at the close of the twelfth century, probably between 118) and 1194. On the highway between Brescia and Mantua one passes the little village of Goito, "tidy, white and quiet." A heap of ancient ruins, a wall of impressive thickness and a narrow door are all that remain of the famous castle, "the lodge of the Lady Adelaide." There is nothing of romantic charm, no leafy paths nor pebbly brooks nor wild ravines with unexpected heights and depths as described by Browning. Six hundred years ago it was much as it is to-day. Then, as now, swampy flats and shallow marshes stretched away on every side to meet monotonous sweeps of meadow broken at regular intervals by long rows of mulberry bushes. From the early days of sudden onslaught by fierce Gothic hordes to the latest encounters between Austrians and Piedmontese in 1848, Goito's fortunes have been linked with those of its important neighbor, Mantua. But after all the throb and tumult of its stirring history, it boasts but one claim to immortality, one association that insures perpetuation to its name—on its reedy plain was born Sordello, the mysterious, the most celebrated of the early Italian minstrels, one who wrote in the style of the earlier French troubadours and in their Provençal tongue.

It is to Aliprando's rhyming chronicle we must turn if we would find the source of the Sordellan legends recounted by the earlier biographers. Aliprando tells us of the boy Sordel, and how as a youth he astounded the world of letters by a wonderful poem, "*Le Trésor*;" how when he grew to manhood, arms proved more seductive than letters and challenge after challenge was accepted from overconfident knights; how the King of France, hearing of these deeds of valor, invited the brave bard to cross the Alps—of Sordello's preparations for the journey and how at the last moment he

changed his mind at the earnest entreaty of Ezzelino da Romano, who urged him to come to reside with the Romano family at Verona; of his sojourn at Verona, and how when he found that Ezzelino's sister Beatrice was losing her heart to him, he fled to Mantua; how Beatrice followed him disguised as a page; of his marriage with Beatrice; of his visit to France, where his valor, gallantry and poetic talents were greatly admired; of the presents bestowed upon him by the King, three thousand francs and a golden falcon; how he returned to Italy, where he was received with great pomp as the first warrior of his time; how the Mantuans came out to greet him, but he refused to tarry until he reached Verona, where he was reunited with his bride; of his return with her to Mantua, where they were welcomed by eight days of public rejoicing. Then comes the story of Ezzelino's anger because of the marriage and of his attempt to take the city; of Sordello's defense of the walls and of Ezzelino's ignominious defeat. The narrative concludes with an account of the onset of the poet at the head of a band of Milanese against his crafty enemy. For the second time Sordello was the victor, slaying his opponent with his own hands.

The whole narrative is a sorry mixture of blind anachronism and blundering romance. Tiraboschi rejects most of it. And yet this chronicle is the storehouse from which the historical writers of the next century drew their stories of the Goitan troubadour and of the Lady Beatrice, who never existed. Tiraboschi had access to a large number of early manuscripts which he studied faithfully and transcribed with an almost Teutonic accuracy and patience. He says that Sordello was born near Mantua towards the close of the twelfth century; that he went to Provence when a boy; that he eloped with the wife of Count Richard, of Saint Boniface; that he was of noble birth and a famous warrior; that he died a violent death in the middle of the thirteenth century. Rolandino inserts in his version an ambiguous line, upon which Browning founds the relationship of Sordello and Salinguerra. "Cunizza, wife of Richard of Saint Boniface," Rolandino writes, "and sister of Ezzelino da Romano, was stolen from her husband by one Sordello, *who was of the same family.*" Benvenuto d'Imola's note to Canto VI. of the *Purgatorio* is not without interest. "Sordello was a native of Mantua," Benvenuto tells us, "an illustrious and skillful warrior and an accomplished courtier. This chevalier lived in the time of Ecelin da Romano, whose sister conceived for him a violent affection. Informed of this intrigue, Ecelin disguised himself as a servant and surprised the unfortunate pair. The poet promised on his knees not to repeat the offense. But the cursed Cunizza dragged him anew to perdition. He was naturally grave, virtuous and prudent.



To withdraw himself from Ecelin he fled, but was pursued and assassinated."

Modern students of Provençal literature have spared no pains in their quest of the truth underlying this tissue of biographical fact and legendary fancy. The result has been an endless controversy, in which one faction loudly condemns, while the other heaps up superlative praises. De Lollis can see in Sordello only a time-serving adventurer, Guelph or Ghibelline as occasion demanded, a mediocre poet, a faithless lover and a betrayer of the confidence of his friend and patron, Richard of Saint Boniface. Torraca can see only the most celebrated of the Provençals, a poet of unusual vigor and fecundity, a noble patriot, a dauntless warrior. This diversity of opinion, based upon divergent historical accounts, has led to the theory that there were two Sordellos, contemporaries—the one a poet, student and philosopher; the other a vagabond soldier, a tramp—jongleur, a tavern-brawler, the hero of the many graceless episodes that have been erroneously associated with the name of the great Lombardy troubadour. Through the painstaking researches of Gitterman several documents have been brought to light that seem to point to the existence not only of two, but of three Sordellos, all living in Northern Italy in the early decades of the thirteenth century. To the third Sordello Gitterman attributes the adventure with Cunizza. There is much to be said in favor of the triumvirate. But it would seem that since all three are connected in the Provençal accounts with Ezzelino, and since all three are synchronal and synspatial, it is possible that they were also identical in personality. The high praise of Dante and the gossip of the Provençal tale-bearers, in all likelihood, refer to the same man. Perhaps Sordello, like his successor, Dante, found himself with life half spent, "all in a gloomy wood astray, gone from the path direct." Perhaps his youth was desecrated by leaps of overvaulting ambition, an inordinate love of self-aggrandizement and lawless pleasure-guests. But if he came at last to see the error of his ways; if in the end he followed the Light and abjured Darkness; if his later years were consecrated to truth-seeking and beauty-loving and the doing of good, we must judge him by his final choice, not by his early errors. It is the Master's way to be merciful. Our age, however, is too apt to speak of repentant sinners as if their sinning and repenting were something to their credit. The true penitent never sees sin in that light. By every deliberate choice of evil something is forever lost—lost for eternity. The Master pardoned Peter, but John was the disciple that He loved.

Besides, we must not forget that De Lollis and his school of critics find plenty of evidence to support their censures. Early in his

twenties Sordello appears as a disturber of the peace in a tavern at Florence. A fight ensues and a wine flask is broken over the poet's head. Then there is the story of his cowardly refusal to accompany Saint Louis on a crusade because of his fear of rough waters. His apologists insist that this refusal was a mere pleasantry, one that would never have been indulged in except by a man whose reputation for bravery was too well established to be in any danger of question or suspicion. From all accounts he was a great traveler. He left Italy in 1229 and made a tour of the south of France, visiting the courts of Provence, Toulouse, Rousillon, Castile, Leon and Portugal. About ten years later we find him at the castle of the Countess Beatrice, daughter of Raymond Berenger, Count of Provence, and wife of Charles I. of Anjou. Charles took the wandering minstrel under his protection, and time and again proved himself a friend in need. The poet repaid him by complaints and ingratitude. "How can a man be cheerful," Sordello asks, "when he is poor, sick all the time and unfortunate in lord, love and lady?" To which Charles replied: "I have always cherished and honored him. I have given him substantial property and a wife of his own choosing. But he is a fool and a nuisance and would not be grateful if one gave him a county." For all this, some years later we find Charles bestowing five castles in the Abruzzi upon "his intimate and faithful friend Sordello," as a reward for services rendered in an expedition against Manfred. During this expedition the poet was taken prisoner at Novara by the Ghibellines. At first Charles received the news with indifference. But Pope Clement IV. interceded in behalf of the troubadour, asking that he be ransomed and recompensed for his sufferings. Charles' indifference was at once transformed into active interest, and the gift of the Abruzzi castles followed. And so Sordello returned to continue his programme of finding friends and losing them, of falling in love and promptly falling out again. Love, except of self, and friendship, except with a view to some personal advantage, he could not understand. And yet he wrote much of love and friendship. Such baseless vaporings coarsen the soul; they even leave an impression upon the body. And, in fact, our poet was not imposing in presence. His well-cut lips smiled too easily; his bold black eyes suggested recklessness and daring rather than courage. Such lips might say harsh words upon slight provocation; such eyes could never brighten save in selfish cunning or through some sordid joy or gain. For him duty consisted in getting what he wanted. In one of his poems he tells us:

And whoso lacks the thing his heart desires  
Is worse than dead. He lives in woe and need.

In another he advocates the dual service of God and Mammon:

Whoe'er considers life with care  
Will always find, so I declare,  
One thing enjoined by wisdom's rod,  
To please at once the world and God.

Shortly after Sordello received his castle-grant he disappeared. From the fact that Dante places him among those who died before they could repent, it is conjectured that he met a violent end. It may be that he fell at the hand of Ezzelino, as Benvenuto d'Imola testifies. Ezzelino is held responsible for so many crimes that one more laid at his door can hardly make much difference. Villani says that "Ezzelino was the cruelest and most redoubtable tyrant that ever existed among Christians." And Symonds in "The Renaissance in Italy" portrays him thus: "Ezzelino, a small, pale, wiry man, with terror in his face and enthusiasm for evil in his heart, lived a foe to luxury, cold to the pathos of children, dead to every higher emotion. His one passion was the love of power. When he captured Friola he deprived all the citizens of their eyes, noses and legs, and then ordered the unfortunates to be exposed to the mercy of the elements. He expired in agony, wrenching from his wounds the dressings placed there by his enemies to keep him from dying." According to a sixteenth century legend, Sordello lies at San Pietro, in Mantua, near his beloved Mincio. Virgil celebrates "Mincius crowned with sea-green reeds;" Milton sings of "smooth-sliding Mincius circled with vocal reeds." There our poet sleeps. He is done with the mad rivalries and bitter animosities of the Italy of the thirteenth century; with the perpetual struggle between Pope and Emperor and the ever-recurring battles between commune and nobles. And yet these centuries were in no sense dark. Through all the clamor and confusion two ideals were growing steadily clearer and brighter—one was the chivalric ideal of love with all that it enjoins of sympathy with the weak and suffering and reverence for womanhood; the other was the glorification of utter selflessness by the triple vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. The knights and their various allied orders were the propagators of the first; the gentle saint of Assisi and his brothers were the champions of the second. Sordello in his youth had chosen, not the monk's, but the knight's part.

## II.

## THE SORDELLO OF DANTE.

But lo! a spirit there  
Stands solitary, and towards us looks.  
—Purgatory, Canto VI.

Three of the principal characters in the Sordellan cycle appear in the Divine Comedy—Sordello himself, Cunizza and Ezzelino.

Ezzolino is confined with the violent in the Seventh Circle of the Inferno. There, guarded by the Minotaur, runs a river of blood, wherein are tormented such as have committed acts of violence against their neighbors. Some are immersed to their eyebrows, others to their throats, according to the degree of their guilt. From the crimson flood loud shrieks arise as the unhappy sufferers forever renew their futile attempts to escape. The banks are patrolled by Centaurs armed with keen arrows. One of these monsters explains:

These are the souls of tyrants who were given  
To dealing woe and death. They wail aloud  
Their merciless wrongs. Here Alexander dwells,  
And Dionysius fell, who many a year  
Of woe wrought for fair Sicily. That brow  
Whereon the hair so jetty clustering hangs  
Is Ezzolino; that with flaxen locks,  
Obizzo of Este, in the world destroyed  
By his foul stepson.

Cunizza circles in the Third Heaven of the Paradiso in the planet Venus. She describes to Dante the site of Romano, where she and her brother Ezzolino were born. She comments upon the fair fame won by the troubadour Folco, and regrets that no such fame is now sought by her countrymen of Venetia. Then, seeming no longer to heed Dante, she resumes her place on the wheel of light and continues her dance in the heavenly cosmos. Cunizza, like Sordello, must have found "the path direct" in her later years. Although placed in Paradise by the sternest of moralizers and the most uncompromising of all lovers of justice, she has not escaped veiled censures and even open reproach. The commentators heap up footnotes. They remind us that while William of Lucerne was declaring Cunizza beyond all other women in worth and beauty and threatening those who made war upon her reputation with a sword which would surely cut before it bent, Ugo de Saint Cyr was replying with a smile that an infinite number of wounds would not suffice to vindicate the honor of the Lady of Romano; that all the doctors in Salerno could not medicine her good name. Dante's exaltation of her has led to endless controversy and speculation. It may be that the Florentine's fervid Ghibelline faith scorned the slanderous stories circulated by Guelph chroniclers concerning the daughter of a champion of the Emperor. Or he may have been influenced by the so-called "document of emancipation" executed in 1265. This was a deed of manumission granting freedom to all the slaves and bondsmen of the house of Romano. It was signed by Cunizza in her extreme old age. Transfigured by her sorrow and delivered from the tumult of her youthful emotions, her declining years seem to have been serenely calm and even solemn. If in those later days she ever met Sordello, we have no record of the meeting. And yet their mutual tenderness and the bond of a common repentance may

have brought them together for a brief moment at the end, perhaps to ask forgiveness and to say a last farewell. For years the aged penitent dwelt with the Cavalcanti, the family of Guido Cavalcanti, the poet-friend of Dante. There Dante must have known her in his childhood days. There he must have heard the whole sad story of her life. And after her death he must have heard of the penitential spirit of her closing years, of her edifying death and of the grateful prayers of the emancipated dependents who never wearied of rehearsing the virtues of the good Cunizza, the last Lady of Romano.

Sordello is consigned to the purifying flames of the Purgatorio. There, at the foot of the mount, in company with those who have come to sudden and untimely ends, he meets Dante and Virgil. The spirits press about the living poet and his guide, chanting:

We all by violence died, and to our latest  
Were sinners, but then warmed by light from heaven;  
So that, repenting and forgiving, we  
Did issue out of life at peace with God,  
Who with desire to see Him fills our hearts.

After some converse with Giacomo del Cassero, a Ghibelline of note; Buonconte da Montefeltro, Dante's comrade-in-arms at the battle of Campaldino, and Pia, a lady of Sienna, who was murdered in secret by her husband, the two poets observe a solitary spirit that has not joined in the general press, standing apart from the crowd. Virgil speaks:

But lo! a spirit there  
Stands solitary, and toward us looks:  
It will instruct us in the speediest way.

Dante continues:

We soon approach'd it. Oh, thou Lombard spirit!  
How didst thou stand in high abstracted mood,  
Scarce moving with slow dignity thine eyes!  
It spoke not aught, but let us onward pass,  
Eyeing us as a lion on his watch.  
But Virgil with entreaty mild advanced,  
Requesting it to show the best ascent;  
It answer to his question none returned,  
But of our country and our kind of life  
Demanded. When my courteous guide began,  
"Mantua," the shadow in itself absorb'd,  
Rose towards us from the place in which it stood  
And cried: "Mantuan, I am thy countryman,  
Sordello." Each the other then embraced.

At the first mention of his native city Sordello is aroused. He becomes all alertness and attention. So it should be, Dante muses bitterly. Italy is worthy of such love, but her sons are recreant. He opens his heart in a long wail of mingled pity and scorn:

Ah, slavish Italy! Thou inn of grief!  
Vessel without a pilot in loud storm!  
Lady no longer of fair provinces,  
But weedy wastes o'ergrown. This gentle spirit

Even from the pleasant sound of his dear land  
 Was prompt to greet a fellow-citizen  
 With such glad cheer: while now thy living ones  
 In thee abide not without war; and one  
 Malicious gnaws another, ay, of those  
 Whom the same wall and the same moat contains.  
 Seek, wretched one, around thy sea-coast wide;  
 Then homeward to thy bosom turn and mark,  
 If any part of thee sweet peace enjoy.

Then follows a scathing arraignment of the factions in the various cities of Italy and of the callousness of the rulers who leave them to their fate. Florence is at first sarcastically omitted from the censorship; but the sarcasm soon dies away in a groan of despair when he recalls the depths to which the fair city by the Arno has fallen:

My Florence . . . . .  
 How many times within my memory  
 Customs and laws and coins and offices  
 Have been by thee renewed and people changed.  
 If thou remember'st well and canst see clear,  
 Thou wilt perceive thyself like a sick wretch,  
 Who finds no rest upon her down, but oft  
 Shifting her side, short respite seeks from pain.

Sordello was overjoyed when he found that this shade from the dim corridors of the under-world was a Mantuan; but when, upon further questioning, he found that his guest was none other than Master Virgil, he fell upon his knees in loving reverence, exclaiming:

Glory of Latium,  
 In whom our tongue its utmost power displayed;  
 Boast of my honored birthplace! What desert  
 Of mine, what favor rather, undeserved,  
 Shows thee to me? If I to hear that voice  
 Am worthy, say if from below thou comest,  
 And from what cloister's pale?

Virgil replies that he belongs in that part of the Inferno where "mourning's voice sounds not of anguish sharp, but breathes in sighs;" where souls abide who "the three holy virtues put not on, but understood the rest and without blame followed them all." Then he asks to be directed up the mountain-side. Sordello answers:

Thou beholdest now how day declines;  
 And upward to proceed by night, our power  
 Excels. Therefore, it may be well to choose  
 A place of pleasant sojourn. To the right  
 Some spirits sit apart retired. If thou  
 Consentest, I to these will lead thy steps,  
 And thou wilt know them, not without delight.

In accordance with this plan the three poets ascend an eminence whence they behold a pleasant recess in the form of a flowery vale. Within the enclosure on the grass are the spirits of dead Kings and rulers chanting the *Salve Regina*. Sordello names and describes them as he points them out: The Emperor Rudolph, "who might have healed the wounds whereof fair Italy died;" Ottocar of Bohemia, "with kindly visage;" Philip III. of France, "that one with

nose deprest;" Henry of Navarre, "him of gentle look, who flying expired, withering the lily's flower;" Charles I. of Anjou, "him of feature prominent;" Henry III., "the King of simple life and plain, Harry of England," and last, but not least, William, Marquis of Montferrat, "who sits lowest, yet his gaze directs aloft." The night descends, and with it two green-robed angels with emerald wings. "From Mary's bosom both are come," explains Sordello, "as a guard for the vale against him who hither tends, the Serpent." The poets enter the valley and Dante is speaking with Nino, the judge of Gallura, when the Serpent glides noiselessly in between the grass and flowers. But the "celestial falcons," the verdant-vested sentinels, swoop down and the ancient enemy of the human race disappears from view. The night advances; the eastern cliffs begin to glow. Dante, still burdened by his earthly frame, is forced to rest. He sinks upon the ground overcome by sleep. And while he sleeps Lucia comes and carries him up the mountain-side, where, awaking two hours later, he finds himself with Virgil at the gate of Purgatory. Sordello and the spirits of the vale of flowers have been left behind.

It is the general opinion of critics and commentators that this entire episode; with its famous Italian Jeremiad, was suggested to Dante by the Goitan bard's "Lament for Blacas." This elegy, written upon the death of Blacas, a Spanish troubadour of extraordinary personal courage, urges the craven-hearted rulers of the age to eat of the great heart of the dead Blacas, in the hope that they, too, may become brave and generous and honor-loving. "Why," asks Tommaseo in his "Nuovi Studi du Dante," "does Dante place Sordello as a guide through the flowery valley where Kings and rulers are found? Because in this place he meant to call together to himself as judge many of the most powerful princes of Italy and of Europe, and Sordello in a Provençal song did similar work and judged with lofty severity many great princes of his time."

The "Lament" is noteworthy and in the original may well have made a deep impression on Dante. The first stanza eulogizes the brave troubadour:

I fain would mourn Blacas—let all the world attend!  
For sorrow, grief and pain my bosom justly rend;  
In him am I despoiled of master and of friend,  
And every noble trait hath met in him its end,  
So mortal is the blow, such fatal ills impend,  
We can but vainly hope the generous loss to mend,  
Unless his heart we take and through the nations send  
That cowardly lords may eat, for that will courage lend.

The succeeding stanzas arraign the Roman Emperor, Frederick II., against whom Milan had rebelled; Louis IX. of France, who, influenced by his mother, allowed his right to the throne of Castile

to lapse; the English King, Henry III., who had lost territory to the French, and the Spanish King, Ferdinand III. of Castile, for allowing his mother to interfere in affairs of state. They are all invited to partake of the heart of the brave Blacas. No funeral dirge ever served better to express at the same time deep love and reverence for the dead and supreme contempt for the living. The irony is unsurpassed:

The first of all to eat, since greatest is his need,  
 Shall be the Roman Emperor, if he would succeed  
 Against the Milanese, who count themselves freed;  
 For he, despite his Germans, hath the worst indeed.  
 The witless King of France shall next upon it feed,  
 And then regain Castile, lost ere he gave it heed;  
 But he will never taste it if his mother plead,  
 For he would grieve her not—he well deserves his meed.

Then let the King of England, timid as a hart,  
 Eat bountifully thereof, and quickly will he start  
 To win back the lands which France with lance and dart—  
 Because she knows him well—hath taken for her part.  
 But let the Spanish King eat doubly of the heart,  
 Too weak for one good realm, while two are on his chart;  
 But should he wish to eat it, let him go apart,  
 For should his mother know, her stick would make him start.

Dante tells us in his "De Volgari Eloquia" that Sordello excelled in all kinds of composition and that he helped to form the Tuscan tongue by some happy attempts which he made in the dialects of Cremona, Brescia and Verona. Dante also speaks of a "Goito Mantuan" who was the author of many good songs and who left in every stanza an unmatched line which he called "the key." This singer, according to Tiraboschi, was our Lombardy minstrel. None of the Italian poems has come down to us; the Goito Lay, whatever may have been its theme or merit, is lost forever. Gone, too, are his "History of the House of Aragon" and his "Defense of Walled Towns." His extant poems, thirty-four in number, have been collected by Sainte-Pelaye, Fauriel, Raynouard, Diez, Mahn and de Lollis. They are all in Provençal and for the most part gallant songs. They are remarkable, Gismondi tells us, for "the harmony and sensibility of their verses" and for "the purity and delicacy of their sentiments."

But the poet-patriot of Dante is not the restless traveler and polished courtesan of the early biographers, nor the gay chanter in novel metre and faultless phrase of loves that wax and wane, as portrayed by some of the later critics, nor yet the severe ruler and judge, who, repenting of his youthful follies, has lost all that is human and engaging, degenerating into a mere bundle of sententiousness and self-complacency, as others would have us believe. The Sordello of Dante is an exalted nature, a man of his age, and yet a true contemplative with a turn for speculation and an ironical contempt for



mere worldliness and its concomitants. Dante calls him "the good Sordello" and "the courteous Sordello." He must have left a noble record—a record lost in part to us—thus to have impressed so penetrating a student of human nature, so impartial a lover of righteousness. Like a recluse, we discern the shadowy form of the famous Goitan, moving majestically among the spirits of the mighty ones of former days. He is with them, but not of them.

But lo! a spirit there  
Stands solitary, and towards us looks.

### III.

#### THE POET-PHILOSOPHER OF BROWNING.

My stress lay on the incidents in the development of a soul. Little else is worth study.—Browning's foreword to *Sordello*.

The Sordello of Browning is a poet, a troubadour, with a poet's sensitiveness to beauty and a troubadour's faith in the springtime of things, in fresh green leaves and the aspirations of youth and the love that lasts forever and forever. But he is more than a lover of the beautiful. "The poet, when he leans on truth, is a philosopher," Plato tells us. If not in the beginning, at least in the end, the Sordello of Browning loves truth as passionately as he loves beauty. And so we have Sordello, the poet-philosopher, as the hero of a poem which is a study of the proper service of the poet. Browning ascribes to the mediæval minstrel the thoughts, emotions and ideals of a Dante, makes him a modern who chooses unhesitatingly the side of the people, transforms Cunizza into Palma as the romantic factor in the story, and concludes with the dramatic incident in which Palma reveals the fact that Sordello is, in reality, Salinguerra's son. Of course, we know that the Lombardy minstrel was intensely Ghibelline in his sympathies, and therefore a partisan of the Emperor as against the people's party, which was championed by the Pope; we know that he loved Cunizza and not Palma, her elder sister, and we know that there is no historical basis for Palma's revelation, unless the ambiguous line in Rolandino's Chronicle can be conformed to some such supposition. Browning's version is founded upon the ancient Provençal record of Sordello's youth in the north of Italy; but in the long years of his tempestuous life our troubadour traveled over the greater part of Southern Europe. His youth in Northern Italy was not the third part of his life. He was over eighty when Charles of Anjou, King of Naples, gave him five castles in the Abruzzi. After that he disappeared—died, I suppose, as we all do in the end.

Browning intentionally ignores the mere facts. "The historical

decoration," he writes, "was purposely of no more importance than a background requires; my stress lay on the incidents in the development of a soul. Little else is worth study." And so he attempts to body forth for us the soul of Sordello—the soul of a poet who would feign be a philosopher, too. Now there is an ancient feud between poetry and philosophy. Plato tells us so in the Republic when he decides that the verse-makers are to be forever banished from his ideal state. "For if we allow the honeyed muse to enter either in epic or lyric strains, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our state," he explains. And truly the feud is an ancient one; there is none older. Feeling and thought have ever been at outs in the soul of man; there has never been a truce in the perpetual warfare waged between heart and head. And compromises are unendurable; we demand complete surrender from one side or the other and absolute perfection in the final adjustment. Browning is not so exacting. Perhaps, he argues, perfection is for eternity and approximations to perfection for time; perhaps ideal standards are not adapted to measuring the half-flights of our earth-life. But, he continues, if we must choose between the heart and the head, let it be the heart.

Forget  
Vain ordinances. I have one appeal—  
I feel, am what I feel, know what I feel:  
So much is truth to me.

This is a sort of pragmatic emotionalism which accepts our feelings as deeper and truer than our thoughts. A profounder analysis reveals the synthesis of thought and feeling in action, the unity of truth and beauty in goodness. There is no conflict, no need of choosing between the two.

"Who will may hear Sordello's story told," the poet assures us at the opening of the poem; "who would has heard Sordello's story told" are his concluding words, the last line of the last book. The first two books describe Sordello's failure as a poet; the last four tell how near he came to failing as a man. And the story is easy to follow if one is familiar with the history of the period. The opening scene is set in Verona. The curtain rises with Palma, Sordello, Ezzelino, Salinguerra and all the various adherents of Pope and Emperor upon the stage. Guelphs and Ghibellines are locked in a death-struggle. But this is just a device to arouse interest and to focus attention upon the principal characters. The poet soon decides that it is best after all to begin at the beginning. The scene shifts from Verona to Goito. Sordello is a boy upon the hill-sides there. The seasons come and go in a mist of white or green or russet. The child lives in a dream-world, because the real one

is as yet inaccessible. But he is a poet and gives his heart unre-servedly to all that is fair and lovely and of good report. And at first he is wholly absorbed in the exquisite beauty of the material universe—the simmering quiet of long summer afternoons sacred to the noiseless flight of azure damsel-flies or broken by the swift onset of palpitating lightning flashes alternating with rumbling thunder-rolls; the cold white calm of wintry nights with snow-shrouded forests gleaming under the moon's ensilvering pall. But externals cannot satisfy his soul for long. His sympathies widen. He becomes interested in man and man's work in the world; he comes to understand something of the beauty of the human soul, of the sweetness of its love and friendship, the austere heights of its sacrifices and renunciations, its capacity for illimitable happiness and immeasurable pain. He weaves all these experiences into his songs and sings because he cannot help singing. The love of nature leads him to the love of man. Perhaps his love for mankind will lead him to a love higher still. If he seeks unweariedly, he will find at last; if he knocks unceasingly, the golden door will be opened unto him. Browning outlines the process for us in advance:

Fresh births of beauty wake  
Fresh homage; every grade of love is past,  
With every mode of loveliness. Then cast  
Inferior idols off their borrowed crown  
Before a coming glory. Up and down  
Runs arrowy fire, while earthly forms combine  
To throb the secret forth, a touch divine—  
And the scaled eyeball owns the mystic rod;  
Visibly through his garden walketh GOD.

First nature, then man, and finally God: these are the successive objects of Sordello's love as his awakening soul grows out of the dream-life of his childhood into the verities of manhood. His love of nature is deep and genuine. There are the oaks and scarlet maples and lady-birches to shelter him from the hot sun; there are the shining depths of the Nuncio and its sandy banks overrun with slimy water-life; there are rings of vineyards circling the southern hillsides and pleasant pasture lands on the northern slopes; there are the wild creatures that creep timidly up out of the swampy defiles and morasses Mantuawards, and the tams, domestic ones that live about the lodge. And in the midst of all this natural beauty, shut in amongst the mountains, stands the castle of the Lady Adelaide. Without, it is a stately pile; within, it is a "maze of corridors contrived for sin," a labyrinth of dusk winding-stairs leading to inner chambers, and dim galleries girdling forbidden passageways. This is Sordello's home—all the home he has ever known. For his parents are dead, so they tell him, and the Lady Adelaide has been good enough to take him as her page. He is left quite

to himself; he has no playmates. Sometimes he sits for hours in the evening in the maple-paneled room with the slim palm pillars; sometimes he visits the cumbrous font in the central vault and wonders at the patience of the Caryatides that stand, year after year, shoulder to shoulder, at the fountain's edge. Sometimes the statues seem to smile at him, or their look of weariness lessens as he assures them of his sympathy.

Calmly, then  
About this secret lodge of Adalalde's  
Glided his youth away; beyond the glades  
Of the fir-forest border, and the rim  
Of the low range of mountains, was for him  
No other world: but this appeared his own  
To wander through at pleasure and alone.

Thus he lives and dreams and plans a wondrous future. He will be satisfied with nothing short of perfection; he will be a poet. And Palma of the golden hair, the fair daughter of Agnes Ese and Ecelin. Palma will be his bride. The gossips about the castle say that she is betrothed to Count Richard of Saint Boniface; but there are also rumors to the effect that she has rejected his suit. As an adventurous spider that spins its web and flings it out from barbican to battlement, so our young architect of fate erects his visionary dome in the first white glory of the morning and sees it gleaming with rainbow-edged raindrops in the gold and purple majesty of the advancing day. And yet there is danger ahead. The world brushes cobwebs and dream-webs impatiently aside. But there can be no turning back now; nature can never again be all sufficient. He longs for real life in a real world of real men and women.

His opportunity comes sooner than he expects. A troubadour, Eglamor by name, a protégé of Count Richard, is to sing at a court of love. These courts are supposed to have been assemblies of ladies that met to hear the cases of recreant lovers. Chaucer refers to these courts, but they are never mentioned in the *tensos* of the troubadours. Raynouzrd, however, the compiler of the great collection of Provençal poetry, maintains that these courts actually existed and that their decisions were held as binding as those of any other court. The day comes and Sordello is present. Eglamor, smiling in conscious power, sings, to the accompaniment of his jongleur, Naddo, his song to the Lady Elys—*el lys*, the lily. The crowd applauds. But Sordello is disappointed. He steps forward on the impulse of the moment and takes up the same theme:

The true lay with the true end,  
Taking the other's names and time and place  
For his. On flew the song, a giddy race,  
After the flying story; word made leap  
Out word, rhyme, rhyme; the lay could barely keep  
Pace with the action visibly rushing past.

The people fall back aghast. Then the air is rent with shouts

of approval. And Palma is there. She has heard the song and has noted the matchless lines, the immortal part of the impromptu Goito lay:

*Take Elys there,  
Her head that's sharp and perfect like a pear,  
So close and smooth are laid the few fine locks,  
Colored like honey, oozed from topmost rocks,  
Sun-blanced the livelong summer.*

Sordello grows faint when he sees her. She unbinds a scarf from her neck and decorates him with it as a token of her favor. It is too much. He stammers something, anything, and the jongleurs bear him away. Eglamor accepts his defeat with touching gentleness—Eglamor, who had loved art better than life, who had not understood that to be a man is greater than to be a poet. He places his crown beneath that of his successful rival and lies down to die. Sordello recovers in time to go out to meet the funeral procession. They lay the vanquished minstrel to rest under a canopy of primeval pines in a covert of tender ferns and wild-wood flowers, while his successor speaks words of eulogy and prays that his fame may be everlasting. And the prayer is not fruitless. A tiny white flower is named for the dead bard. On its frail petals his name will be borne to succeeding generations.

A plant they have, yielding a three-leaved bell,  
Which whitens at the heart ere noon, and all  
Till evening; evening gives it to her gales  
To clear away with such forgotten things  
As are an eyesore to the morn: this brings  
Him to their mind and bears his name.  
So much for Eglamor.

And so Sordello comes into his own. He is accepted of men, even of Palma. And at first he strives earnestly to perfect his work, for he is too true an artist not to be aware of his limitations. He is forever melting, welding, hammering out words in the hope of fashioning an armor worthy of his thoughts. He succeeds a little, but fails more, partly because of the distractions growing out of the plaudits of the mob. He begins to lose faith in art and to weary of a life devoted to pleasuring the populace. And so when Naddo comes requesting that he sing at a festival to be held in honor of Tanrello Salinguerra, he refuses flatly. He steals away to Goito to the home of his boyhood, and leaves the world to sing and feast and celebrate as best it can without him. He realizes that he has failed as a poet, or rather that poetry has failed in proving itself inadequate as an embodiment of the emotions and aspirations of life. His sojourn at Goito is in the nature of a spiritual retreat. The day of trial is coming. He will need all the strength he can gather from the sacred silence of the woody solitudes. A year passes. And then suddenly Naddo appears upon the scene bearing important news and

a message from Palma. Eccelin's two sons have taken Guelph brides, Palma is once more betrothed to Saint Boniface. Palma desires that Sordello shall compose the marriage hymn. To Naddo's surprise Sordello consents to depart at once for Verona.

And now comes the rest. Palma and Sordello are alone together in a room of the palace at Verona. All is confusion and excitement outside. The promised peace that was to crown the Guelph-Ghibelline alliances seems farther off than ever. It is time some strong hand seize the reins. Palma looks to Sordello. He can control the situation if he will only stand with the Ghibellines—make the Kaiser's cause his own. She speaks deliberately and with feeling. She tells him how she has loved him ever since the day when she first saw him; how she has planned for him, and how, at last, the time has come when her dreams may be realized. Sordello listens in silence. He is a man of thought rather than a man of action. He sets out for Ferrara, where the strife is at its height, to make a calm study of the merits of the two parties, so that he may choose his side in the contest. But the rival claims are bewildering; good and bad are mingled in both camps. Guelph or Ghibelline matters not, he concludes after much meditating. Man's welfare depends on neither. A new Rome, free from the bitterness of party strife, a great free commonwealth with justice and righteousness as its watchwords—this is his dream. But before sunset his dream dissolves. He sees that the race progresses slowly; that out of the good and evil of to-day are evolved the perfection of to-morrow. He sees that the Guelphs, led by the Pope, represent the popular cause—the people's party. Therefore, he decides to stand with the Guelphs, to persuade Salinguerra to stand with them. He goes to him and makes his plea in the presence of Palma. Salinguerra in turn tries to convert Sordello to the Ghibelline side, and ends by solemnly investing the poet with his own badge—the symbol of supreme leadership among the followers of the Emperor. All three are aware of the significance of the act. If Sordello will he may be chief of the more powerful of the two parties, and with Palma as his bride, rule all Northern Italy. But the price is oppression of the people, the sacrifice of his most sacred convictions. How often our modern statesmen have been tested by a similar temptation and have weakly chosen the badge of Cæsar and trampled in the dust the banner of the Cross. The moment is a dramatic one, and a dramatic revelation crowns it. Palma has long known certain facts concerning the birth and parentage of Sordello, facts concealed by the dead Adelaide for reasons of her own. Sordello is Salinguerra's son, who did not perish in the fire at Vicenza, as had always been supposed. Surely now he will accept his mission, will stand with

his father, with the Emperor. Sordello is aroused at last; Salinguerra is overcome. The girl leads the old warrior from the room. Sordello remains with the Emperor's badge upon his breast torn between conflicting emotions.

It is evening, and the moon is rising over the city. The badge gleams in the white light, burns into his very soul. He cannot think clearly; his head is hot. Palma had said something about his need of a determining outside influence to give coherence to his life, "some moon to control his spiritual sea-depths."

But years and years the sky above  
Held none, and so, untasked of any love,  
His sensitiveness idled, now amorphous,  
Alive now, and to sullenness or sport  
Given wholly up, disposed itself anew  
At every passing instigation, grew  
And dwindled at caprice, in foam-showers spilt,  
Wedge-like insisting, quivered now a gilt  
Shield in the sunshine, now a blinding race  
Of whitest ripples o'er the reef; found place  
For much display, not gathered up and hurried  
Right from the heart, encompassing the world.

Others with half his strength accomplish more, just because of the concrete definiteness of their working ideals. They are swayed by one, not many motives. He is strong and yet he needs external strength. Long ago he had discovered that he could not find that strength in nature; now he sees that he cannot find it in man. Even Palma's love is insufficient, for Palma's plans are for this world, and "there is a life beyond life." There is need of a power "utterly incomprehensible" and "out of all rivalry," a being at once human and divine, one who can love infinitely and be satisfied with a finite love in return. But this infinite being is none other than the Christ of the Christian Revelation. And those who would follow Him must love the Cross and wear the thorn-crown. The struggle is to the death, but Sordello is equal to it. He tears the badge from his breast and tramples it underfoot. Thus is his spiritual triumph complete. He has not failed as a man. But the physical strain is greater than he can bear. When Palma and Salinguerra return to receive his answer to their proposal, they find him dead. Palma kneels down to kiss his cold lips, and for a moment his heart beats audibly. But it is only for a moment. He is dead. Taurello and the Emperor must seek some other representative. Guelphs and Ghibellines must work out their salvation unaided by the dream-builder of a new Rome. As for the poet, his songs, as well as his life, are soon forgotten, all except the matchless description in the inspired Goito lay:

So, on a heathy brown and nameless hill  
By sparkling Asolo, in mist and chill,  
Morning just up, higher and higher runs  
A child barefoot and rosy . . . . .

Up and up goes he, singing all the while  
 Some unintelligible words to beat  
 The lark, God's poet, swooning at his feet,  
 So worsted is he at "*the few fine locks,*  
*Stained like pale honey, oozed from topmost rocks,*  
*Sun-blanch'd the livelong summer*"—all that's left  
*Of the Goito lay.*

It is morning; the child sings and Sordello sleeps.

Who would has heard Sordello's story told.

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## CONTRACT AS THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT.

SPINOZA, LOCKE AND ROUSSEAU.

SPINOZA, substituting for the materialistic tendency of Hobbes an openly declared pantheism, follows him in distinguishing a rude state of nature as precedent to a state of political organization wherein reason holds sway over primitive passions; not, indeed, with complete success, but with much improved results. In the first stage, at which there has been no revelation, there has been no knowledge of God; and because there has been no civil government, there has been no human justice. Man under such privation can offend only against himself or his own interests. "In statu naturali non datur peccatum; vel si quis peccat, is sibi et non alteri; et nihil absolute jure prohibetur nisi quod nemo potest." (Tract. Polit., Cap. II., n. 18.) "Ante revelationem nemo jure divino, quod non potest non ignorare, tenetur. Jus divinum incipit, a quo homines expresso pacto Deo promiserunt in omnibus obedire, quo sua libertate naturali quasi cesserunt et jus suum in Deum transtulerunt." (Tract. Theolog.-Polit., c. xvi.) Right is coextensive with might for the natural man as it is also for God: "Deus jus ad omnia habet, et jus Dei nihil aliud est quam ipsa Dei potentia." (Cap. II., n. 3.) Man-kind in this state must be estimated as regards conduct quite in the dry light of science. Human action must be understood, not evaluated; it has simply to be described on particular lines. "Sedulo curavi humanas actiones non lugere sed intelligere." (Cap. I., n. 4.) In this first stage, as in every other, all conduct is under rigorous necessity in its every detail, being determined by the one power which is divine: "Naturalium potestas nulla alia esse potest quam ipsa Dei aeterna potentia." (C. II., n. 2.) It is true that a large part of action in the natural man is the work of passion, which means



defect of reason. But passion is unblamable, for it is a part of inevitable nature: "Homo sola cupiditate ductus non agit nisi secundum regulas naturae hoc est, ex jure naturae." (Cap. II., n. 5.) Mental deformity, which in rude races is so great, is as little culpable as is bodily. Adam could not resist the attraction of the forbidden fruit (n. 6). He, like all his posterity, must follow the stream of nature, which, if bad at times for individuals, is good for the universe at large. "Quisquid nobis in natura ridiculum, absurdum, aut malum videtur, id inde est quod res tantum ex parte novimus, totiusque naturae ordinem maxima ex parte ignoramus" (n. 8).

The good of the universe must be purchased by evil for the individual; that is the explanation for all that is seemingly bad in nature. When we pass from this state of Spinoza's primeval nature to his cultivated, his better, state, with its civil government, we find that many of the old blotches are transferred to the new picture, because passion still retains a sway in human conduct which remains throughout as inevitable as ever. All we can say is that they are freest who, being the most intelligent, are least the slaves of their passions: "Maxime sui juris sunt qui maxime ratione decunter" (n. 11). By a compact in the new state men agree to form a civil society which has justice for its aim instead of the greatest exertion of individual strength on its own behalf. But unfortunately this compact of itself has only a utilitarian value, and breaks down where there is no force at hand to secure its observance. Of itself it lasts only as long as a contracting party does not find it convenient to change his mind: "Tantum rata manet fides quamdiu ejus qui fidem dedit non mutatur voluntas." (Cap. II., n. 12.) Hobbes speaks in the like way of compacts, but the force at the command of the government is a remedy against individual defaulters. It is necessary, therefore, to make the political power—of which democracy is the best form, while absolute monarchy is almost an unworkable form—strong enough to hold under control for the public good all attempts of private individuals to seek at its expense what they, with their limited outlook, consider better than adherence to the rigor of the social contract. Spinoza, severely condemning the individual preferences, says that no one can doubt how much more useful it is for men to live by law and the clear dictates of reason, because these aim at nothing but man's true utility. (Tract. Theol.-Polit., Cap. XVI. This account is twice given with a fair degree of consistency, once in the *Tractatus Politicus* and once in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.) The state is therefore a necessity, and must be founded "by a stable contract to live according to the light of reason alone, and to restrain appetite so far as it tends to the injury of others" (*ibid*). The state is the sole judge of what is genuinely

for the common good, hence the individual must submit his judgment to the state, unless the thing commanded is so outrageous—for instance, parricide—as to be what man cannot be expected to do, either for hopes or for fears—the only sanctions of government. Hence a qualification is added to the rule which is laid down so terribly in the Tract. Polit., Cap. III.: “*Quamvis subditus civitatis decreta iniqua censeat tenetur nihilominus exequi.*” The qualified form of Spinoza’s doctrine is that there are indeed cases wherein man is expected to act against reason in obedience to the state, because disobedience would be a greater evil than compliance with the irrational, or even the anti-rational (n. 6). Yet there is a bound set to such compliance in the case of evils beyond comparison mischievous (n. 8). As to religion, the state should leave that alone (Cap. III., 10),<sup>1</sup> giving no help to such works as church building (Cap. VI., 40). While all forms of religion should be tolerated which do not menace the Republic, no Church ought to be allowed to become an independent owner within the state.

Should the state, as above described, seem desperately tyrannous, there is hope for a remedy against the extremity of despotism, not in the right of rebellion, but in the fact that a grossly oppressive government actually destroys itself, *mole sua ruit*. Though not responsible to the people, it is subject to the laws of existence and of annihilation as laid down by nature and by God. The state can in some sense do no wrong, and if in another sense it does act wrongly, it is not to blame, inasmuch as all its acts are the acts of men whose conduct is determined by the laws of the divine nature working themselves out inevitably in the world’s course. Under such restrictions Spinoza makes the admission which from another point of view he denies, namely, that the sovereign power may do wrong: “*Peccat civitas: quando contra rationis dictamen agit aliquod: et est tum maxime sui juris, quando ex dictamine rationis agit: quatenus igitur contra rationem agit sibi deficit.*” (Cap. IV., n. 4.)

Enough has been said to show the unloveliness of the theory of political compact set forth by Spinoza. Being fatalistic throughout, it seeks to improve upon a lawless state of nature by a contractual law of justice which still leaves the people under great oppression, civil and religious, for which there is no remedy except in the gradually self-destructive action of tyranny when it goes to its extreme.

It is to Locke’s second book on government that we must look,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Tract. Theol.-Polit., c. 19. “*Justitia vim juris non potest accipere nisi ex jure imperii. Religio vim juris accipit qui ex solo eorum decreto qui jus imperandi habent. Deus nullum regnum in homines, habet nisi per eos qui imperium tenent.*”

for his first is spent on what we do not want, the refutation, namely, of Sir Robert Filmer's view that civil power is a gift descending from Adam through the patriarchs to its modern possessors; that monarchy is absolute, and "no man is born free." According to Filmer, it is a truth undeniable that there cannot be "any multitude of men whatever, either great or small, but that among them there is one man that hath a right to be king of all the rest as being the next heir to Adam. If Adam himself were still living and were ready to die, it is certain that there is one man in the world, and but one man, who is his next heir." (Bk. I., Chap. X., n. 104.) From this extravagance we may pass on to the next book, in which Locke deals with more serious considerations. Here Locke, while failing to correct Hobbes in his aggregation theory of society, which overlooks the organic society, dissents from him by denying that the state of nature is one of war; rather it is a state of rational inclination to amity, often upset by war, and providing very inadequate means to end a strife once begun. "We have a plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war. Mankind living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth that has authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature." (Part II., Chap. III., n. 19.) Each has then to judge and to uphold his own cause. As to the political proof that the state of nature ever existed, Locke does not insist upon that in its literal sense, regarding it rather as "probable that people who were naturally free, and by their own consent either submitted to the government of their father or united together out of different families to make a government, would generally put the rule into one man's hands without so much as express conditions limiting or regulating the power which they thought safe enough in his honesty and prudence, though they never dreamed of a monarch being *jure divino*." We have reason, then, to conclude that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people. He adds that the want of records testifying to peoples in the state of nature<sup>2</sup> are accounted for by the impracticability of continuing in such a state (Part II., Ch. VIII., n. 10), which, however, has been and still is a reality, "since all princes and rulers of independent governments are in a state of nature. It is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature, but only this one of agreeing mutually to enter into one community and form one body politic." (Part II., Chap. II., n. 14). In making the distinction between the

<sup>2</sup> It is lawful to consider the individual man in the abstract as endowed with rights limited by no social claim, if thereby we can illustrate principles, and do not mean to be describing concrete facts.

compact to form a society and the agreement to set up over that society a formal government, Locke more or less agrees with Hobbes and Rousseau, though the last has peculiarities of his own. "He that will with clearness speak of the dissolution of government," says Locke, "ought, in the first place, to distinguish between the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of government. That which makes the community and brings men out of the loose state of nature into one politic society is the agreement which every one has with the rest to act as one body and to be one distinct government." Theoretically, the multitude first agree to be one people, and then to have one ruling authority. (Part II., Ch. XIX., 211.) Society thus formed can, for a substantial violation of the conditions upon which sovereignty was granted, depose its ruler and set up another; it has no right or power to surrender itself to a slavery. This theory Locke advanced to justify the act of England in replacing James II. by William III., a kind of change which Hobbes had tried to make impossible by an extravagant view of indefeasible right from the force of contract in fixing immovably the absolute sovereignty. Locke, who, as a matter of indifference, terminologically uses "compact" instead of "contract," is more consistent and decidedly preferable in his principle that "the keeping of faith belongs to men as men" and not merely "as members of society," though the two aspects cannot really be separated. (Chap. II., 4.) He regards the ruler's faith as violable specially in three ways—by modifying laws to suit private interests, by imposing taxes without the authorization of the people, and by transferring the legislative power into unconstitutional hands. (Chap. II., 142.) Hence James II. had offended, in Locke's view of compact.

Aristotelians would see in Locke's theory too much of the mechanical aggregation and too little of the teleological organization. They would recognize in the state a political end settled by the very nature of man, to be attained by moral means; and their test of a constitution would be: Does it properly make for its goal? Of course, Locke cannot wholly leave out such considerations, but he fails to give them organic life. He saw the brutality of a government which would regard the people chiefly as a resource for taxes and for military recruits; he saw that even after the revolutionary change the English Government was still not an ideal constitution. But he thought that, at any rate, a step had been made in advance of Stuart practice and of the Hobbesian theory, which sought to stereotype that practice.

Before describing Rousseau's system we need a few preliminary remarks. Scholastic authors say that every action of man, no matter how detrimental to his final beatitude, has its spring in that ulti-

mate desire for it; his fundamental will is to perfect contentment, even while he knowingly sacrifices the dictate of his rational appetite by an irrational act. In some degree similarly Rousseau says that the people as a rational society really want always the common good, for that is natural tendency of man as *zoon politikon*, and he designates this will "*la volonté générale*" as opposed to "*la volonté de tous*" or "*la volonté d'un.*" Rousseau adds force to his view by asserting the essential goodness of human nature as such.<sup>3</sup>

When German philosophers took up Rousseau's idea, as they very fervently did, they extended it considerably in their own direction. Kant held that man as a rational nature prescribes to himself, with a categorical imperative, his own moral laws and own last end, and that in so doing he prescribes it likewise for all other men, as they each in turn do for him. It is the universally legislative will of each and all together. Thus men are laws to themselves, prescribing their own destiny and, if they are good, working it out. This is their essential liberty, which leads to self-realization. The seeming restraints on individual liberty which political organization demands are not really diminutions of it, for man is by nature social, and as such is best situated when the liberty of each stops short at the claims of equal liberty in all others. Hegel, with his idealism and monism, carried still further the theory of Kant concerning man as rational, free, *solidaire*, so that there could be no genuine opposition between people and sovereign in their true relationship. Nature was the same self-developing power everywhere, and worked out its own purpose by a fundamental logic of which individuals were mostly unconscious; so that it was not a refutation of the general will for the common good if many persons were not aware what precisely that good was, and did not consciously aim at it. These are ideas to be usefully kept in view while considering Rousseau's work, but we shall not explicitly apply them at the several stages. They may be tacitly kept in mind, but not attributed to him in their explicit shape, because he never held the opinions of German pantheism.

Nor must we perplex our course by pretending to say exactly what Hegel in his several utterances exactly taught as to organic society, "*la volonté générale*," the life of the individual in the totality of his *volk*, the power of the individual's personal life to take upon itself the form of eternity in order to act "*auf ewige Weise, sub specie aeternitatis*," and to reach an absolute ethic and religion. It is enough to be aware while considering Rousseau's "*volonté générale*" that it has been greatly amplified by German idealists, whom English copyists of our own day are following with much

<sup>3</sup> Socialists make a like claim for their *volonté générale*.

obsequiousness and attributing to Rousseau what he never maintained.

In his great work, "*Le Contrat Social*," Rousseau laments that free born men are everywhere reduced to slavery by the bad state of existent societies. In common with the later French Revolutionists, he calls man "good by nature,"\* yet allows that primitive state of nature, though free and contented, to have been something like Plato's city of swine, in that it lacked intellectual elevation and was infra-moral, lower, indeed, and less desirable than the civilization of modern Europe, which he denounced. After it came a condition of culture in which social life was spoilt by the abuses of private property and by the tyranny of the strong minority over the weak multitude; to remedy which he proposes the scheme of the social contract.

All the citizens should meet together to form themselves into one sovereign people. Always the people remain sovereign. They cannot give the sovereignty to representatives, such as are English members of Parliament. In England the only time of freedom is when, if we suppose universal suffrage, the people are in the election crisis and are doing their one sovereign act. The first process towards the social contract is by a unanimous vote of the majority, so they become fitted to start the solution of their great problem: "*Découvrir une forme d'association qui defende et protège de toute la force commune la personne et les biens de chaque associé et par laquelle chacun s'unissant à tous n'obeisse pourtant que lui-même et reste aussi libre qu'auparavant.*" This reservation of popular power, which Hobbes calls impossible, is provided for by Rousseau in "the general will," which is to be distinguished from the "will of all," inasmuch as the latter may be selfish, while the former, though it may misjudge the means, always makes its aim to be the public good. The difference may be roughly illustrated by a cricket team. If its members, for their individual glory, vote unanimously to play a game of hard hitting, which most attracts to the players singly the "*admiratio populi*," that is, the "will of all," but not the "general will," because part of the calculation is that the side as a whole is less likely to win the game. The general credit of the side as a side is sacrificed to a common desire for individual feats. We may omit to consider Rousseau's theory as to how the general will is left as the residue by the mutual neutralizations of individual self-seekings, at least if the voting is not by parties or sections, but is really by individual determinations. His plea that the will may be good while

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\* The exalted idea of the human race was not derived from Voltaire's "*le genre sot, méchant et fou, dans toute sa turpitude, et tout sa demence, dans ses misères et ses atrocités*"—that is, his description of mankind.

the judgment errs is more to the point, and it was anticipated by Thrasymachus, who urged that "the ruler as ruler does not go wrong."<sup>3</sup>

So far from magnifying self-sacrifice in his political theory, Rousseau insists that no one can give himself away for nothing: "Se donner gratuitement, c'est une chose inconcevable." By submission the citizen "forces himself to be free," free to exercise his best will, which is "la volonté générale," and to which corresponds "le moi commune," legislative on one side and subject to law on the other, like the human will on the Kantian account of its double position of noumenon and phenomenon.

Next in Rousseau's system to the constitution of the sovereign people, with its inalienable supremacy, which could cease only in the case that it should vote its self-dissolution, comes the appointment of the government, a merely administrative agency, and not an element in social contract itself, which is limited to the formation of one united sovereign people. The government lasts as long as it satisfies its master; it has no strictly legislative act, for that as an act of sovereignty is confined to the people in its General Assembly. No limited body of representatives can be entrusted with the prerogative. The government has the executive power according to the law, and any rules which it lays down are not strictly laws, but acts of the magistracy. Periodic meetings of the people are required to settle whether a government, once commissioned, is to be retained in office—Rousseau admitting, as we have seen, what nobody can deny, that the assembled people may fail to express that general will which is really for the common good—desiderates for the guidance of the sovereign assembly some very gifted individuals, who will act as its inspirers. So great, indeed, was the difficulty that the powers needed for such an office are superhuman. "La volonté générale est toujours droit, mais le jugement qui la guide ne le voit pas toujours. Pour découvrir les meilleurs règles de société il faudrait une intelligence suprême, qui vit toutes les passions des hommes, et qui n'en éprouvoit aucune: qui n'eût aucune rapport avec notre nature et qui la connaît du fond: dont le bonheur fut indépendant de nous, et qui pourtant voulait bien s'occuper du notre: enfin qui dans le progrès des temps, se ménageant une gloire éloignée, peut travailler dans un siècle et jouir une autre. Il faudrait des dieux pour donner les lois aux hommes. Celui qui rédige les lois ne doit avoir aucun droit législatif." Here the author admits a combination of impossibilities: "Une entreprise au dessus de la force humaine, et pour

<sup>3</sup> Plato *Repub.*, I. 14, 3, 4. Adam Smith held that the search of each man for his own greatest good is "led by an invisible hand" to result in the common good.

l'executeur une autorité qui n'est rien." As to such counsel-giving men as can be actually obtained, Rousseau did not expect in them the motive of love which urges a father to take care of his family; also he thought a purely dispassionate, disinterested service not obtainable. He therefore offered as a motive the pleasure of holding sway and the glory of the position. The lowness of such a view reminds one of the opinion put before Thrasymachus: "There is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor government provide for their own interest; men rule for the interests of their subjects, who are the weaker and not the stronger. And this is the reason why no one is willing to govern. In order that rulers may be willing to rule they must be paid in one of three kinds of payment—money or honor or a penalty for refusing." (*Republic*, 346-347.) The outlook in Europe when Rousseau proposed his reformed state was not promising for him. The American Republic and the French Republic of the Revolution tried<sup>6</sup> to give some effect to his scheme, but he himself was unfortunate enough to prophesy that Corsica, whose actual feat was to give Napoleon as a despot to France, would be a future triumph of his principles: "J'ar quelque pressentiment qu'un jour cette petite ile étonnera l'Europe."

Those who have an admiration of Rousseau do not defend his scheme as a whole: what they claim for him is that he started certain ideas which others could apply in a more practical way to the work of political amelioration. It was the mistake of French Revolutionists to take him literally. "Son esprit," says Taine; "anime la Constitution toute entière. Il semble que la nation ait pris son jeu de idéalogue au sérieux, sa fiction abstraite. Cette fiction elle l'exécute de point en point. Un contrat social effectif est spontané: une immense assemblée des hommes qui, pour la première fois, viennent librement s'associer leurs droits respectifs<sup>7</sup> s'engager pour un pacte explicite, se lier par un serment solennelle est la recette sociale présentée par les philosophes; on la suit à la lettre."

In the spirit of Rousseau's sentimentality his followers called themselves equals, friends, brothers. They were very festive in their demonstrations of fraternity; high-wrought feeling characterized their proceedings as a whole. This excess of sentiment was not, in fact, strengthening to character. E. Caird says that Rousseau was apt to take his resolves for the accomplishment of his desires, and to treat as facts what he had only proposed or rhetorically enunciated.

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<sup>6</sup> Arthur Young at the time said that the important question was whether the French would "copy the Constitution of England, freed from its faults, or attempt from theory something absolutely speculative."

<sup>7</sup> Engels complains that the reason which triumphed in the social contract was the bourgeoisie reason which neglected the proletariat.



## ROISIN DUBH.

THE proclivity of foreign correspondents to garble facts and then report them with a gloss of falsification is not a sin of modern growth. It has had for its advance agent since the world began "the father of lies," and it will continue while there is power in the dictatorial home office to force its prejudices into the words of its representative. The wide-reaching scope of this evil is known to every thorough student of history; a sentence that is almost a proverb in the language epitomizes the evil and its scope thus: "History is a conspiracy against the truth." And of more than Macaulay might it be said that his "history is his story." Almost every new historical study in our magazine literature is an effort to reconstruct popular opinion on past events and epochs.

Whatever may have been the pernicious effects of misrepresentation on great characters and nations in the world's history, it is not wide of the mark to say that Ireland has suffered as no other country from the pen of government emissaries, whether military or civilian. In support of this assertion the eloquent utterances of countless witnesses, who are not Irish in religion or nationality, might be adduced; this temperate statement<sup>1</sup> will be sufficient, with all its impartiality, from Douglas Hyde: "Few English Elizabethans, once they passed over into Ireland, seem to have been able either to keep faith or tell truth; there was never such a thoroughly dishonorable race or one so utterly devoid of all moral sense as the 'Irish statesmen' of that period."

The foreign correspondent whose prevarications are the occasion of this statement is (Proh pudor!) the poet of the Fairy Queen, Edmund Spenser. He had, of course, a cause to maintain—to keep his hold on the stolen grant of the Kilcomlan estate—and not possessing a "bonhomme" that might win him a way among the natives nor a military outfit that could terrify them, he had recourse to other weapons. All is fair in love or war, he may have said; and again, the pen is mightier than the sword. Spenser's pen had inspiration for other things than charming poetry, and it most likely helped to write the famous "Act" of Elizabeth which condemned the Irish bards;<sup>2</sup> for we find phrases from Spenser's reports identical with

<sup>1</sup> "Literary History of Ireland," Douglas Hyde, p. 495.

<sup>2</sup> One "item" of the Act of Elizabeth reads thus: "For that those rhymours by their ditties and rhymes made to divers lords and gentlemen in Ireland to the commendation and high praise of extortion, rebellion, rape, ravin and other injustice, encourage those lords and gentlemen rather to follow those vices than to leave them, and for the making of said rhymes rewards are given by the said lords and gentlemen, let orders be taken for the abolishing of so heinous an abuse."

those in the act. But however high-sounding the indictment is against the bards, as announced by the act and by Spenser's criticism, their poems were not the praise of "extortion, rebellion, rape, ravin and other injustice;" in no measure were they so blameworthy, as any one may see from a perusal of hundreds of poems that still exist from those very bards.<sup>3</sup> But treasonable they were because of a patriotism that was condemned; because they endeavored to fan into flame the smouldering sparks of national life and tended to what Spenser called "the hurt of the English and the maintenance of their owne lewde libertie." The strong national spirit of the Scotch border ballads and the Spanish minstrelsy that was so effective against the Moor win the world's attention for their very racial vigor. But Irish ballads have had a stigma of reproach upon them because they had the pulse-beat of the motherland. Such was the lawlessness and "other injustice" of the songs of O'Gnive, the bard of Shane O'Neill, "that often flung the stirrupless lancers of Ulster like a falling rock upon the armies of Elizabeth;" and that was, no doubt, the motive for condemning men like O'Daly, the bard of the Wicklow clans, and O'Mulconry, the laureate of Ireland in his day.

The Act went into force and many a good poet had his head taken off. But the spirit of song was a birthright of the people and was not to die easily; it was part of their very life and would perish only with their final extermination. The bards were not "white-livered," and they exercised their art even in the face of exile and the scaffold. They had the ingeniousness which is a characteristic of their countrymen. To escape the terrible penalties which were set upon their patriotic songs they adopted allegorical names for their native land, usually some endearing name of a woman; and, as if addressing some fair maiden in distress, with strong words of love and devotion, they sang in reality the praises and hopes of their beloved Erin. The circumstances of the times made the allusions in the allegory easily intelligible to the people. By this device the poets kept themselves safe from the clutches of the law, and yet did they reach the heart of the nation with stirring songs of patriotism.

The name that was most frequently given to Ireland in the allegorical ballads of the Elizabethan times was "Roisin Dubh," the "Dark Little Rose," or sometimes entitled "Rois Gheal Dubh," the "Dark Fair Rose." And the most famous of the Roisin Dubh poems was that by the bard of Hugh the Red O'Donnell, the celebrated Tírconnellian chieftain. There are many English renditions<sup>4</sup> of this splen-

<sup>3</sup> Douglas Hyde (*ibid.*, p. 495) gives witness here: "I have read hundreds of poems of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but have never come across a single syllable in laudation of either 'extortion, rape, ravin or other injustice.'"

<sup>4</sup> A translation of one of the Roisin Dubh poems by Thomas Furlong

did ballad, but the translation that is worthy of a place in any English anthology of lyrics is by James Clarence Mangan, under the name "The Dark Rosaleen." Three of the seven stanzas from Mangan's rendition will suffice to show some of the excellence of the famous song. Here, as in the original, the gallant lover of the Dark Rosaleen is the O'Donnell; he has been oversea and has returned with the blessing of Rome and the promise of military aid from Spain, or, as the allegory calls them, wine from the royal Pope and Spanish ale.

O, my Dark Rosaleen,  
Do not sigh, do not weep!  
The priests are on the ocean green,  
They march along the deep.  
There's wine from the royal Pope  
Upon the ocean green;  
And Spanish ale shall give you hope,  
My Dark Rosaleen! My own Rosaleen!  
Shall glad your heart, shall give you hope,  
Shall give you health, and help, and hope,  
My Dark Rosaleen!

Over hills, and through dales,  
Have I roamed for your sake;  
All yesterday I sailed with sails  
On river and on lake.  
The Erne at its highest flood,  
I dashed across unseen,  
For there was lightning in my blood,  
My Dark Rosaleen! My own Rosaleen!  
O! there was lightning in my blood,  
Red lightning lightened all my blood,  
My Dark Rosaleen!

Woe and pain, pain and woe,  
Are my lot night and noon,  
To see your bright face clouded so,  
Like to the mournful moon.  
But yet will I rear your throne  
Again in golden sheen;  
'Tis you shall reign, shall reign alone,  
My Dark Rosaleen! My own Rosaleen!  
'Tis you shall have the golden throne,  
'Tis you shall reign, and reign alone,  
My Dark Rosaleen!

When O'Donnell died in Spain from the poison that the emissary of Carew and Mountjoy administered, and when the "Flight of the Northern Earls" left Ireland without its gallant heroes, even then the allegorical poetry did not end. The Jacobite wars came on, and with them entered a new conventionality into the song structure.<sup>5</sup> The

(1794-1827) is well known among the popular ballads of Ireland, and it is still sung as if it were a real love poem without any allegorical meaning. Various musical settings are given to the song by Petrie, Bunting and O'Daly. That by Dr. Joyce is a chosen one, and of it Dr. Joyce wrote in 1888: "I have been familiar with the air since my childhood, and I have always heard it sung and played in minor; and I believe that it is only the minor mode that brings out the true character. I give the simple and, as I believe, the most ancient vocal version, as I heard it sung by the best singers among the old people of Munster forty years ago."

<sup>5</sup> Dr. Sigerson ("Bards of the Gael and Gall," p. 413) finds this conventional form of ancient Irish origin. One of the Monks of St. Gall, he shows, had used it in Latin nine hundred years before. For specimens of the Jacobite ballads in this form, see "The Poets of Ireland," p. 90, A. M. Williams.

womanly names were continued and the allegory was extended in many ways. They express at times an anxious longing for the union of Una and Donald—that is, of Ireland and the Stuart. Again there is a greater variety of names than in the Elizabethan times. Sometimes the maiden is Grana Weal, the young princess of Connaught whose exploits and adventures were famous in the land; again it was Sheela Ni Guira, or Moreen Ni Cullenan, or the name that another translation by Mangan has made famous, Caitilin Ni Uallachain.\*

According to the allegorical form of the Jacobite poetry, the poet, as he wanders in lonely contemplation, sees a queenly maiden of exquisite beauty and grace sitting alone and in tears near some fairy rath by moonlight or in the shadow of some ruined castle of ancient splendor. The poet's attention is drawn towards the poor woman in distress, and with gentle courtesy he asks who may she be—is she Helen, "who caused Troy town to burn," or Venus, the bright goddess, or is she the beloved of Finn or of Deidre, "for whom the sons of Usnach died?" These are the types that were most frequently used, and they show the intermingling of classical mythology with Irish tradition.

If these later poems are defective on some art course, it is easy to win pardon for them when we consider the insuperable difficulties under which they were written. With circumstances a little more favorable, the native poetry of Ireland of that period would have rivaled, if not excelled, the richness of the contemporaneous Scotch ballads. Even after the terrible devastation of intervening years there is enough of the Irish Jacobite poetry to make a large sized volume.<sup>†</sup> And these poems, with others that have come down from Elizabethan times, have a merit that puts them beyond the cavilling pen of the mere literary critic. They made the heart of the nation beat high during perilous times; they nerved the hands of the people to action; they held the great ideal fast in the minds of their children and their children's children—steadfastness to the ancient religion and nationality, and they made the halo of hope shine brightly over every defeat with a splendor as undimmed to-day as it was a thou-

\* Two verses of the Caitilin Ni Uallachain that Mangan freely translated are these:

Think her not a ghastly hag, too hideous to be seen;  
Call her not unseemly names, our matchless Kathaleen.  
Young she is, and fair she is, and would be crowned a queen,  
Were the King's son at home here with Kathaleen Ny-Houlahan!

Sweet and mild would look her face, O none so sweet and mild,  
Could she crush the foes by whom her beauty is reviled;  
Woolen plaids would grace herself and robes of silk her child,  
If the King's son were living here with Kathaleen Ny-Houlahan!

† Douglas Hyde, *ibid.*, p. 596. In the second volume of Hardiman's "Irish Minstrelsy" and in O'Daly's "Irish Jacobite Poetry," in its second edition, about fifty of these poems may be found.

sand years ago, when the Danes were swept back into the sea from the field at Clontarf. The *Roisin Dubh* still lives and sings to the sweet-sounding lyre of the younger Irish poets. Her realm is a larger world to-day than was the little island of which Edmund Spenser sent a report home to Elizabeth; it is great with numerous and brave men and women in ten thousand corners of the earth, and it is of their "empery" that the *Roisin Dubh* sings in Aubrey de Vere's song of that name:

I am black but fair, and the robe I wear  
Is dark as earth;  
My cheek is pale, and I bind my veil  
With a cypress wreath.  
Where the night shades flower I build the tower  
Of my secret rest;  
O kind is sleep to the eyes that weep  
And the bleeding breast.

My palace floor I tread no more;  
No throne is mine;  
No sceptre I hold, nor drink from gold  
Of victory's wine;  
Yet I rule a Queen in the worlds unseen  
By Sassanach eye;  
A realm I have in the hearts of the brave  
And an empery.

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PIUS VII. AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.—IX.

WHILE Napoleon was engaged in his campaign in Russia, Pius VII. led the same retired life in the Palace of Fontainebleau that he had led at Savona, for he considered himself as being still a prisoner. He refused to leave the Palace and to make use of the imperial carriages which had been placed at his service; and he preferred to say Mass in private at an altar placed in one of his rooms, rather than in the chapel of the Palace, where he would have been surrounded with greater splendor and ceremony. Some of the Cardinals then residing in Paris and known as the "red Cardinals,"<sup>1</sup> as well as the Bishops favorable to the imperial policy who had formed the deputation to Savona, were allowed to visit the Holy Father and to take up their residence at Fontainebleau. In their interviews with the Pope they did not fail to place before him the lamentable condition of

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<sup>1</sup> The "red Cardinals" were those who had assisted at the Emperor's marriage with the Archduchess Maria Louisa, and had thereby merited his favor, while the thirteen Cardinals who had absented themselves were banished to various provincial towns and deprived of the right of wearing their robes. They were therefore known as the "black Cardinals." See THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for January, 1910, p. 154.

the Church, which since so many years had been unable to communicate with its supreme head. They depicted the sufferings of the Cardinals and prelates who, as well as large numbers of the clergy of the Papal States, had been banished or flung into prison on account of their resistance to the Emperor's will. Unless this state of affairs, they said, were ended without delay, the bonds which united the various churches to the centre of unity might, perhaps, be severed and a schism would ensue. There was only one way to remedy these evils; it was to grant the Emperor's demands and be reconciled to him. These arguments could not fail to produce a profound impression on the Holy Father, worn out and enfeebled both in mind and body by his long imprisonment at Savona, and the fatigue he had undergone in his journey from thence to Fontainebleau. But though Pius VII. listened patiently to these observations, he gave no other reply than what he had already so often given to similar advice from the Emperor's emissaries, and refused to do anything until he was set free and was assisted by his counsellors. Then he would see what measures ought to be adopted in order to restore peace.<sup>2</sup>

Napoleon's Russian campaign had been opened by several brilliant victories; but it had ended by a disastrous retreat, in which the greater part of the army of 500,000 men with which he had crossed the Niemen on July 24, 1812, perished of cold and hunger. Fearing for the security of his throne, the instability of which was made evident by the conspiracy of General Malet, the Emperor saw the necessity of speedily returning to France; and, abandoning the disorganized remains of his troops, he reappeared suddenly in Paris on December 18. After taking the necessary steps to raise another army and place the Empire in a state of defense, he turned his attention to his relations with the Holy See. While he was engaged in the preparations for his campaign Pius VII. had written to him twice, but he had not deigned to reply, except indirectly, by a letter which he ordered his Minister of Worship to address to the Cardinals and Bishops who had been deputed to Savona. It criticized the actions of the Holy Father in the most insolent and contemptuous tone; he was accused of ignorance, and advised to resign. It was evidently the Emperor's intention that the prelates should communicate this letter to the Pope; but, as they had already left Savona, it was M. de Chabrol, the Prefect of the Department, who performed that duty.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cardinal Bartolomeo Pacca, *Memorie Storiche*, Orvieto, 1843, t. II., p. 87. Comte d'Haussonville, *L'Église Romaine et le premier Empire (1800-1814)*, Paris, 1869, t. V., p. 172. Henri Welschinger, *Le Pape et l'Empereur (1804-1815)*, Paris, 1905, p. 348. P. Mario Rinaldi, *Napoleone e Pio VII. (1804-1813)*, Torino, 1906, t. II., p. 315.

<sup>3</sup> See *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW* for July, 1910, p. 443.

Now, however, that Napoleon's misfortunes had shown him that he was not invincible, and that he was aware of the animosity which his treatment of the Sovereign Pontiff and of the clergy had excited against him among the Catholic nations of Europe, he felt the necessity of being reconciled with the Holy Father, especially with the view of maintaining the alliance with Austria, and he saw that it was his duty to take the initiative. On the eve, therefore, of the New Year he sent to the Holy Father by an officer of his household a letter in which, after congratulating him on the restoration of his health, he assured him that, in spite of the events which had taken place, he still preserved the same friendship for him; he expressed the hope that they might succeed in putting an end to the dissensions between the Church and the State; as for his part he was willing to do so, and that the matter depended entirely on His Holiness.<sup>4</sup>

To thank the Emperor for this unexpected show of friendship and to reply to his wish of coming to an understanding, the Pope sent to Paris Cardinal Giuseppe Doria, who had formerly held the post of Nuncio there, and it was soon decided to negotiate once more. Mgr. Duvoisin, Bishop of Nantes, well known as an active supporter of Napoleon's views at the Council of Paris, was named by the Emperor to represent him in this discussion, which was to be held at Fontainebleau, where were also assembled Cardinals Fabrizio, Ruffo, Dugnani and De Bajane, Mgr. Bertazzoli, Archbishop of Edessa; Mgr. de Barral, Archbishop of Tours; Mgr. Mannay, Bishop of Trèves, and the Bishop of Evreux. Some of the demands which the Bishop of Nantes was instructed to present to the Pope were so exorbitant that the Emperor must have known that they could not be accepted, and may perhaps have wished to seem to make a great concession on withdrawing them. They were: Firstly, that the Pope and his successors before being crowned should swear never to do or to order anything contrary to the four propositions of the Gallican clergy. Secondly, that the Pope and his successors should in future name only one-third of the Sacred College, the other two-thirds should be named by the Catholic sovereigns. Thirdly, the Pope should disapprove and condemn by a brief the conduct of the Cardinals who had refused to assist at the Emperor's marriage with the Archduchess Maria Louisa—in which case, and provided that they accepted and signed the brief, the Emperor would forgive them and allow them to rejoin the Pope. But Cardinals Pacca and Di Pietro were to be excluded from this pardon and were

<sup>4</sup> Correspondance de Napoléon I., publié par ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon III., Paris, 1868, t. XXIV., No. 19.402. Au Pape Pie VII., Paris, 29 Décembre, 1812.

never to be allowed to approach the Holy Father. Other articles stipulated that the Holy Father should reside in Paris, where he should receive a yearly income of two millions of francs (\$400,000) and be allowed to receive the envoys of foreign powers. The Emperor claimed the right of nominating the Bishops of the Papal States, and the Pope was to recognize the new delimitation of their sees. Finally, the Pope was to grant canonical institution within a delay of six months to the Bishops of France and Italy nominated by the Emperor, or, if he failed to do so, the metropolitan or the senior Bishop of the province should confer it.<sup>5</sup>

It is not surprising that, as the Bishop of Nantes informed the Minister of Worship, the presentation of these demands should have caused the Holy Father very great pain. He objected especially to the obligation of residing in Paris, to the suppression of the suburbicarian bishoprics and to the mode of selecting the Cardinals, which would not leave him enough of influence in the formation of the Sacred College, which acts as the Papal council. Above all, he asked, as previously at Savona, to be assisted by his advisers.<sup>6</sup> The Holy Father knew what advice he would be likely to receive from the Cardinals then at Fontainebleau, and though willing to make what concessions he could in order to appease the Emperor, he did not wish to come to any decision until he was restored to liberty and surrounded by the Sacred College. A few days of intense mental suffering caused by this state of anxiety broke down the Holy Father's health, and in a second letter to the Minister the Bishop of Nantes told him that he did not think that the Holy Father was capable of taking part in a discussion; that he was in a state of great agitation and could not sleep, and repeated continually that, though he was anxious to please the Emperor, his conscience would not allow him to decide while he was alone, imprisoned and deprived of councillors. The Bishop added that, as he wanted an answer, he was watching for the moment when he might ask for it without causing the Holy Father too much emotion.

Napoleon evidently thought that the Pope's power of resistance had been at last sufficiently enfeebled, and that it was time for him to intervene and win the final victory. On the 18th of January he ordered a hunt to take place in the woods of Melun, and toward the end of the day, as if by a sudden inspiration, he sent for a traveling carriage and drove to Fontainebleau, whither he had already requested the Empress to go. It was already night when he arrived,

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<sup>5</sup> Pacca, *Memorie*, t. II., p. 199. Rinaldi, II., p. 319.

<sup>6</sup> D'Haussonville, t. V., p. 218. Mgr. Duvoisin au Ministre des Cultes, Fontainebleau, 11 Janvier, 1812.



and the Pope was conversing with the Cardinals and Bishops who resided in the Palace when Napoleon suddenly entered the room. The visitors at once withdrew, and the Emperor, as though he were on the most friendly terms with the Holy Father, saluted him affectionately, while the Pope received him with much satisfaction, apparently under the impression that he found in him some signs of repentance. On the following day the Pope and the Emperor began to discuss the important questions which were pending between them. No one assisted at these interviews, the outcome of which was the agreement known as the Concordat of Fontainebleau, and little has been known hitherto of what took place there, except that Napoleon, when irritated by the Holy Father's resistance to his demands, showed his anger by addressing him in dictatorial and contemptuous language; he even accused him of being ignorant of ecclesiastical matters.<sup>7</sup> Some light, however, has recently been thrown on this event by the publication of a document from the Vatican archives, in which Cardinal Gaziola, Bishop of Cervia, has related the account given him by the Holy Father of the means employed by Napoleon to obtain his signature. The Pope, unmoved by the Emperor's outbursts of ill temper, had steadily persisted in rejecting his proposals, until at last Napoleon presented to him a document containing articles which he said were the preliminaries of the future Concordat. He asked him to examine them and see if they could be accepted, assuring him that they should not be published until they had been agreed upon and until he (the Pope) had approved of them. This the Holy Father steadily refused to do, and still more to sign them. But Napoleon protested so strongly that they were only the preliminaries for a Concordat which should end all controversy and misunderstanding, and that they should not be shown to any one until they had been examined, corrected and approved of, that he overcame his resistance.<sup>8</sup>

The preamble of the Concordat confirms this account, for it states that "His Majesty the Emperor and King and His Holiness, wishing to put an end to the dissensions which have arisen between them and settle the difficulties existing with regard to several ecclesiastical matters, have agreed on the following articles, which are to serve for a definitive arrangement." The eleventh and last article, too, declares that "the Holy Father agrees to the above mentioned stipulations out of consideration for the present state of the Church, and trusting that his Majesty will grant his powerful protection to the many wants of religion in our present times."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Pacca, *Memorie*, t. III., p. 92.

<sup>8</sup> Rinieri, II., p. 326.

<sup>9</sup> Welachinger, p. 357.

The first article of this Concordat declared that the Pope should exercise the Pontificate in France and in Italy in the same manner and with the same forms as his predecessors. The second granted to the ambassadors and envoys accredited to the Pope by foreign powers, and to those sent to foreign powers by the Pope, the same immunities and privileges as those possessed by the diplomatic body. The third exempted from taxation the domains belonging to the Holy Father; those which had been alienated were to be replaced by an income of 2,000,000 of francs (\$400,000). By the fourth article the Emperor obtained at last the important concession for which he had so long intrigued. It declared that within the six months following a nomination by the Emperor to an archbishopric or a bishopric the Pope should confer canonical institution on the nominee in conformity with the Concordat and in virtue of the present Indult. The preliminary information should be made by the metropolitan. If the Pope had not granted confirmation before the expiration of that delay, the metropolitan, or, in his default, or in the case of the metropolitan himself, the senior Bishop of the province should grant confirmation to the nominee, so that no see should remain vacant more than a year. The fifth article gave the Pope the right of nomination to ten sees in France or in Italy, to be agreed upon subsequently. By the sixth the suburbicarian sees were restored and the right of nomination to them left to the Pope. On the death of the Bishops of Anagni and Bieti, their dioceses were to be united to the above sees, in conformity with an agreement to be made between his Majesty and the Holy Father. By the seventh article the Bishops of the Roman States absent from their dioceses, "in consequence of circumstances,"<sup>10</sup> might be made Bishops *in partibus*—they were to be granted pensions equal to the revenues they had possessed, and they could be nominated to vacant sees either of the empire or of the kingdom of Italy. The eighth article stated that his Majesty and His Holiness should come to an understanding as to the reduction to be made, if necessary, in the bishoprics of Tuscany and of the State of Genoa, and also as to those to be created in Holland and in the Hanseatic departments. The ninth decreed that the Propaganda, the Penitentiary and the Archives should be established wherever the Pope should reside. The tenth article assured that the Emperor would restore his favor to the Cardinals, Bishops, priests and laymen who had incurred his displeasure on account of the present circumstances.<sup>11</sup>

Such was the Concordat which was signed on the evening of

<sup>10</sup> A euphemistic way of indicating the Bishops who had been sent into exile for refusing to take the oath to the Emperor, and whose dioceses had been suppressed in order to be united to others.

<sup>11</sup> Rinieri, t. II, p. 323.

January 25, 1813, by Pius VII., when broken down in health by his long imprisonment, worn out by the solicitation of the Cardinals and Bishops who supported the Emperor's policy and deceived by Napoleon's assurances that it represented merely a basis for future negotiations and was to be kept secret until finally accepted. Besides the Emperor and Empress, the Cardinals and Bishops then residing in the palace assisted at the signature of the Concordat. At the last moment the Holy Father hesitated and, recoiling from the momentous act he was about to perform, looked towards them imploringly, as though to ask for a word of advice, but they remained silent. One of them bent his head, thus implying that all resistance was useless, and the Pope, yielding at last, signed the Concordat. The Emperor added his signature, and, in spite of his promise to keep the matter secret, he hastened to send a copy to the Emperor of Austria, asking him, it is true, not to publish it; and another to the Duke of Lodi, Chancellor of the kingdom of Italy, directing him not to publish the text, but to spread the news that a Concordat had been signed.<sup>12</sup> The next day those who had most contributed to the Emperor's success received their rewards. Cardinals Doria and Ruffo were named officers of the Legion of Honor, Mgr. Bertazzoli a Knight of the Iron Crown, and all three received gold snuff boxes enriched with diamonds. The Archbishop of Tours and the Bishop of Nantes were made Councillors of State; Cardinal Bajane and the Bishop of Evreux, Senators.

As a result of the Concordat the Cardinals who had been imprisoned in fortresses or forced to reside in various towns under the supervision of the police were set free and allowed to come to Fontainebleau. The strictness with which the Holy Father had been guarded until then was somewhat relaxed; it was allowed to assist at his Mass, and many persons from all parts of France hastened to take advantage of the privilege.<sup>13</sup>

Napoleon returned to Paris three days after the signature of the Concordat, and Pius VII., overcome with grief at having yielded at last to the Emperor's importunity, and fearing the evil effects on the welfare of the Church which might be the result of his concessions, fell into the same state of deep melancholy which he had experienced at Savona. The first of the "black Cardinals" to reach Fontainebleau were di Pietro, Gabrielli and Litta. They discussed with the Pope the articles he had been induced to sign, and their observations contributed not a little to increase his remorse. His grief was so intense that it caused him sleepless nights. He abstained almost

<sup>12</sup> Correspondance de Napoléon I., t. XXIV., No. 19,510. A. M. Melzi Duca de Lodi, 25 Janvier, 1813. No. 19,511. A. François L., Empereur d'Autriche, 25 Janvier, 1813.

<sup>13</sup> Pacca, *Memorie*, III., p. 95. D'Haussonville, t. V., p. 242.

entirely from food, and the effect on his health was so marked that when Cardinal Pacca arrived at Fontainebleau on February 18, after being released from Fenestrelle, he was seriously alarmed. The Cardinal, who on his way had been everywhere received with manifestations of sympathy and admiration, such as were due to one who had suffered so much for the cause of the Church, was struck on arriving at the palace by the solitude and the silence which prevailed around it, instead of the animation which he had expected to find. It seemed to him that he was entering "not a royal dwelling, but a state prison." When he was presented to the Pope he was shocked and grieved to see him so changed. He was pale, emaciated, his sunken eyes stared fixedly, like those of one in a stupor. When the Cardinal told him that he had hastened to come to express to him his admiration for the heroic constancy with which he had undergone a long and severe imprisonment, the Pope replied sadly: "But we have at last disgraced ourselves. Those Cardinals dragged me to the table and forced me to sign."<sup>14</sup> At a second audience on the same day Pacca succeeded in calming somewhat the Holy Father's grief by assuring him that when the other Cardinals who had given such undoubted proofs of their devotion to the Holy See came to the palace they would help him to find a remedy for the misfortune which had occurred, and that there was hardly any evil for which, with good-will, some remedy might not be found. That evening Cardinal Consalvi arrived, and by the end of the month the thirteen Cardinals who had been known as the "black Cardinals" were again assembled round the Holy Father, some of them lodging in the palace and others in the town of Fontainebleau.

Pius VII. then requested each of the Cardinals to state in writing what he thought of the new Concordat, and to add whatever suggestions he might think fit to make with regard to it. The replies showed that there existed in the Sacred College two very different opinions on the subject. Some Cardinals, among whom were even a few of those known as "black," dreading the consequences of the fury to which Napoleon would give way on learning the failure of his plans, thought that it would be better to accept the Concordat, and when the time came for the final negotiation, to demand the insertion of some clauses more favorable to the Pope and to the Holy See. Others, on the contrary, advised the Holy Father to revoke and annul openly all his concessions, for that was the only way to avert the great misfortunes which the execution of such a Concordat would not fail to bring upon the Church. This revocation should be made publicly, and the Holy Father should declare that he

<sup>14</sup> Pacca, *Memorie*, II., p. 196. "Ma ci siamo in fine sporcificati. Quei Cardinali . . . mi strascinarono al tavolino e mi fecero sottoscrivere."

retracted all that he had conceded, and that he had committed a grievous fault in making concessions which he could not make and ought never to have made. This opinion, which the most influential Cardinals had adopted in their discussions on the subject, was communicated to the Pope by Cardinal Consalvi, and though it was painful and humiliating to make such a retraction, he gladly accepted the suggestion and fully approved of it. As to the best method of carrying out their advice, the Cardinals, after much deliberation, came to the conclusion that the Holy Father ought to inform the Emperor of his resolution by an autograph letter, a copy of which he should then show to the Cardinals, and allow them to make it known to the public in every way they could.<sup>15</sup>

Any hesitation which the Cardinals might have felt in recommending the Pope to take such a decisive step as to annul the Concordat had been set aside by Napoleon himself. The Emperor's suspicions had been aroused by the reports furnished by his spies of the frequent interviews which took place between the Pope and the Cardinals, and the Holy Father's delay to grant the bulls of canonical institution which had been demanded, as well as his refusal to accept the first instalment of his pension, made it seem probable that he had changed his mind with regard to the Concordat. Hoping, therefore, to hinder Pius VII. from taking such a step, the Emperor resolved to render it obligatory without delay, and published it as a law of the empire by a decree given at the Palace of the Tuileries on February 13, although he had promised to keep it secret, and the preamble stated that it was merely intended to serve as a basis for a definitive arrangement.<sup>16</sup>

It was necessary to take great precautions to enable the Holy Father to write his letter to the Emperor, for so minute was the supervision exercised over his actions by Napoleon's spies that every day while he celebrated Mass in his chapel an emissary of the police visited his room, opened his desk and his presses with false keys and examined all his papers. The Holy Father was so feeble that he could not compose or write more than a small portion of this document at a time. Every morning, therefore, Cardinals Consalvi and di Pietro brought him the letter, some of which he had written on the previous day. He then added a few lines, and worked again at it in the afternoon. In the evening the original draft and the copy were

<sup>15</sup> Pacca, *Memorie*, t. III., pp. 112-114.

<sup>16</sup> This decree, accompanied by the text of the Concordat, was printed in the *Bulletin des Lois*, 4e Série, t. XVIII., p. 485, No. 488, and ordered to be sent to all the courts of law, to be inscribed in their registers and observed by them. By another decree of 25th March the Emperor reminded the Archbishops, Bishops and chapters that they were obliged to obey the new Concordat.

carried away by Cardinal Pacca to Cardinal Pignatelli's lodging, where the Cardinals could meet without exciting suspicion, as he was confined to his rooms by paralysis, and Pacca frankly confesses how intense was the anxiety which he often felt while passing before the sentinels lest he should be arrested and searched. The letter took several days to write, as the Holy Father recommenced it more than once. When it was finished, on March 24, he gave it to Colonel Lagorse, the officer of gendarmes who had brought him from Savona, and requested him to place it at once in the Emperor's hands.

Pius VII. began this retraction of the Concordat by frankly stating that though the confession which he was about to make and the displeasure which it would cause the Emperor were most painful to him, yet the fear of the Divine judgment, to which his great age and his feeble health were gradually bringing him nearer, made him conquer every other consideration, as well as the grief which he felt. He assured his Majesty that since the day on which he had signed the articles which were to serve as a basis for a definitive treaty the greatest remorse and the most intense contrition had tortured his soul, and left it without peace or rest. He had immediately seen the error into which he had been led by the desire of ending as soon as possible the dissensions with regard to the affairs of the Church and of pleasing his Majesty, and continual meditation had shown it to him more clearly. Only one consideration appeased somewhat his grief, namely, that when the time came for a final arrangement the harm which his signature had done to the Church might have been amended, but, to his great surprise and grief, and in spite of the agreement made with his Majesty, these articles, which were only the basis for a future treaty, had been published with the title of a Concordat. It was only the desire to act with prudence and to avoid precipitation in such an important matter that had prevented him from at once expressing his feelings and protesting. He resolved then to wait until the Sacred College was assembled, in order that he might consult it, not as to what he should do to correct what he had done, but as to the best mode of executing his intention. What seemed to him most advisable was to write this letter to the Emperor confessing with apostolic frankness that there were many articles in this deed which his conscience would not allow him to carry out, for he acknowledged with grief and confusion that to do so would be to exercise his power not for edification, but for destruction.

He then quoted with regard to the Concordat the words applied by Pascal II. to a concession extorted from him by the Emperor Henry V., and of which he repented: "We acknowledge, and therefore confess, that this document is bad, and, with the help of the

Lord, we desire that it should be completely amended so that no harm may ensue to the Church and no injury to our soul." Some of the articles, indeed, might be corrected, but others were intrinsically bad, contrary to justice and to the government of the Church as established by our Lord Jesus Christ, and could not therefore be executed or allowed to exist. How could he, for instance, be so unjust as to deprive so many Bishops of their sees and allow the suppression of the same sees without any canonical reason? The suppression of sees in 1801 was an exceptional measure acknowledged to be necessary to put an end to a schism and to lead a great nation back to the centre of unity. Does one of these reasons now exist to justify before God and before men the measure prescribed in one of these clauses?

Pius VII. also showed that his authority could not be subjected to that of a metropolitan, who would thereby be made the judge of the Sovereign Pontiff. That concession had, indeed, been made by the brief given at Savona, but there were some variations in it. Even then, as he frankly confessed, the concession was a mistake, but he had hoped thereby to relieve the sufferings of the Church. That brief, however, had been rejected by the Emperor, so the concessions it granted had ceased to exist. His conscience also reproached him, he said, for not having mentioned, as he ought to have done, in these articles his rights to the dominions of the Holy See, which the oaths he had taken on his election to the Papacy obliged him to claim and to maintain. Though well aware, he added, of the obligations imposed by these stipulations, he also knew that, being opposed to the divine institutions and to his duty, they must yield to an obligation of a superior order which forbade their observance and rendered it illegal. He concluded by assuring the Emperor that he ardently desired to come to a definitive understanding with him, but on a basis which should be compatible with his duties, and he implored of God to grant him abundant blessings.<sup>17</sup>

The Holy Father then summoned the Cardinals to his presence one by one, as he wished to avoid the accusation of holding a meeting, and showed to each of them a copy of his letter and of an Allocution addressed to the Sacred College, in which he placed the facts before them, expressed his regret at what had occurred, and again declared that the Concordat of January 25, as well as the Brief of Savona, should be considered as no longer in existence. They would thus have no injurious effect on the Divine constitution of the Church or the rights of the Holy See. "Blessed be the Lord!" he exclaimed in concluding, "who has not turned away His mercy from us. It is He who chastises and who quickens. It has been

<sup>17</sup> Pacca, *Memorie*, t. III., p. 117.

His will to humble us by a salutary confusion, but He has also sustained us by His almighty hand, giving us the assistance necessary for the performance of our duty in this difficult circumstance. We willingly accept, therefore, this humiliation for the good of our soul. To Him be now and forever all honor and glory."<sup>18</sup>

Napoleon's cunningly laid plans for the subjection to his authority of the Sovereign Pontiff and of the entire Church had thus been completely defeated by the letter of Pius VII.: his only resource was to attempt to conceal its existence. He wrote to Bigot de Préameneu: "The Minister of Worship will observe the utmost secrecy with regard to the Pope's letter of the 24th of March, as I wish to be able to say that I have or have not received it, according as events may turn out."<sup>19</sup> He told him also to order all the Archbishops and Bishops then in Paris to go to Fontainebleau before returning to their dioceses and present to the Pope an address which he proceeded to dictate. They were to congratulate Pius VII. on having concluded a Concordat which should establish peace in the Church, and to express their regret that he had not as yet begun to execute it, which caused uneasiness and left many sees vacant. They were to assure him also that as Bishops and theologians they approved of the Concordat, and to request His Holiness to come to an understanding with the head of the State with regard to conferring canonical institution. But the Minister wisely replied that such a deputation would afford the Pope an opportunity, of which he would not fail to profit, of publicly repeating his retraction, which at that moment would be very embarrassing, and the Emperor seems to have let the matter drop.<sup>20</sup> He sent, however, Cardinal Maury to Fontainebleau to give the Holy Father his opinion of the Concordat, and at an audience on March 29 the Pope presented him with the letter he had written to the Emperor and his allocution to the Sacred College. The Cardinal asked to be allowed some time to study them, but, at an interview on the following day, he undertook to criticize the tone of the Holy Father's letter. He accused him of being guided by political considerations, and his language was so disrespectful that the Pope drove him from his presence.<sup>21</sup>

Napoleon was then about to enter on his campaign in Germany against the allied forces of Russia and Prussia, and, finding that all his efforts to deceive or to intimidate Pius VII. had ignominiously

<sup>18</sup> Pacca, *Memorie*, t. III., p. 123.

<sup>19</sup> Lecestre, *Lettres inédites*, t. II., No. 975. Au Comte Bigot de Préameneu, *Ministre des Cultes*, Paris, 25 Mars, 1813. (Letters which were not included in the official edition of Napoleon's correspondence, as they showed him in an unfavorable light.)

<sup>20</sup> Welschinger, *Le Pape et l'Empereur*, p. 383.

<sup>21</sup> D'Haussonville, t. V., pp. 274 and 534.



failed, he resolved before leaving Paris to isolate him from the world, as he had done at Savona. The Minister of Police, Savary, Duke of Rovigo, was ordered to allow no one, except the Cardinals and the four Bishops already named, to assist at the Pope's Mass; no strangers, even no Sisters of Charity, were to be admitted to the palace. Colonel Lagorse, the adjutant of the palace, was instructed to warn the Cardinals that since they had done nothing for the good of the Church during the two months they had been at Fontainebleau, and did not wish to do anything, but were apparently anxious to give trouble, they would be allowed to stay at Fontainebleau only on condition of not meddling in anything or writing any letters. They were to remain perfectly inactive, visiting the Pope and meditating on their bad management of the affairs of the Church. The slightest infringement of these rules or any communication with Italy would cause them to be suspected by the Emperor, and might endanger their liberty.<sup>22</sup>

In consequence of orders also contained in this letter, Cardinal di Pietro was suddenly arrested during the night of April 5 and brought away to Auxonne, a village in Burgundy, where he remained under the supervision of the police until the fall of the Empire. The Emperor believed him to be especially responsible for the revocation of the Concordat, and looked upon him as an enemy of the State. The Holy Father, surrounded by spies, was again cut off from all communication with the outer world, except such as he could hold by means of the Cardinals and of a few courageous men always ready to risk their liberty, or even their lives, in his service.

The dissolution of the council held in Paris in 1811 had been followed by the arrestation and imprisonment at Vincennes on July 12 of Mgr. de Broglie, Bishop of Ghent; Mgr. de Boulogne, Bishop of Troyes, and Mgr. Hirn, Bishop of Tournay. They had distinguished themselves above all the other members of the council by their courageous defense of the rights of the Holy See, and the Emperor hoped that by striking them he might deter others from following their example. At the end of November, 1811, the Emperor insisted that they should resign their sees. They yielded to his orders after a slight resistance, and in the early part of December, 1811, the three prelates were released from Vincennes and exiled to small country towns. The Bishop of Ghent was sent to Beaune, in Burgundy; the Bishop of Tournay to Gien, near Orleans, and the Bishop of Troyes to Falaise, in Normandy. They were also obliged to promise not to correspond with their dioceses or to take part in ecclesiastical affairs, but as the canons of Ghent

<sup>22</sup> Lecestre, *Lettres inédites*, t. II., No. 982. Général Savary, Duc de Rovigo, *Ministre de la Police Générale*, Paris, 2 Avril, 1813.

sought to hold communication with their Bishop, Mgr. de Broglie, the Emperor before leaving for the Russian campaign ordered him to be imprisoned in a fortress in one of the islands of Lérins, off the south coast of France.<sup>23</sup>

The three sees could not be considered vacant, for the resignation of the Bishops had not been accepted by the Pope, as the canons of Ghent frankly told the Minister of Worship. The chapters eluded the difficulty by electing as administrators some of their members who had secretly received powers as vicars general from their Bishops. The Government accepted them, and for some time the matter was allowed to rest. But Napoleon, before leaving Paris for his campaign in Germany, wishing probably to show that he considered the new Concordat definitively established, published a decree by which he declared it to be obligatory on the Archbishops, Bishops and chapters, and at the same time nominated twelve Bishops to vacant sees. Among these were the Sees of Ghent, Tournai and Troyes.<sup>24</sup> The canons of Troyes, after some indecision, found means to consult the Pope, and in conformity with his reply they refused to accept the Emperor's nominee. Mgr. de Boulogne was then asked to renew the declaration that he was no longer Bishop of Troyes. On his refusal he was again arrested (27 November, 1813) and imprisoned in Vincennes, whence he was removed to the prison of la Force, in Paris, where he remained until the entry of the Allies (1 April, 1814).

Mgr. Hirn, Bishop of Tournay, was also asked to declare a second time that his see was vacant, and on being given to understand that in case of non-compliance he ran the risk of being imprisoned, he consented without much resistance.<sup>25</sup> The chapter, however, refused to submit. Some of its members resigned, and the superiors of the seminary, foreseeing that disturbances might arise, dismissed the students before the usual time. Napoleon, who was then at Dresden, wrote an angry letter to the Minister of Police. He ordered him to arrest all the canons of Tournay; to send the three who were most to blame to a State prison, and shut up the others in French seminaries. The students under eighteen years of age were to be sent to different French seminaries, and those over eighteen to Magdebourg. This meant that they were to be incorporated in the army. If the city of Tournay conducted itself badly, it was to be

<sup>23</sup> D'Haussonville, t. V., p. 191. The fort Ste. Marguérite in the island of that name, where the celebrated "Iron Mask" had been confined for many years. In 1813 Mgr. de Broglie was allowed to return to Burgundy.

<sup>24</sup> Welschinger, p. 397. The Abbé de la Bruc, a canon of Dijon, was nominated to the See of Ghent; the Abbé de Saint-Médard, grand vicaire of la Rochelle, to that of Tournai, and l'Abbé de Cussy to that of Troyes.

<sup>25</sup> L. de Lanzac de Laborie, *La domination Française en Belgique (1795-1814)*, Paris, 1895, t. II, p. 248.

deprived of its Bishop and the see united to another.<sup>26</sup> The Emperor's object, it is true, seemed to be rather to terrorize than to punish, for though the seminarists were sent to Cambrai, Arras and St. Omer, none were placed in the army, and only one canon was detained for a few weeks at Cambrai. The Emperor's nominee, the Abbé de Saint-Médard, appears to have succeeded in being named administrator of the diocese, where he remained until the arrival of the Allies in 1814, when he returned to France.<sup>27</sup>

The clergy of Ghent offered an equally courageous resistance to Napoleon, and it was immediately followed by severe repressive measures. When Mgr. de Broglie, the Bishop, was asked to renew his resignation, he yielded to the threats of the Government and consented. Most of the canons refused to believe the fact, but three of them were weak enough to elect the Abbé de la Brue, the Emperor's nominee, as vicar capitular. The Pope was secretly consulted. He replied that the new Bishop was an intruder, and out of the 1,200 priests who formed the clergy of the diocese, only thirty acknowledged him.<sup>28</sup> The seminarists revolted openly. On July 25, the Sunday following the election of the Abbé de la Brue, they and their professors refused to assist at the ceremonies in the cathedral, and when told by one of de la Brue's partisans that if they refused to submit they would have to serve in the army, they exclaimed: "We are ready to go at once; it is better to be soldiers than schismatics." Napoleon's vengeance was not long delayed. He ordered the director of the seminary and three of the professors to be sent to State prisons, and that no one should know what had become of them. All the seminarists over eighteen, whether in holy orders or not, were to be sent to the fortress of Wesel, on the Rhine, and incorporated in different regiments of artillery. Those who were unfit for military service were to be sent to French seminaries, and they were escorted to Paris by the police as criminals and imprisoned at Sainte-Pelagie for some time before being sent to the seminaries of Cambrai and Arras. This persecution came to an end with the fall of Napoleon, and the forcibly enlisted seminarists returned to Ghent when, after a siege of four months, the fortress of Wesel surrendered to the Allies on May 1, 1814.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Lecestre, *Lettres inédites*, t. II., No. 1,060. Au Général Savary, Duc de Rovigo, Ministre de la Police Générale, Dresde, 14 Août, 1813.

<sup>27</sup> De Lanzac de Laborie, t. II., p. 259.

<sup>28</sup> D'Haussonville, t. V., p. 285. De Lanzac de Laborie, t. II., p. 260. J. van der Moere, S. J., *Die Verfolgung der Genter Seminaristen in den Jahren, 1813 und 1814*, Mainz, 1874, p. 87, p. 85.

<sup>29</sup> Lecestre, *Lettres inédites*, t. II., No. 1,068 and No. 1,069. Au Général Savary, Duc de Rovigo, Dresde, 6 and 8 Août, 1813. Van der Moere, pp. 114, 140. The seminarists of Bruges were also comprised in this persecution, and were subjected to the same arbitrary measures as those of Ghent.

The seminarists of the Dioceses of Ghent and Tournay were not the only victims of Napoleon's fury. Many Belgian priests who, in the performance of their duty, had dared to resist the Emperor's will were sent to live under police supervision in distant towns or to State prisons. Their number cannot be ascertained with certainty, but in 1814 there were still twenty-four Belgian priests in State prisons.<sup>30</sup>

And yet at that moment a last appeal was made to Napoleon, imploring of him to restore peace to the Church. Mgr. Duvier, Bishop of Nantes, who had been one of his most devoted partisans, wrote to him from his deathbed: "I beg of you to set the Holy Father free. His captivity is troubling the last moments of my life. . . . I believe that the return of His Holiness to Rome is necessary for your happiness." But the Emperor's pride and his confidence in his success had been again excited by his brilliant victories at Lutzen and at Bautzen. He was convinced that if he triumphed in this campaign nothing could thenceforth resist his will; that he would force the Church to submit to his supremacy, and he gave no answer to this request.

The situation of Pius VII. was indeed apparently hopeless, since even a Catholic power like Austria seemed inclined to take advantage of his misfortunes for its own aggrandizement. Napoleon's victories had been followed by an armistice between the belligerent powers (June, 1813), and the representatives of Russia, as well as those of Austria, had met at Prague with the view of discussing proposals for a general peace. The Holy Father did not wish to lose this opportunity of protesting against the loss of the Papal States, and in an autograph letter to Francis II., Emperor of Austria, he declared that he had never renounced the sovereignty over the dominions of the Holy See, and that they were necessary for the free exercise of the spiritual power of the visible head of the Church. He therefore begged of the Emperor to protect at the congress the interests of the Holy See, which were also the interests of religion.<sup>31</sup> By the courage and devotedness of a Belgian nobleman, Count Paul van der Vrecken, who risked his liberty, and perhaps his life, in serving as messenger to Pius VII., this letter reached its destination safely, but not until after the congress of Prague had come to an end and Austria had joined Russia and Prussia in the war against France on August 10, 1813.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Lanzac de Laborie, t. II., p. 253. Welschinger, p. 403. At that time the State prisons at Saumur, Vincennes, Ham, Landskame, Pierre-Châtel, Fenestrelle and Camplano were filled with priests and laymen imprisoned for having withstood the Emperor's anti-religious policy.

<sup>31</sup> Pacca, *Memorie*, t. III., p. 279.

<sup>32</sup> Paul Verhaegen, *Le Comte Paul van der Urecken (1777-1868) in the "Publications de la Société d'Archéologie et d'Histoire du Duché de Lim-*

The loss of the battle of Leipzig and the advance of the allied armies towards the French frontier made Napoleon fear that if he were obliged to treat with the coalition he should probably be forced to restore the Papal States. He preferred, therefore, to treat directly with the Holy Father while it was yet time and seek to satisfy him by the restitution of a small portion of his States, which might prevent greater sacrifices from being demanded at a congress. The first attempt to open negotiations was made in November, 1813, when a Siennese lady, the Marchesa di Brignole, one of the Emperor's ladies of honor, and well known for her attachment to the Church and to the Papal cause, was sent to Fontainebleau to inform Cardinal Consalvi that if the Pope wished to come to an understanding with the Emperor, he was free to send to Paris an envoy furnished with full powers for that purpose. But the Cardinal, after having consulted some of the other Cardinals and the Holy Father, replied that neither the time nor the place were suitable for any further discussion of the affairs of the Church.<sup>33</sup>

Madame de Brignole was succeeded towards the end of December by Mgr. Fallot de Beaumont, Bishop of Piacenza, who had been recently nominated Archbishop of Bourges.<sup>34</sup> He was instructed by the Duc de Bassano, Secretary of State, to inform the Pope unofficially that it might be possible to set aside the obstacles which hindered his return to Rome. But the Holy Father replied that he had examined in the presence of God the reasons which guided his conduct; that nothing could make him change his opinions; that he had forbidden the Cardinals to mention the subject to him, and he dismissed him. In an interview with the Archbishop on January 2, 1814, Cardinals Pacca and Consalvi explained to him the motives which had guided the Holy Father in his refusal to treat. From the regret which the Brief of Savona and the Concordat of Fontainebleau had caused the Pope, and the consequences which they had produced, it was easy to see that no arrangement with regard to

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bourg," *Maestricht*, 1893. The treaty between Russia, Prussia and Austria, drawn up at the Congress of Prague, has never been published, but from a letter from Metternich to Castlereagh in 1814 it would seem to have been agreed that the Papal States were to be given to Austria. The subject shall be mentioned in another article.

<sup>33</sup> Pacca, *Memorie*, t. III., p. 169.

<sup>34</sup> Mgr. Fallot de Beaumont was born in 1750 at Avignon, a subject, therefore, of the Holy See. Pius VI. made him Bishop of Valson. He resigned his see in 1801, at the time of the Concordat, and was named by the First Consul Bishop of Ghent. In 1807 he was transferred to Piacenza, where he sought to induce the priests who had been deported from the Papal States to take the oath to the Emperor. (See *THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW* for July, 1910, p. 415.) In 1813 Napoleon nominated him Archbishop of Bourges, but he left the administration of the see in the hands of the vicars-capitular. In 1815 he resigned the See of Piacenza, and was allowed a pension by the Pope.

spiritual matters could be permanent and decisive unless it were settled under conditions of absolute independence. A treaty made as they then were would not bear that character, and the other powers would find in it a pretext for raising objections and advancing claims. It was, therefore, better to defer it until a more favorable time, and the Emperor would then be satisfied with the spirit of justice and of moderation which he should find at the court of Rome.<sup>35</sup>

The Archbishop's mission had failed, but the Duc de Bassano sent him again to Fontainebleau with a letter to Pius VII. and the draft of a treaty by which the Emperor offered to restore his States. The end of Napoleon's power was approaching; the Allies had crossed the Rhine at three places on January 1, and his brother-in-law, Joachim Murat, King of Naples, who had already occupied Rome and a considerable portion of the Papal States, was about to form an alliance with Austria. It was therefore especially the desire to thwart Murat's ambitious projects which inspired the Emperor's action, and he frankly confessed it in the letter which the Archbishop was to present to the Pope. It stated that as the King of Naples had made a treaty with the Coalition, one of the objects of which seemed to be the future annexation of Rome to his kingdom, the Emperor had considered that it would be more in conformity with the true policy of his empire and with the interests of the Roman people to restore the Roman States to His Holiness, in whose hands he would prefer to see them rather than in those of any other sovereign. The Archbishop was therefore empowered to sign a treaty by which the Emperor would acknowledge Pius VII. as temporal sovereign of Rome, and the Roman States which had been united to the French Empire would be surrendered as soon as possible, together with their fortresses, to His Holiness or to his representatives. Other clauses stipulated that the Pope was to confirm all the public and private transactions which had taken place according to the French laws in the Roman States. He was to allow those of his subjects who wished to settle in France to do so, and to leave France in possession of the same rights and privileges which had existed before the annexation of the Roman provinces to the French Empire.<sup>36</sup>

Pius VII. refused to accept the treaty. He told Mgr. de Beau-

<sup>35</sup> D'Haussonville, t. V., p. 311, p. 550. Note remise au Duc de Bassano par M. Fallot de Beaumont, 3 Janvier, 1814. Murat's treaty with Austria was not made till the 11th, but he had been negotiating with Austria and England since some time.

<sup>36</sup> D'Haussonville, t. V., p. 554. Projet de lettre remis à M. l'évêque de Plaisance, par le Duc de Bassano, 13 Janvier, 1814. Welschinger, p. 415. All that he really offered were the two departments of Rome and the Trasimene, annexed in 1809.

mont, whom he received with his usual kindness, that as the restitution of his States was an act of justice, it could not be made the subject of a treaty; and, moreover, that whatever he might do while absent from his States might seem to be the result of violence and would give scandal to the Catholic world. He added that he wished to return to Rome, and that Providence would bring him back there. "It is possible," he said, "that my sins render me unworthy of seeing Rome again, but you may be assured that my successors will regain all the States which belong to them." On dismissing Mgr. de Beaumont the Holy Father told him to assure the Emperor that he was not his enemy, for religion would not allow it. He loved France, and when back in Rome it would be seen that he would do everything that should be required.<sup>37</sup>

The allied armies had already occupied Dijon, and were advancing towards Paris. Napoleon was unwilling that the Pope should fall into their hands, for he hoped to be able to repel the invasion, in which case the Holy Father would be still in his power. He therefore ordered Savary, Duke of Rovigo, his Minister of Police, to send Pius VII. back to Savona, taking with him only Mgr. Bertazzoli. But Colonel Lagorse, who was to escort him, was to tell him that he was bringing him back to Rome. The Cardinals were to be sent to different towns in the south of France, accompanied by officers of gendarmes, and they were not to be allowed to know each others' destination.<sup>38</sup>

Neither Pius VII. nor the Cardinals were deceived when Lagorse brought them this decision. They understood that the Pope was not going back to Rome, which was no longer in the Emperor's power, but that he was to be placed out of reach of the allied armies. The Holy Father begged in vain to be accompanied by even one Cardinal. He was allowed to take with him only Mgr. Bertazzoli; Lagorse was to follow in a second carriage with Dr. Porta and two servants.

On the following morning, January 23, Pius VII., after having said Mass, assembled the sixteen Cardinals then at Fontainebleau. He told them that he was leaving for an unknown destination, and might perhaps never see them again, but that he was firmly convinced that whatever might happen they would conduct themselves as became their dignity. He then gave Cardinal Mattei, the dean of the Sacred College, instructions which he had written for their guidance, and he strictly forbade them to listen to any proposal regarding a treaty, whether spiritual or temporal, for that such was his firm

<sup>37</sup> "Tout ce qui sera convenable." D'Haussonville, t. V., p. 315. Pacca, *Memorie*, t. III., p. 173.

<sup>38</sup> Lecestre, *Lettres inédites*, t. II., No. 1,128. Au Général Savary, Duc de Rovigo, *Ministre de la Police Générale*, Paris, 21 Janvier, 1814.

resolution. Then, after a short prayer in the chapel, he gave his blessing to the Cardinals and to a few people who were present and entered his traveling carriage, together with Mgr. Bertazzoli.

According to the instructions left by the Holy Father, the Cardinals were to reside near him, wherever he might be, or, if prevented, to remain together as much as possible. If a schism were to take place, they were to avoid carefully holding any communication in religious matters with those who belonged to it, or to assist at any ceremony in which a prelate took part who had not been canonically instituted. They were to avoid performing any act which might seem to acknowledge the pretended sovereignty of the Emperor or of his successors over the States of the Church, and never to accept any decoration, dignity or charge, secular or ecclesiastical. On account of the situation of the Church, and especially of the Holy See, they were to act as in a time of mourning, and were not to assist at banquets or public rejoicings, or to appear at Court. Finally, they were forbidden to accept any pension from the Government.<sup>39</sup>

A few days later the Cardinals left Fontainebleau for various towns in the south of France. Cardinal Pacca was brought to Uzès, near Nîmes, where, although the Minister of Police had assured him that the authorities would do everything in their power to render his stay agreeable to him, the *sous-préfet* was ordered to have him closely watched; to find out from his servants what he said, what persons he visited and with whom he corresponded. He was not to be allowed to officiate in public, his relations with the clergy were to be supervised, and he was to be warned that if he gave any cause of complaint he should be deprived of his liberty. It was only after the abdication of Napoleon that the Cardinals were able to return to Rome.

According to the instructions given to Lagorse, the Holy Father was brought to Savona by a long circuit through the central and southern provinces of France, passing by Limoges, Montauban, Carcassonne and Montpellier. He was received everywhere with demonstrations of joy and affection on the part of the people; at the bridge over the Rhone between Beaucaire and Tarrascon, especially, the applause of the crowd was so enthusiastic that Lagorse, displeased by the veneration manifested for the Sovereign Pontiff, exclaimed angrily: "What would you do if the Emperor were to come here?" To which the people replied, pointing to the Rhone: "We would give him a drink!" and as the Colonel continued to show his irritation, he was asked: "Are you thirsty?"<sup>40</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Pacca, *Memorie*, t. III., p. 181.

<sup>40</sup> Pacca, *Memorie*, t. III., p. 206.



Pius VII. reached Savona towards the end of February. He was received there by M. de Chabrol's successor, the Marchese de Brignole, a Genoese nobleman well known as a sympathizer with the Papal cause, and who treated the Holy Father during his stay not as a prisoner, but as a sovereign.

A considerable portion of the Papal States was at that time occupied by the troops of Joachim Murat, King of Naples, who had openly abandoned Napoleon and who aimed at rendering himself the ruler of a united Italy. Shortly after his return in January, 1813, from the disastrous Russian campaign he appears to have thought it advisable to take steps to provide for the safety of his kingdom in view of the approaching downfall of Napoleon, which everything seemed to forebode. He also dreaded that Napoleon, who was deeply irritated against him on account of his sudden departure from the army, might, in case he triumphed over the Coalition, and was again master of Europe, deprive him of his crown and drive him into exile.<sup>41</sup> Murat began, therefore, in April, 1813, to negotiate secretly with Austria and with England; but before any definite conclusion was reached a friendly letter from the Emperor, whose long silence had been one of the motives of his intended defection, rallied him again to the Imperial cause. He left Naples, therefore, on August 2, joined Napoleon at Dresden in time to take part in the last battles of the campaign, in which he held a high command and distinguished himself by the brilliant manner in which he executed Napoleon's orders. After the battle of Leipzig (16th, 17th, 18th October, 1813) he again left the army for Naples, but this time with the consent of Napoleon, who reckoned on his sending 30,000 men to support Prince Eugene against the Austrians in the north of Italy. He renewed, however, without delay, his negotiations with Austria, and with Lord William Bentinck, the commander of the English forces in Sicily. In the meanwhile, under the pretext of marching to the assistance of Prince Eugene, some of Murat's troops had occupied Rome, where General Miollis commanded only a small French garrison, and others advanced towards Florence and towards Ancona. At the same time he seemed to be willing not to turn his arms against the Emperor if he could obtain from him conditions which should satisfy his ambitious aims. He wrote to Napoleon on December 28, 1813, that he had already done all he could for the service of France by sending his army towards the North, a movement which had stopped the advance of the Austrians towards Milan and Turin, but that he could not risk the safety of his kingdom by sending his troops too

<sup>41</sup> Jules Chavagnon et Georges Saint-Yves, *Joachim Murat (1767-1815)*. Paris, 1905, p. 232.

far. He then asked the Emperor to proclaim the independence of Italy by forming it into his kingdom, and giving him all the provinces to the south of the River Po. The Emperor would find him in return a faithful and powerful ally. But an answer should be given without delay, as he (Murat) would soon be forced to explain matters to his people and to the enemy.<sup>42</sup>

The arrival at Naples of Count Neipperg as Austrian plenipotentiary, and the threat of an immediate declaration of war in case he should refuse to sign a treaty, overcame at last Murat's indecision. He made, it is true, a last effort to induce the Emperor to grant him the concession he had already demanded; he informed him of the arrival at Naples of an Austrian envoy; he implored of him to make peace, and he warned him that otherwise he would find it impossible ever again to fight for him.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, the treaty was signed on January 11. Murat promised to assist the allies with an army of 30,000 men, and Austria guaranteed the kingdom of Naples to him and to his heirs. Sicily was to be left to the Bourbon King, Ferdinand IV.; and as compensation Austria promised to give Murat a portion of the Papal States containing a population of 400,000 souls, and to persuade the Pope and the allies to sanction this concession. Lord William Bentinck, who was strongly opposed to Murat, and who from the beginning of the negotiations in 1813 had sought to uphold the claims of the Bourbons to Naples and Sicily, had up to then refused to sign an armistice with Naples, although authorized by his Government to do so. He criticized the treaty severely as being inopportune. Murat, he said, should have been given some compensation for Naples elsewhere, but as little as possible; he cannot be reckoned on; the treaty renders him master of Italy, and Italy under Murat will be dangerous for the peace of the world; it is lamentable to see such favors granted to a man whose whole life has been a crime.<sup>44</sup> He yielded, however, with much ill will, to the orders of Lord Castlereagh, and crossing over to Naples, he signed there on February 3 an armistice between the Neapolitan and British forces, and agreed to a plan for the coöperation of his troops with those of Austria and Naples, but he refused to discuss the conditions of a treaty of peace, as he did not wish to take any step which should be opposed to the interests of Ferdinand IV.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>42</sup> M. H. Weil, *Le Prince Eugène et Murat (1813-1814)*, Paris, 1902, t. III., p. 291.

<sup>43</sup> Chavagnon, p. 269. Weil, t. III., p. 336, Joachim Murat à l'Empereur, 3 Janvier, 1814.

<sup>44</sup> Weil, t. III., pp. 413, 640, Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh, Palermo, 14 January, 1814.

<sup>45</sup> Weil, t. III., pp. 515, 518 and 642, Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh, Naples, 2 February, 1814.

A part of Murat's troops had by that time reached Bologna, Imola and Modena, and were thus in line with the detachment of the Austrian army which, under the command of Major General Count Nugent, had crossed over to the southern bank of the Po; but they had not as yet fought against the French, and Field Marshal Count de Bellegarde, the Austrian commander-in-chief, was still so uncertain as to Murat's intentions that he warned Count Nugent to be on his guard against the Neapolitans.<sup>46</sup> Murat had, however, poured a large number of troops into Rome under the pretence that they were on their way to join Prince Eugene; he had thus made himself master of the city, and named General de la Vaugnyon, a Frenchman in his service, its Governor. General Miollis, unable to offer any resistance, had withdrawn into the Castle of Saint Angelo on January 19 with the few French soldiers remaining to him (only 1,943), and the Neapolitans, who made no attempt to attack the Castle, immediately expelled the French civil functionaries and replaced them by Neapolitans. Some time previously the Emperor had sent Fouché, Duke of Otranto, to Naples to induce Murat to unite his forces with those of Prince Eugene; he was also apparently authorized to negotiate with him in case the course of events should render it hopeless to attempt to defend Italy.<sup>47</sup> The time for that step seemed to have come in February, 1814, and Napoleon, who was struggling against the advance of the three allied powers towards Paris, ordered Prince Eugene to retreat towards the Alps as soon as Murat should have openly declared war against France. The Grand Duchess Eliza of Tuscany, Napoleon's sister, and General Miollis were also instructed to surrender Tuscany and Rome to Murat, on condition that the French troops should be allowed to bring away their arms and artillery. It was only on February 15 that Murat, who had arrived at Modena, sent an official declaration of war to Prince Eugene; but as it was not followed up by any act of hostility, the Prince did not consider himself bound to carry out at once the order which he had received to retreat towards the Alps. It was, indeed, soon revoked, for Napoleon's hopes of ultimate success were, just then, revived by the brilliant victories which he won at Chainpaubert and Montmirail, and he sent at once a counter order to the Viceroy instructing him to defend Italy as long as he could, since it might be possible to preserve it if the enemies were expelled from France; and in that

<sup>46</sup> Well, t. III., p. 491. "Considering your situation and your position with regard to the Neapolitans, it is indispensable to take every sort of precautions." F. M. Count Bellegarde to Major-General Count Nugent, Vicenza, 30 January, 1814.

<sup>47</sup> Louis Madelin, *La Rome de Napoléon. La Domination Française à Rome de 1809 à 1814*, Paris, 1906, p. 624.

case, he added, the King of Naples would change sides.<sup>48</sup> Prince Eugene, therefore, retained his positions on the banks of the Mincio, but Fouché carried out the orders he had received to withdraw the French garrisons in Rome and in Tuscany. On February 24 he signed at Lucca an agreement with Lieutenant General Lecchi, Murat's aide-de-camp, by which the fortresses still remaining in the possession of the Grand Duchess Eliza, as well as the Castle of St. Angelo and the town of Civita Vecchia, were surrendered to the Neapolitans. General Miollis and his soldiers left the Castle on March 10, and, for a short time, Murat was master of Rome.<sup>49</sup>

A Congress was then being held at Chatillon-sur-Seine between representatives of the Allied Powers and an envoy of the Emperor to discuss the conditions which should be offered to France in order to bring the war to an end.<sup>50</sup> Napoleon had probably reason to suppose that the Congress would demand that Pius VII. should be set free and the States of the Church restored, and, as he wished that any concession to Pius VII. should seem to be a spontaneous act on his part and not imposed by his victorious enemies, he gave orders that the Holy Father should be allowed to return to Rome. He knew also that the Pope's presence in his States would probably be a cause of dissension between the Austrians and their new ally. He took care, however, to avoid giving him the title of Sovereign, lest he should seem to rescind his annexation of the Papal States, and to acknowledge the rights of the Holy See. The Emperor, therefore, on March 10, directed General Savary, his Minister of Police, to order the officer of gendarmes who was with the Pope to bring him to Parma and there hand him over to the Neapolitan advanced posts. The Pope was to be told that since he had asked to return to his see the Emperor had consented. A few days later he wrote to Prince Eugene that he had ordered the Pope to be sent to the advanced posts for the purpose of embarrassing Murat. "I made the Pope be informed that, since he had asked as Bishop of Rome to return to his diocese, I allowed him to do so. Take care, therefore, not to bind yourself to anything with regard to the Pope, either to acknowledge him or not to acknowledge him."

<sup>48</sup> Correspondance de Napoleon I., t. XXVII., No. 21,212. Au Général Clarke, Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre, Nogent, 8 Février, 1814. No. 21,295. A Eugène Napoléon, vice-roi d'Italie, Nangis, 18 Février, 1814. Weil, t. IV., pp. 153, 217.

<sup>49</sup> Madelin, p. 667. Weil, t. IV., pp. 220, 246. The text of the Convention of Lucca is in t. V., p. 32.

<sup>50</sup> Angebert, *Le Congrès de Vienne et les Traités de 1815*, Paris, 1863, t. I., p. 105. The plenipotentiaries were: Count de Stadion for Austria, Count Razumoffski for Russia, Lord Aberdeen, Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart for England, and Baron von Humboldt for Prussia. The Emperor was represented by de Cantaincourt, Duke of Vicenza. Lord Castlereagh also assisted at this congress, but unofficially, not as plenipotentiary.

In the same letter he told Prince Eugene to seek to make a treaty with Murat—to divide Italy, with the exception of Piedmont and Genoa, into two kingdoms. Every effort should be made to win the Neapolitans over to his side; later on he could do what he liked, for after such ingratitude he could not be bound to anything. These instructions would seem to show that even when setting the Holy Father free Napoleon did not intend to restore the Papal States to him, but that he still apparently hoped to defeat the Coalition and reestablish his Empire in its former splendor.<sup>51</sup>

As Napoleon had foreseen, the Congress of Chatillon did not fail to take into consideration the position of Pius VII. and to manifest its sympathy with him. Before separating on March 19, without having come to any conclusion with regard to the terms of peace, the plenipotentiaries presented a note to De Canlaincourt, in which they stated that, while insisting on the independence of Italy, the allied Courts had the intention of reestablishing the Holy Father in his former capital and that the Emperor's Government had shown the same intention in the counter-project presented by its envoy. The religion professed by a large portion of the nations then at war, justice and equity, as well as humanity, were equally interested in demanding the liberation of His Holiness, and the plenipotentiaries were persuaded that they had only to ask the French Government in the name of their Courts to obtain that the Holy Father should be enabled to provide for the wants of the Catholic Church by the enjoyment of absolute independence.<sup>52</sup>

Pius VII. had been already set free. The Marchese de Brignole had informed him on March 17 that he was at liberty to return to Rome; but as the following day was the feast of Our Lady of Mercy, the Patroness of Savona, he deferred his departure in order to say Mass in the Cathedral. He left Savona on March 19, reached Piacenza on the 23d, and on the morning of the 25th he was accompanied by the French Generals Mancune, Rambourg and Van Dedem from San Donnino to the Taro, on the further side of which the Austrian advanced posts were held by the Radetsky Hussars. There the Holy Father, who could at last feel that he was free, was received by Generals Nugent and Von Stahremberg, who escorted him to Parma, where he met with an enthusiastic welcome.

<sup>51</sup> Correspondance de Napoléon I., t. XXVII., No. 21,459. Au Général Savary, Duc de Rovigo, Ministre de la Police Générale, Chavignon, 10 Mars, 1814. Lecestre, Lettres inédites, t. II., No. 1,143. Au Prince Eugène Napoléon, Vice-roi d'Italie, Soissons, 12 Mars, 1814. Pius VII. had never asked to return to Rome as Bishop, but had always demanded the recognition of his right to the States of the Church as their sovereign.

<sup>52</sup> P. Ilario Rinieri, S. J., Il Congresso di Vienna e la Santa Sede, Roma, 1904, p. 11. This work forms the fourth part of "La diplomazia Pontificia nel Secolo XIX."

Murat was much alarmed by the unexpected return of Pius VII., which he saw would prove fatal to his hopes of reigning over a united Italy. He sent orders to Count Nugent to stop the Holy Father wherever he might be, until he received further instructions, if, indeed, he (Murat) thought fit to allow him to continue his journey. General Nugent took no notice of this order, nor of another which forbade him to allow the Pope to leave Parma; but he facilitated the Holy Father's progress in every way. At Modena Pius VII. gave audience to the Duke del Gallo, Murat's Minister of Foreign Affairs, but to all his attempts to come to an understanding merely replied that he could make no agreement except in Rome when he should be surrounded by his Cardinals.<sup>53</sup> Lord William Bentinck, who was in command of the Anglo-Sicilian expedition against Genoa which had landed at Leghorn on March 9, and had already reached La Spezia, had also an interview with the Holy Father while he was at Modena. Pius VII. received him in a most friendly manner, repeated to him the statement which he had made to Murat's envoy, and assured him that he would not recognize Murat before returning to Rome; and that then he would wait until the Allied Sovereigns had given the example.<sup>54</sup>

On the following day (March 31) Pius VII. made a triumphal entry into Bologna, where he was received with enthusiasm, and took up his residence at the Archbishop's palace. Murat came immediately to solicit an audience, and again requested to be recognized as King of Naples; but he was not more successful than the Duke del Gallo, and his demands were rejected. When the Holy Father returned Murat's visit next day he informed him that he intended to return to Rome without delay and to resume again the government of his States. Murat then sought to negotiate; he offered to restore the two provinces which had been annexed to the French Empire on condition that the Neapolitan troops should be allowed to occupy the Roman States and maintain order there, but the Pope rejected this proposal, and declared that he would not renounce his claims to all the territory which belonged to the Holy See. This interview with Murat was followed by another with Lord William Bentinck, who, on learning from a member of the Papal household how great was the poverty of the Holy Father, and that he was subjected to many privations, presented him at once, in the name of the English Government, with the sum of 4,000 crowns.<sup>55</sup>

Before leaving Bologna Pius VII. wrote to the Emperor of

<sup>53</sup> Well, t. IV., p. 437; t. V., p. 99. Rinieri, p. 84.

<sup>54</sup> Well, t. IV., p. 451.

<sup>55</sup> The receipt was for £1,252, or about \$6,200. Well, t. IV., p. 462. Rinieri, p. 88.

Austria to point out to him the equivocal conduct of Murat, who had occupied the greater part of the States of the Church, and whose good faith seemed doubtful. He hoped, however, that the Emperor's sense of justice and of religion would remove all the obstacles which might hinder the free exercise of his sovereign rights. The Pope again appealed to the Emperor in letters dated from Cesena and Foligno, requesting him to protect the interests of the Holy See in the Congress which was about to be held, and to oblige Murat to withdraw his troops. The King of Naples had already perceived the necessity of modifying his policy towards the Holy Father; he saw the impossibility of continuing to hold Rome, and on April 10 he issued a proclamation to the Roman people, in which he assured them that he had occupied their city not as a conqueror, but as a friend; that he would seek every opportunity of rendering them some service, and he expressed his veneration for the Sovereign Pontiff. He then wrote to Pius VII. during his stay at Imola to renew his offer of restoring the provinces which had been named by the French the "departments of Rome and of the Trasimene," but the Pope refused even to answer his letter.<sup>66</sup>

At Cesena on April 29 Murat had another interview with the Holy Father and offered to make a further concession by withdrawing his troops from Pesaro and Tano (situated in the province of the Marches), so that the Pope might return to Rome through his own States, but he declared that he would retain the rest until the allied sovereigns should make some new agreement with him. Pius VII., therefore, resolved to remain at Cesena and await there the decision of the allies with regard to his States; but Herr von Lebzeltern, the envoy of the Emperor of Austria, who arrived just then at Cesena, urged him to return to Rome at once and take in hands the management of affairs. The Holy Father acquiesced, and sent Mgr. Rivarda as Delegate to Rome to form a provisional government, and Mgr. della Genga (afterwards Pope Leo XII.) to Paris as Nuncio and envoy to the allied sovereigns.<sup>67</sup> Pius VII. then continued his journey towards Rome—escorted, since he had crossed the Taro by the Austrian cavalry. At Ancona, still occupied by the Neapolitans, he met Cardinal Fesch, Napoleon's uncle, and Madame Letizia, Napoleon's mother, both now fugitives and exiles and seeking the protection of the Holy Father, which he readily granted them. While at Foligno he sent Cardinal Consalvi, who had resumed his position as Secretary of State, to Paris to represent him at the Congress about to be held by the sovereigns of Europe;

<sup>66</sup> Ch. van Duerm, S. J., *Correspondance du Cardinal Consalvi avec le Prince de Metternich*, Louvain, 1899, pp. 4, 7, 12, 17. Rinieri, p. 89.

<sup>67</sup> Rinieri, pp. 96, 104.

and then passing through Spoleto, Terni and Nepi, he made his entry into Rome on May 24.

The exactions of the Napoleonic Government, the absence of the Papal Court and of many of the nobles, had much impoverished the Romans, but they made every effort to manifest their joy at the return of the Holy Father to his capital after his long exile, and the streets through which he was to pass were decorated with triumphal arches, colonnades, statues and precious tapestries; all classes contributed to the embellishment of the city according to their means. Pius VII. was met at the Ponte Molle by the members of the provisional government and the envoys of Austria and Portugal. Cardinal Mattsi and Cardinal Pacca took their places in his carriage, and seventy-two young men, unharnessing the horses, drew it from thence to Saint Peter's and to the Quirinal. The Neapolitan troops still garrisoned Rome, and together with a body of Austrian cavalry which had recently arrived, furnished the escort. The Swiss guards had been reorganized; they surrounded the Papal carriage, to the right of which rode Prince Pignatelli-Cerchiara, the Neapolitan General,<sup>58</sup> and on the left Colonel von Oppitz, the commander of the Austrians. About a mile from the Porta del Popolo the Holy Father was greeted by a band of children dressed in white, chanting "Hosanna! Blessed be he who comes in the name of the Lord!" and bearing palms, which they offered to him and fixed to his carriage. At the city gates the Senate, or municipal council of Rome, congratulated the Pope in the name of the Roman people, and the clergy of Rome then took its place in the procession. At Saint Peter's the Holy Father was received by the Cardinals; he prayed at the tomb of the Apostle, assisted at Benediction, and then went to the Palace of the Quirinal, whence five years previously he had been carried away into exile by Napoleon's Generals, Miollis and Radet.<sup>59</sup>

The trials of Pius VII. were not, however, ended by his triumphant return to his capital. The Marches, a large and fertile part of the Papal States, were still occupied by Murat's troops and the Austrians

<sup>58</sup> It is a curious coincidence that Pignatelli-Cerchiara also commanded the troops which Murat sent to Rome in 1809 to strengthen the French garrison at the time of the storming of the Quirinal and the expulsion of Pius VII.

<sup>59</sup> Gaetano Moroni, *Dizionario di erudizione storico-ecclesiastica*, Venezia, 1845, t. XXXV, p. 186. Rinieri, p. 21. *Le Moniteur universel*, Paris, 1814, 15 Juin. *Lettre de Rome*, 27 Mai. Padre Rinieri does not agree with the opinion of Madelin, quoted in the July number of the *QUARTERLY*, that the Roman nobles submitted willingly to Napoleon. With very few exceptions, the higher nobility stood aloof and made every effort to avoid taking part in a deputation sent to compliment the Emperor. Five of the great families were sent into exile and obliged to reside in Paris in October, 1809. Three nobles who had been named Senators declined to accept the dignity. (Rinieri, pp. 211, 215, 239.)



held the Legations, three of the most important provinces. The Emperor of Austria was known to be favorable to the restitution of the Papal territories, but his ministers could not be reckoned on, and the intentions of the other powers which were to be represented at the Congress of Vienna could not be foreseen. The future position and welfare of the Sovereign Pontiff were, therefore, still uncertain, and it was mainly owing to the diplomatic talent of Cardinal Consalvi, his unwearied efforts, and the influence which he acquired over the other plenipotentiaries at the Congress that the Holy See regained its possessions.

DONAT SAMPSON.

London.

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## STUDIES IN KANT.

### WAS KANT A MERE SOPHIST?

IT has long been a source of wonder to the writer of this article that the metaphysical doctrines of Kant have never to this day been refuted. Some time ago in an article in this REVIEW we stated that such a refutation was the great philosophical need of the times. We are still of this opinion; and as no one else seems to undertake the task, it is our intention in a brief series of articles to subject to a critical analysis the cardinal principles of the "Critique of Pure Reason." It should, perhaps, be said at the very outset that the task of dealing adequately with Kant is by no means an easy one. It will not make easy writing, and the uninitiated should be admonished that it is not likely to make easy reading. The subject is an abstruse one. Kant's treatment of it is obscurity itself—as he himself freely admits. We would that some one with more leisure and whose occupations and duties lie along the line of philosophical and metaphysical studies had taken up the work rather than one who finds in it a mere pastime, who finds too little leisure for that pastime, and who consequently cannot devote to the work the time requisite to make the difficult subject intelligible to readers without a philosophical training. Kant's meaning must be made clear, and this is no easy task, since it failed Kant himself; and in the mass of obscurity and sophistry the fallacy must be exposed. Better, however, that it should be done in some fashion than that it should not be done at all; and this must be our apology for introducing so obscure a metaphysical subject to the readers of the QUARTERLY.

The intellectual ascendancy of the Konigsberg philosopher throughout the empire of metaphysical thought is to-day freely admitted. The spell of Kant, however, has not been confined to mere metaphysic. Nearly all our modern errors, whether in metaphysical speculations, in philosophy, in theology, in the physical sciences, in morals, in natural theology, nay, even in revealed religion, are directly traceable to Kant and his system of knowledge. But it is in philosophy above and before all that his baneful influence is so deeply and painfully felt. The whole agnostic world of our day rests mainly on Kant. Much as he deprecated agnosticism and much as he protested against the adoption of it as a philosophical conclusion in which the mind might find a last resting-place, there can be no manner of doubt that the dogmatism of denial, whose essence is summed up in the intellectual (?) formula, "I don't know," is the logical outcome of the Kantian contention. No one perceived this more clearly than Kant himself. Foreseeing that agnosticism was the only legitimate consequence of his speculations, he labored hard in advance to stem the tide that must inevitably carry men's minds over the barriers and into the new philosophical absurdity; but he had opened the floodgates, and although he tried to raise his voice above the commotion which he had raised, he discovered that it was completely lost in the roar of the waters. His principles once admitted, the conclusion from them was irresistible, and the logic of the multitude soon proved stronger than the voice of his authority. In vain did he protest that his own method was "totally different from skepticism or that artificial and scientific agnosticism which undermines the foundations of all knowledge, in order, if possible, to leave nothing trustworthy and certain anywhere." To no purpose did he warn his followers that "skepticism is a resting-place of reason, where it may reflect for a time" in the midst of its wanderings, "but that it can never be its permanent dwelling-place." The disciples were more consistent than their master; from his premises they drew the only legitimate though barren and desolate conclusion.

The Quixotic position of the Modernists, too, absurd and ridiculous as its claims are, is directly traceable to the Kantian influence of the times. If any one is inclined to question the truth of this statement, we need only refer him to the utterances of the late Modernist leader, Tyrrell, shortly before his sad and pitiful demise.

Nor is it less true that the philosophical follies of pragmatism as recently promulgated by Schiller, Dewey and the late William James, in all their crude and naked vulgarity, are the legitimate offspring of the Kantian juggleries in his antinomian—thetic and anti-thetic—legerdemain. Nay, the ethics of our day which exclude God

and the supernatural from the motives of human conduct are the inevitable results of Kant's system. Proofs of these statements will appear in the sequel, so that it is unnecessary to delay upon them here; but certain it is that, what with his concepts and categories; his transcendental æsthetics, analytics and dialectics; his still more sweeping transcendental ideas; his antinomies, amphibolies and paralogsms; his phenomena and noumena; his pure reason and practical reason; his pure subjectivism and his phenomenalism; the broad basis on which all modern philosophical errors rest and on which the modern theological errors—whether theistic, deistic or atheistic—are founded, proves, in the last analysis, to be nothing more or less than the vaunted principles and so-called philosophical discoveries of Kant. For a century and a quarter Kant has held the sceptre of philosophy in Germany. During that period his influence has caused a complete revolution in nearly all the countries of Europe. There have been, it is true, occasional revolts against his authority; but even to-day, although his sway is to some extent diminished, for a great portion of the philosophic world the name of Kant retains all its magic, and entire schools of philosophy are ready to maintain that the "Critique of Pure Reason" has marked forever for mankind the boundary lines and impassable limits of all human knowledge. Hence the imperative necessity of exposing the fallacies in the *entire* Kantian system.

For it must not be forgotten that partial uprisings against the authority of Kant and his teachings there frequently have been. Fichte, Hegel and Schelling, in his own land, have, in part, repudiated the authority of Kant; but so far have they been from refuting him that their systems are mere branches grafted more or less scientifically on the great Kantian stem; and all of them derive their very subsistence from the root of the Kantian principles, which remain the while wholly undisturbed. Other attempts, too, have been made here and there to challenge Kant's claims on certain points. A sort of guerrilla warfare has been waged against his philosophy in certain quarters from the very outset. A deep philosopher now and then has endeavored to discover the vulnerable points in the gigantic edifice. An occasional roving band or an individual marksman has fired a few shots, usually ineffectual. The only portion of the mighty structure that seems to have at all suffered is the transcendental æsthetic. The great philosophical structure itself remains unshaken. There it stands, like a mighty German fortress, with its frowning battlements and mighty bulwarks. Here indeed a pinnacle is shot away. There a porthole is defaced so as to be useless. A flying buttress is met with, occasionally, utterly demolished; but the fortress itself, with its walls, its towers, its bastions, its engines of destruc-

tion, stand firm and intact. Its commanding position and complete mastery of the entire field remain the same. There has not been even the semblance of an effort, so far as we are aware, to overthrow the main structure or undermine the foundations. Some of the assailants end by becoming Kant's willing vassals; others seem to settle down to a sort of stolid submission in a sullen and mute despair.

Even among our Catholic philosophers we look in vain for anything like a vigorous or logical assault. They have indeed again and again challenged the transcendental æsthetic; but even their challenge has been a mere rejection rather than a refutation. Even so, they too frequently lose sight of the advantage of their position and forget to press their charge home to victory. The importance to Kant of the transcendental æsthetic seems to be greatly undervalued by them. The fact is that without it Kant would be often in a sorry plight. We have somewhere read of a fox whose den was on the face of a precipice, some feet below the upper surface. When hotly pursued he was wont to seize in his teeth some strong twigs which grew on the ledge and thus easily swing himself into safety, to the utter bewilderment of the hounds. The transcendental æsthetic is the Kantian twig. Over and over again when his case seems hopeless has he succeeded in extricating himself from an otherwise insurmountable difficulty by his theory of space and time, with their convenient definitions, but rotten philosophy. Perhaps no Catholic philosopher has made greater onslaughts on the Kantian "Critique" than our own late Dr. Brownson; but although he scored several minor victories, he left the foundations entirely untouched, while Kant's great central position, the deduction of the categories, he passed by altogether unnoticed. The categories themselves he indeed challenged. His argument that the subject can never be the object—as Kant attempts to make it—is clearly enough shown; but for the rest it seems to us that Brownson missed the main argument of Kant altogether and failed to grasp the system of Kant as one great whole. Indeed, the utter failure of all attempts to thoroughly refute Kant's teachings is one of the marvels of philosophy and is equaled only by that other astonishing phenomenon, viz., the marvellous ascendancy which that philosophy has acquired over the minds of men. This ascendancy deserves more than a passing word.

The influence which Kant's extraordinary work at once exercised not only over the mere student of philosophy, but also over men of acute and powerful intellect is one of the most striking episodes in the whole history of philosophy.

The instantaneous success of his work was nothing short of marvellous. Kant was, possibly, the worst writer imaginable. His style

was obscurity itself. His adverbs and particles even to-day drive scholars to despair. Several passages have been abandoned by his interpreters as utterly hopeless. Men of genius, famous themselves as profound philosophers, admit that it is only on the fourth or fifth reading they begin to understand his meaning. Add to this that metaphysic is not only the most unattractive, but even the most repellent of subjects, and we find ourselves face to face with the extraordinary fact that when men's minds had recovered from the stunning effect of the first edition and the second edition had appeared in 1787, three new editions were speedily added, so that before the century closed five editions in all seemed to be necessary to satisfy the demands of those who wanted to read what the most obscure of philosophical writers had to say on the most abstruse of philosophical subjects. The discussions which followed the publication of the *Critique* were endless; they continue even to this day. During the first ten years after the appearance of the *Critique*, according to Vaihinger, three hundred publications were counted for and against the new philosophy. These works were printed in every language of the world. And this state of things has continued advancing down to the present day, when the Kantian renaissance seems to outrival the original birth by the brilliancy and magnificence of the Neo-Kantian splendor.

The greatest marvel of all, however, is the ease and readiness with which the Kantian philosophy seems to have subjugated the minds of men who are well versed in logic and who have been able to boast of no mean intellectual strength. The encomiums passed on the work of Kant by such men would be startling if they were not so numerous as to be even common. Goethe—though he admitted that the feeling required repeated readings—regarded the impression produced by the philosophy of Kant somewhat like that “produced by the act of stepping into a lighted room.” To Jean Paul Richter, Kant was “not only as a light of the world, but as a whole solar system in one.” The great German poet, Schiller, declared that he was determined to master Kant's *Critique*, even though it were to cost him his whole life. He thought that “the fundamental ideas of Kant's ideal philosophy will remain a treasure forever, and for their sake alone we ought to be grateful to have been born in this age.”

If such is the adulation of the poets, we need not be surprised at the eulogies of the philosophers. Schopenhauer, savagely as he assailed Kant, nevertheless calls the “*Critique of Pure Reason*” “the highest achievement of human genius.” He styles Kant “the most philosophical head that nature has ever produced,” asserts that “he possessed such an amount of clear and quite peculiar thought-

fulness as has never been granted to any other mortal;" and he is of opinion that "never will a philosopher, without an independent, zealous and oft-repeated study of the principal works of Kant, gain any idea of the most important of all philosophical phenomena." Fichte, who opposed Kant on many important points, thought, nevertheless, that "Kant's philosophy will in time overshadow the whole human race and call to life a new, more noble and more worthy generation." Even the English Professor Caird thought that it was "not unfair to say that the speculations of all those who have not learned the lesson of Kant are beside the point."

But it is the historian of philosophy that proceeds to the utmost limit of laudatory extravagance. Vacherot pronounces the "Critique" "*un livre immortel*," comparable only to the "Organon" of Bacon and the "Discours de la Methode" of Descartes. Vaihinger devoted his life to the study of Kant and thus sums up his opinion of his work: "The 'Critique' is a work to which, whether we look to the grandeur of conception, or the accuracy of thought, or the weight of ideas, or the power of language, few only can be compared—possibly Plato's 'Republic,' Aristotle's 'Metaphysics,' Spinoza's 'Ethics'—none, if we consider their lasting effect, their penetrating and far-reaching influence, their wealth of thought and their variety of suggestions." Max Muller made Kant's "Critique," he tells us, his "constant companion through life." He proclaims that "whatever purpose or method there may have been in the work of his life was due to his beginning of life with Kant." From his professor's chair at Oxford he gave out: "I have often, in season and out of season, been preaching Kant," and as the Kant centenary drew near he determined "to carry out his long-cherished plan" of translating into English the 'Critik der reinen Vernunft,' for," he tells us, "I thought I was in honor bound not to delay any longer this tribute to the memory of the greatest philosopher of modern times." But all these tributes pale into insignificance alongside of the words of Ludwig Noiré, who tells us in repeated outbursts of enthusiasm that "the palm of valor belongs to the hero of thought who has plunged into the obscurest abysses of the human mind and, with almost superhuman calm, has succeeded in emerging with the key to the mystery in his hand." And not content with this rhapsody, he proceeds to tell us: "If, as no one has yet questioned, reason is the true and only tool and means to which man owes his high place, his successes and his inward nobility, Kant must be recognized with equal unreserve as the greatest benefactor of humanity." This is indeed a lofty pedestal upon which to place the Konigsberg philosopher, but with Noiré it is no mere momentary outburst; it is a settled conviction. Once more he makes his oft-urged claim: "It is

therefore not too much to say that Kant is the greatest philosophical genius that has ever dwelt upon earth and the 'Critique of Pure Reason' the highest achievement of human wisdom."

We could duplicate these glowing eulogies from other writers equally famous, but enough has been said to show to even the uninitiated the rank which Kant holds among philosophers and the place assigned by the world to his famous "Critique." Indeed, when we find Kant the idol of his time, the worship of posterity, the praised of men who themselves merited the highest praise; when his genius has become the pride of a great and powerful nation and his name has been placed among—nay, even above—the greatest of earth's great ones, it seems like unparalleled temerity to question his conclusions or challenge his premises; and it sounds like daring folly or midsummer madness to venture the assertion that the name and philosophy of Kant are among the greatest of earth's illusions. When we find men of every intellectual rank and station, men who have been and are the leaders of thought in their own day, men whose names are revered in literature, in philosophy and in science, holding his name in veneration and his system of philosophy as supreme, we are at once impressed with the necessity of proceeding with caution and of risking no statement that cannot be backed by the strongest argument.

Nor is the belief in the supremacy of Kant confined to those who have adopted his philosophical conclusions. Even among Catholics the culture of Kantian ideas seems to be growing. There seems to be a notion in some quarters that sooner or later we must all come to Kant's terms. The modernists in many instances have been led into their vain and foolish speculations because they imagine that all philosophy must sooner or later capitulate to Kant, and that his estimate of the value of all human knowledge, and especially of its limitations, is really the true one. Even the late Orestes A. Brownson—whose ontologism was the direct antithesis of the whole Kantian position—freely admitted that Kant's analysis of reason was complete and final. Professor De Wulf in his recent very able work, "Scholasticism Old and New," tells us that there is a movement of recent date, which "is making rapid progress" by "a group of French Catholics—not merely lay, but clerical—who are enthusiastic supporters of Neo-Kantism." He truthfully says that not only is "the intellectual dictatorship of Kant nowadays officially proclaimed and acknowledged in most universities, especially in France and Germany," but that "from the calm heights of pure speculation, which are familiar to the philosopher alone, Kant's teaching and theories have also found their way into the prefaces of scientific works, and avowedly popularizing treatises; nay, they

have even percolated into our modern dramas and romances." In spite of the condemnation of Kantism by the Holy See, says a recent French writer, "there are Catholics, and even priests, who have, consciously or unconsciously, drawn their inspiration from Kant, and continue to do so, in the hope of building up in this wise a new philosophy that may serve as a basis for revealed faith."

The truth is that all modern philosophy is founded on Kant. The great fundamental questions of philosophy—the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will—have all been colored with the rays that emanated from Kant's intellect, and those who have written about these subjects since his day have been completely laboring under the spell of Kant. The idealism of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel and the realism of Schopenhauer and Herbart were merely two branches shooting from the common stem of Kant. In France even Comté declared that Kant's metaphysic was a very effective instrument for preparing minds to accept the Positive philosophy. In Great Britain Hamilton and Manzel drew not only their inspiration, but even their thought, from Kant, in their discussion of the relative and the absolute; while John Stuart Mill's abstractions are evidently and everywhere swayed by the new doctrine which had just been introduced in the world of philosophy. Indignantly as he repudiated the charge, Herbert Spencer, throughout his philosophy of the unknowable, was nothing more or less than an echo of Kant. Whole chapters of the "Synthetic Philosophy" are mere developments of the Kantian principles, while the agnosticism of which Spencer and Huxley were the supreme pontiffs was, as has been said, a somewhat shrewd application of Kant's answer to the question: What can we know?

Nor, on second thought, should we, perhaps, be too greatly astonished at the marvelous encomiums which have been heaped on the name of Kant. The very conception of his philosophy was the boldness of genius itself. If we can manage to forget the flimsiness of the material from which it has been constructed, the vast, magnificent, imposing structure which Kant has erected in the philosophical arena rises up before us like a majestic temple, whose architectonics, by their overwhelming grandeur and colossal dimensions, inspire us with something almost akin to awe. There it stands like some mighty Gothic cathedral, with its wondrous apse, its gigantic columns, its magnificent, sweeping arches, its noble architraves. It forms one complete organic whole. As Kant himself has said, "the whole is there for the sake of every part, and every part for the sake of the whole." Indeed, it is only when we can take in the entire organic structure as one great whole, to which even the most important features are subsidiary, and to which even the most insignificant



is absolutely necessary, that we begin to understand the philosophy of Kant. And it is only when we have attained to a complete mastery of Kant that we can obtain a view of the entire structure and comprehend how all the different parts are united in one mighty edifice. Too many readers mistake a part for the whole, and have thus missed the whole force of the Kantian position. This doubtless, to some extent, explains why so many efforts to overthrow the structure have been ineffectual. Once we have grasped the Kantian problem and its alleged solution, however, it is, as Goethe has put it, "like going into a lighted room." The unity of the vast structure at once becomes apparent, and the relative value of its different parts are plainly seen. The architectonics—the scheme, the plan, the design, the details and their mutual relation and dependence, all—are apt to force themselves upon the mind as a production of real genius. The very orientation of the edifice is startling. It is not only a revolution in philosophy, but a complete *volte face* movement. Kant himself says: "The very object of the critique of pure speculative reason consists in this attempt at changing the old procedure of metaphysic and imparting to it the secure method of a science, after having completely revolutionized it." He took especial pride in comparing his work with that of Copernicus, and the parallelism is indeed undeniable. It is, however, when we come to examine the construction of the edifice that we become disillusioned. When to its lines and arches we apply the rules of sound philosophy, we soon discover that we have but come upon the glories of a subterranean cave. Its majestic pillars, its noble curves and dazzling ornaments of reason are no more substantial than the stalagmites of a grotto where every detail is weird and unnatural; the refracted light is strangely jarred and shattered, and the entire effect is bizarre and unreal. Some of his positions are so bewildering that it requires rare self-possession to withstand his sophistry. Like a swimmer in a deep, rough sea, whose safety depends as much on his constitutional powers of physical endurance as on his skill as an expert swimmer, the student of philosophy who embarks on the sea of Kantian speculation has need of rare powers of philosophical endurance. Woe betide the luckless wight who commits himself to the waves of Kant's deep-sea philosophy, to be buffeted by the cross-play of his bewildering arguments, unless he is deeply grounded in the principles of logic, possesses an acute logical perception, and is ever keenly alive to the necessity of guarding himself against the danger of being overwhelmed by the surging sea of sophistry, which lies around him on all sides and beneath which lies the unfathomable abyss of Kant's metaphysics. A sure grasp of the principles of sound philosophy, a firm anchorage in the bedrock of logical require-

ment, a mind so constituted by nature that it is, in its keenness and insight, a touchstone of truth, so that it immediately detects the false ring in a philosophical statement and at once discovers the lurking-place of the flaw—these are the requisites for the student of Kant. With these equipments no one need fear to follow Kant, even to the very depths of his almost unfathomable metaphysics. Such an one will soon discover where the misapplied genius of Kant has led him from the path of true reason, involved him in difficulties and contradictions and betrayed him into fallacies so numerous, so entangling, so inextricable, that he is forced, at last, to take refuge in obscurity—where the mind finds no concept to correspond with his language—in order to carry out the self-deception which persuaded him that he was successfully deceiving the rest of mankind. With these equipments we soon perceive the value of Kant's labors. With these lights the eye begins to get accustomed to the twilight, and things begin to appear in their due relations and proportions. The weak points in the edifice are soon discovered. What appeared at first to be of impregnable strength is soon viewed in its true character. The foundations are soon discovered to be of quicksand, the walls of glass, the pillars of pipe clay, the whole a mere mass of illusion and artificial deception. Soon the conviction becomes overwhelming that the skill of the architect is but the cunning of a magician, the splendor of the achievement the mere trickery of a charlatan, the whole the art of the skillful conjuror. The mural splendors are perceived to be but a mass of tangled and deeply interwoven sophistry, which crumbles to pieces the moment we begin to apply to it the axe of sane philosophic thought and the hammer of sound logic. Indeed, when we begin to realize the nature of the structure and the wretched makeshift devices by which the different parts are barely held together to pass muster in the metaphysical twilight, we are apt to feel our indignation rise as we take down one after another the flimsy clasps of fallacy by which the whole is bound together and made to appear as a solid and substantial edifice. At times so intoxicated does Kant seem to have become from the fumes of his own logical opiates that he grows reckless, throws off all restraint and fairly revels and wantons in the luxury of specious sophisms and brilliant but transparent fallacies. Let us quote a single example. It is from his philosophy of nothing.

Of course, every metaphysician has regarded it his bounden duty to give us a philosophy of nothing; and this philosophy has been taken more or less for an explanation of that rather shadowy and intangible element, which in the long run proves to be merely the absence of element of every kind. Usually philosophers are content with limiting positive things to the actual, or the real and the possi-

ble. But Kant is not content with this, and here, as everywhere else, he must have his nothing "according to the categories." Accordingly, in all sober earnestness, and with no vestige of mock gravity, but in all due solemnity, he treats us to his categorical philosophy of nothing. He tells us it is not really necessary, but may seem to be requisite for the completeness of his system. Here are his own words:

"Before leaving this Transcendental Analytic we have to add something which, though in itself of no particular importance, may yet seem to be requisite for the completeness of the system."

This "something," which he "adds," though it is "of no particular importance in itself," is his philosophy of nothing.

"As the categories," he adds, "are the only concepts which apply to objects in general, the distinction whether an object is something or nothing must proceed according to the order and direction of the categories."

Accordingly he arranges his categories, and with all due ceremony passes before each of them the concept of nothing; and with all due precision proceeds formally and systematically to tabulate the results. Here is his own comment on the outcome:

"A table showing this division of the concept of nothing (the corresponding division of the concept of something follows by itself) would have to be arranged as follows." And this is his table:

Nothing,	
as	
I. Empty concept without an object.	
<i>Ens rationis.</i>	
II. Empty object of a concept.	III. Empty intuition without an object.
<i>Nihil privativum.</i>	<i>Ens imaginarium.</i>
IV. Empty object without a concept.	
<i>Nihil negativum.</i>	

Here, then, Kant treats us to four different kinds of nothing with all due philosophic solemnity. This, however, as he has just told us, is not an essential part of the edifice; it is a mere ornament placed there for our delectation and edification, as well as to show the art of the builder, and therefore it is unnecessary to make a formal analysis of it. It is merely necessary to call attention to the fact that stately and categorical as is this ostentatious tabulation of the concept of nothing, our knowledge of that impalpable non-entity is very far from being at all enlarged by it. All this classification and division of the concept brings us not one whit nearer to nothing itself. No doubt we can arrive at the idea of nothing

by means of "the categories;" but there are a million other ways in which we can reach it without asking ourselves under what class of concepts we are traveling. When "poor Mother Hubbard" arrived at her bare and boneless cupboard neither she nor her faithful but disappointed dog was obliged to await a classification before discovering the nature of the nothing that confronted them. It was there in all its appalling forcefulness. It mattered little whether it was the form of *nihil privativum* or *ens rationis* that the calamity assumed; awful nothing was there in almost positive realness. No doubt Kant's classification is as good as any other; but how is our acquaintance with the real state of the case at all improved? Are there grades or degrees in the concept of nothing or in that which the concept suggests? Have we a great, greater and greatest nothing? Is the nothing represented by the absence of five dollars as great as that which is represented by the absence of five millions? Is the concept of the latter greater than the concept of the former? And if so, is the concept correct? Would the nothing which resulted from the displacement of Theodore Roosevelt, for instance, be more extensive, more important or more vast in every way than that which would follow the annihilation of an African jungle, or the tall timbers in a Western forest fire, or the abolition of the tariff? These, no doubt, are foolish questions, but they are not one whit more so than the wisdom that underlies Kant's concept of four different kinds of nothing. Why should the notion of a difference between the nothing which would result from the abolition of the stock exchange and that which comes to a disappointed politician seeking a fat office be regarded as sheer folly, while the distinction of the four different kinds of nothing which the negation of the four categories introduces must be regarded as the highest achievement of human wisdom? What is there in the negation of a noumenon, a golden mountain, a square circle or any specific entity that these should be held as a privileged class—the titled aristocracy in the realm of nothing? What we protest against is the underlying suggestion that we are treated to real knowledge under cover of this vain babbling. No assumption of superior wisdom and no counterfeit structure—no matter how imposing—can be permitted totally to eclipse common sense. In the infinite sea of nothing there can be no degrees, no differences and no distinctions; for it is nothing. We cannot even say that all nothings are equal; for there is but one nothing, though the concept of it may be reached by many different routes. As all roads lead to Rome, or all rivers run to the sea, into the boundless ocean of nothing all negations finally lead. The moment we reach the shore-line of nothing, however, all actualities and all possibilities equally cease. The non-existence of the real

is not distinguishable from the non-existence of the logical. One nothing in that abyss is not greater than another nothing. The loftiest headlands, be they real or be they possible, cease when they reach the vast ocean. All Kant's concepts of nothing, "according to the order and direction of the categories," are simply his notions of something—although that something may be merely a fancy—transferred to the realm of nothing. His *ens rationis*, his *nihil privativum*, his *ens imaginarium*, his *nihil negativum* cannot with any semblance of truth be predicated of nothing; they are mere notions borrowed from the positive world which he has transferred to the negative realm or realm of nothing. He may pursue them in thought down to the border line of nothing; but the moment he embarks on that sea all his concepts vanish as if they never had been. What Kant sees, as he traces his categories down to negations and beyond, are the headlands of his own positive thoughts and conceptions; but when he undertakes to carry these out on the bosom of the ocean of nothingness he is simply deceiving himself. He mistakes the shadows which the headlands of his categories cast on the ocean of nothing for concepts of nothing itself. The matter itself, ocean of nothing for concepts of nothing itself. No one understood this better than Kant himself, and when it serves his purpose he is ready to admit it. Indeed, he quite explicitly admits that, "No one can definitely think a negation unless he finds it on the opposite affirmation." The matter itself, however, is, as Kant says, of little importance, and would hardly be worthy of notice were it not that it is a striking illustration of the pompous pretensions of Kant when he undertakes to dispense wisdom to the generations of mankind. We are forced to resent the insinuation that Kant is here teaching us something about nothing, when in reality all that he actually does is to follow his concepts of the positive to the very line of negation and then delude himself that he can carry these positive concepts beyond that line, and establish them beyond it, in all their force and efficacy.

We have been drawn away almost unwittingly, by the peculiarity of Kant's views on the subject of nothing, from the real scope of this article, which was to show from extrinsic evidence that Kant was a mere sophist. However, since we have pursued Kant thus far on this somewhat irrelevant subject, let us follow him still farther; for Kant again returns to the subject of nothing and again deals so peculiarly with this "manifold of nothing" that one is led to suspect that the philosophy of nothing was specially introduced in order that it might be of some future service.

Readers of the "Critique of Pure Reason" will remember how in his antinomies, to the utter dismay of the reader, and almost with

a sort of ghoulish glee, Kant, in imitation of the Eleatic sophist, was wont to bring forward irrefragable proofs for the existence of God, the freedom of the will, the simplicity of the soul and a limited universe; and how he then proceeded to demonstrate by what he calls "equally strong proofs" the exact contradictory of all these; that is, to show that there is no God, that the will is not free, that the soul is a compound substance, that the world is infinite. It is in his so-called disproof of the simplicity of the soul that he again introduces his conception of nothing. We are not here analyzing the argument of disproof—save only inasmuch as it is affected by his metaphysics of nothing.

The method of disproof is peculiarly Kant's own and consists in the attempt to show that "the existence of the absolutely simple cannot be proved from any experience or perception;" that the absolutely simple "is a mere idea;" that the objective reality of this idea "can never be shown in any possible experience;" that being without objective reality "it is without an object," and that consequently it can be nothing more than a mere idea. This is his proof in outline. But he undertakes to prove his minor premise, viz., that the idea of the absolutely simple is without objective reality, and this is how he does it:

"For if we assumed that an object of this transcendental idea might be found in experience, the empirical intuition of some one object would have to be such as to contain absolutely nothing manifold by the side of each other, and combined to a unity."

We are of opinion that the language which Kant here uses is quite a sufficient answer to the question at the head of this article. We believe that we might search the history of philosophy through and through without meeting a fitting parallel for this extraordinary statement and still more extraordinary language. But more follows. He immediately adds:

"But as, from our not being conscious of such a manifold, we cannot form any valid conclusion as to the entire impossibility of it in any objective intuition, and as without this no absolute simplicity can be established, it follows that such simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception whatsoever."

Here Kant makes the attempt to turn at least one of his four different kinds of nothing to good account; for "nothing manifold by the side of each other, and combined to a unity" is evidently that particular kind of nothing which "must proceed according to the order and direction of the categories." Specifically it is that kind which he places in the fourth division, viz., "an empty object without a concept," or negative nothing—"nihil negativum." This nihil negativum always implies a contradiction in terms, is identical

with the metaphysical impossibility of other philosophers, and of it Kant himself admits that we cannot form any concept. A square circle, a triangle composed of only two straight lines, two adjacent hills without an intervening valley—all these and several other contradictory ideas like them belong to Kant's fourth class of nothing. They are nothing objectively; we can form even no concept of them; and their very terms contradict each other. In other words, they are metaphysical impossibilities.

Now Kant's argument against the simplicity of the soul—as quoted above in the second extract from him—is, that since we are not conscious of this impossible concept—this “nothing manifold by the side of each other, and combined to a unity”—we cannot prove that it does not exist; or to use Kant's own verbiage given above, “we cannot form any valid conclusion as to the entire impossibility of it in any objective intuition;” therefore this absurd, contradictory and impossible concept may have somewhere an objective validity after all; this impossible may be possible. As we have never met with it, it may exist somewhere. It matters not that it implies a contradiction in terms; inasmuch as we have never seen it, we cannot declare it impossible. But as the utter removal of even its possibility is necessary—as he says—before we can have room for the simple, it follows that the simple does not exist. We have tried to simplify Kant's argument, which, to all appearance, he has wrapped up in terms as abstruse as possible, in order to avoid detection. But when brought out into open day and put in all its naked meaning its absurdity is clearly manifest. What would we think of a man who would base an argument on the proposition that because mankind had never within the range of human experience met with such a thing as the contradictory and impossible square circle—so long as he had not met with it—he could not pronounce it impossible, and that, therefore, the length of a line drawn from the centre of a square to one of its angles might, for aught we know, be precisely the same as the length of a line drawn from the same centre to the point of bisection of one of its sides? Certainly if the square circle be not an impossibility—and the falsity of the statement rests upon this impossibility—the statement may be true. Yet this is precisely the argument of Kant here against the simplicity of the soul. Or, again, supposing a carpenter should argue that “since we are not conscious” of two straight lines enclosing a space, “we cannot form any valid conclusion as to the entire impossibility of it in any objective intuition, that since we have never seen a space enclosed by merely two lines we are not in a position to say it cannot be done; and that, therefore, it would be perfectly proper for him to build you a house with merely two sides; he would be doing precisely

what Kant has undertaken to do when he drew his conclusion against the simplicity of the soul from the fact that we have never met with the "nothing manifold by the side of each other, and combined to a unity." The fact is that Kant has here unconsciously laid down an entirely new principle for the treatment of these contradictory concepts which are not only impossible, but unthinkable. Absurd, impossible and unthinkable though they be, he maintains that for that very reason we cannot regard them impossible.

This, however, is not the only way in which Kant's antithetical argument is open to criticism or in which it can be convicted of mere sophistry. In the first of the two quotations from his argument given above he tells us that the transcendental object which corresponds to the transcendental idea of the absolutely simple cannot be found in experience, and proceeds to argue thus:

"For, if we assumed that an object of this transcendental idea might be found in experience, the empirical intuition of some one object would have to be such as to contain absolutely nothing manifold by the side of each other, and combined to a unity."

Now this is a most remarkable statement. Kant does not know what is meant by this "nothing manifold by the side of each other, and combined to a unity." It is an empty object; it is not even a concept. The very notion is in contradiction with itself. It is contradictory, impossible, unknowable, unthinkable. And yet such, he assures us, are the exigencies of the case that he finds himself forced into a recognition and an admittance of this wholly unthinkable thought. We never hear of any one being driven through the sheer force of logic into any of the other contradictory and unthinkable concepts which range themselves under the head of the *nihil negativum*. Why, if the objective reality of the absolutely simple should happen to be once admitted, should Kant be forcibly driven into this horror of horrors? This he does not explain. But is not Kant otherwise a trifle too definite? How does he know that it is precisely into this "nothing manifold" and nothing else that he is forced, since he does not even know what this strange "nothing manifold" is, and cannot have a concept of it which does not contradict itself? How does he know so definitely and accurately what he does not know at all? How does he know with such certainty that he must accept a thing whose existence is not only highly problematical, but logically impossible and wholly unthinkable? These are but a few of the questions which Kant must answer before his disproof of the absolutely simple can be admitted to the realm of philosophy at all, or lifted out of the sewer of wretched quibble.

But we are not yet done with this curious Kantian metaphysical



entity of an "absolutely nothing manifold by the side of each other, and combined to a unity." We have yet to do what we set out to do, viz., to analyze this twin brother to the square circle, which Kant used as a stalking horse to hide the wretched sophistry in which he revels so riotously. Let us now proceed to the task. What is really meant by this "nothing manifold by the side of each other, and combined to a unity?" It is very doubtful whether Kant, in his anxiety to emulate the historic Eleatic philosopher in his famous antinomies, stopped to ask himself whether or no it had any meaning. Indeed, it is very doubtful whether Kant understood the significance of his own words throughout this sophistry at all; and to all appearances his only anxiety was to throw dust enough to blur the vision of his readers. So earnest was he in this, that he seems to have forgotten the thread of his sophistical argument, for he has made the second half contradict the first. But that is not the question here, and we must hasten to the analysis of this extraordinary "nothing manifold by the side of each other, and combined to a unity." The expression is so absurd in every way that for the moment the reader is apt to regard it as a misprint, or at least to incline to the belief that Kant wrote it without at all adverting to its meaning. Such a conclusion would, however, be a grievous mistake; for throughout the remainder of the argument he shows very plainly that he used the term with full deliberation and intended that it should be enshrined with all due honor as a special adornment of his philosophy.

Now it is quite evident that "nothing manifold," if it represents an idea at all, must mean just one of two things. It must mean either nothing at all, or it must mean the simple. It cannot possibly have any other meaning. By "nothing manifold," then, we must understand either nothing or the simple. Nothing that is manifold can be simple and nothing that is simple can be manifold; consequently the simple equals nothing manifold and vice versa. If we take this "nothing manifold" as nothing, it makes little difference whether we take it as a manifold nothing or a nothing manifolded; the result is the same—nothing—in either case. In a manifold nothing it is evident that there is the idea of just one single nothing—which is, of course, nothing; while in nothing manifold there may be implied the notion of more than one nothing and these nothings manifolded. But even in this case the final issue is nothing. For we may place one "nothing manifold" by the side of another "nothing manifold" and this again by the side of a third "nothing manifold," and go on repeating the process to the crack of doom, and it is evident that nothing will be the final result. All these nothings can never combine to make a unity. If, on the other hand, we take the simple

as the meaning of this "nothing manifold," we cannot, it is true, have this simple by the side of each other; for in the simple there is no each and there is no other, and consequently no "each other." Neither does this simple "combine to a unity;" for there are no parts to combine; and it is already unity. Now we have here a result that is absolutely startling. Kant has adopted this singular method of reasoning for the express purpose of demonstrating the impossibility of the simple; but he is merely hoist with his own petard. Here is his reasoning, as we have already seen: "But as we, from our not being conscious of such a manifold (nothing manifold), cannot form any valid conclusion as to the entire impossibility of it in objective intuition, and as without this no absolute simplicity can be established, it follows that such simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception whatsoever." Now, if "we cannot form any valid conclusion as to the entire impossibility" of this "nothing manifold" simply "from our not being conscious of it;" and as this "nothing manifold," about whose impossibility we can form no valid conclusion, is, as we have just seen, nothing else than the simple itself, it follows by an absolute necessity, according to Kant's own reasoning, that we cannot form any valid conclusion as to the entire impossibility of it; that is, of the simple. Now this is a result exactly opposite to that which Kant has undertaken to prove and which he thinks he has actually proved, viz., the impossibility of the simple. If we take the alternate meaning of "nothing manifold," viz., nothing, we shall find that several different conclusions can be arrived at according to the meaning we assign to "nothing," and among them Kant's conclusion; but it is not necessary to pursue it here. The fact is that Kant throughout juggles with thought, juggles with words, juggles with logic, juggles with metaphysic, juggles with definition, juggles with everything. Indeed, here—as the result of his jugglery—we have even a more startling condition than that on which he plumed himself when he announced the equal value of proof and disproof in his antinomies. In his theses and anti-theses he reaches his opposite conclusions by two different lines of thought, while here from one and the same argument we have two opposite conclusions exactly contradictory of each other. Kant started out to prove the impossibility of the simple, but the line of argument which he uses is such that he actually proves at the same time the impossibility of that impossibility.

Indeed, when we find an honored name like that of Kant linked with such evident sophistry, when we find men of otherwise acute intellect so easily duped by abstract reasoning, and when we find philosophical deception so easy that a plausible fallacy can impose upon the world for generations, we are strongly inclined to doubt

the value of all metaphysical speculation where, owing to the abstraction, the most audacious quibbles can escape the observation of even the keenest intellects. After reading Kant we are not surprised at the enormities of *Pragmatism*. It is indeed true that the instances to which we have called attention are to a certain extent exceptional in Kant; that is, not all his numberless fallacies are so bold and glaring. Ordinarily he takes pains to hide the sophistry even from himself. Here, however, he seems to have grown bold and daring and even utterly reckless. He seems to have a boundless faith in the utter gullibility of mankind, and treats his readers with such impudence and effrontery that he does not regard it necessary to conceal his quibbles. Elsewhere he is much more guarded, has a care for the amenities of logic, and at least makes an effort to maintain the forms and appearances of philosophical argument. Of this, however, we shall have ample opportunity to judge in future articles.

We have been drawn away from the original purpose of this article by these tempting follies of Kant, and we must return. That purpose was, as has been said, to show from extrinsic evidence that Kant was nothing more than a mere sophist. This it is easy to show:

1. From his deceptions;
2. From his contradictions;
3. From his deliberate obscurities;
4. From his juggling with the categories;
5. From his empirical psychology;
6. From his antinomies (of which we have already given a sample);
7. From his discrepancies of statement in the different editions.

By extrinsic evidence we mean not so much the testimony of others, as of Kant himself, where he betrays his mental processes; by intrinsic evidence we mean the arguments themselves in which the sophistry appears. Of evidence of both kinds there is enough and to spare, and we hope to furnish enough of each kind to satisfy our readers. In the present article the intrinsic proofs have trespassed on the territory of the extrinsic, and there is now barely room to introduce the latter. In future articles we hope to be able to keep each within its own domain.

By Kant's deceptions we mean the many ways in which he has tried to deceive his readers, whether by covering up the weakness of his own position; by making false and misleading statements; by pretending that he was following principles when he was merely experimenting with hypotheses; or by the omissions, additions and practical retractions which are to be met with in a comparison of his first edition with the second and subsequent ones.

We are of opinion that one of the most useful purposes to which a life could be devoted would be a complete expose of the Kantian humbug. And we believe that, for a complete exposition, a whole lifetime would be needed. But neither the most valuable life, nor the most shining talents, nor the most brilliant attainments devoted to a refutation of Kant could be regarded as wasted. Indeed, we believe that all these could not be dedicated to a nobler work or one more advantageous to philosophy, to theology, to physical science, than the dethronement of the false idol before whose altar men have so long superstitiously worshiped. The student of Kant who has read only the second or some subsequent edition of his works cannot be said to have an acquaintance with the real Kant. To get a clear view of the real Kant there must be a comparison of the first edition with the second. It is such a comparison that reveals to us the real man as well as the real merits of his philosophy.

We have little in common with Schopenhauer except, perhaps, a love of philosophy; but no one who has a complete knowledge of Kant can deny that on many points the father of German pessimism has laid bare the weaknesses of the Königsberg metaphysician. We are very far from being in agreement with Schopenhauer in his extravagant estimate of the value of the portions of Kant's work which were printed in the first edition, but omitted in the second; but there is little doubt that when he tells us that "Kant gives hollow, nay, untrue, excuses for the elimination of" these portions: that "he (Kant) does not confessedly wish that what was omitted should have been thought to have been retracted by him;" and that "the dishonesty of Kant's plea becomes clear if we compare the second with the first edition;" he has interpreted Kant correctly and penetrated not only beneath the surface of the philosophy, but the disguise of the philosopher as well. In perfect keeping with Schopenhauer's views is the palpable dishonesty manifest in Kant's dealing with the definition of his categories. We are not aware that any one has called attention to this bold bit of buccaneering, and we shall close this article with it.

The categories are the very corner-stone of Kant's philosophy. Take them away and his entire contention is left hanging in mid-air. Together with his transcendental æsthetic they constitute the entire foundation on which his whole philosophy is based. Kant himself tells us that "they have given him the greatest trouble." Without them there would never have been the new Copernican philosophy—as Kant prided himself in regarding it. Surely, if a new philosophy was to be founded in which all our old notions were to be reversed as completely as Copernicus reversed our notions in astronomy, the way should be made clear and nothing should be

covered up or concealed. Above and before all the basis of the new philosophical doctrine to which we were expected to subscribe should be sound and without cavil. If we were to have a new science of metaphysic, as Kant intended—nay, as he boasted of having given us—the foundations of that new science should not be suspicious or dubious; they should admit of clear explanation and full elucidation. Perhaps there is no philosopher who has insisted more than Kant on the importance and necessity of such explanation. His opinion was that if we are to have a science of anything we must begin with clear and accurate definition. He himself has pointed out that without adequate definition there can be nothing but confusion and misunderstanding. Quite naturally, therefore, the reader of Kant expects that, since the categories are the basis of his new science of metaphysic, the definition of the categories will be clear and unequivocal, and that at the proper time he will be furnished with an adequate explanation of them. Kant himself was evidently of the same opinion, for he hastens to anticipate the legitimate expectations of the reader on this point. But does he furnish him with the requisite explanation or supply the adequate definition? Far from it. Kant's deliberate deception here is the scandal of philosophy. Out of his own mouth he is convicted of falsehood. Sophistry might be pardonable; but what must be thought of plain lying? Fully comprehending that he could give no adequate explanation of his categories and finding himself powerless to define them, he resorts to the practices of the confidence man. When the proper time arrives for the definition of the categories, with all blithe and winning ingenuousness, Kant nonchalantly tells his reader:

"I intentionally omit here the definition of these categories, though I may be in possession of them. In the sequel I shall dissect these concepts so far as is sufficient for the purpose of the method which I am preparing."

Nothing could be more reassuring than these apparently straightforward words of promise, especially from one who has so high an estimate of the value of definitions; and the reader, thus assured, accepts the promise without question or misgiving. Indeed, he would be a mere churl to do otherwise with one who is as considerate and who has so lively a sense of the requirements of the case. Kant, however, does not let the matter rest here, but proceeds with the smooth address of the confidence man to give us the reason of the "intentional omission here." He adds:

"In a complete system of pure reason they (the definitions) might be justly demanded, but at present they would only make us lose sight of the principal object of our investigation by rousing doubts

and objections which, without injury to our essential object, may well be relegated to another time."

This explanation is not so reassuring, and a suspicion begins to dawn that everything is not exactly right, but all suspicions vanish before the words which follow:

"The little I have said ought to be sufficient to show clearly that a complete dictionary of these concepts, with all requisite explanations, is not only possible, but easy."

We begin to be ashamed of our suspicions as we read these words of confident assurance. Are we not dealing with a man of honor who knows the value—the importance—the necessity of definitions? Is he not preaching definitions and clearness in season and out of season? It is true "here," and now would be the proper place for these same definitions. But why give place to squeamishness? Have we not been assured that the "omission of the definitions" has been "intentional" and merely temporary? Have we not been assured that even "a complete dictionary" of them, "with all requisite explanations, is not only possible, but easy?" Ought not what Kant has said "be sufficient to show" that there is no difficulty in furnishing "a whole dictionary" of definitions of these categories if need be? With our suspicions thus set at rest, and confident that, in accordance with the promise, the missing definitions will turn up at the proper juncture, we pursue our acquaintance with the new philosophy on the Copernican plan—forgetful, perhaps, of definitions or their absence—when on reaching the third chapter of the "Transcendental Analytic" we are suddenly awakened with a rude shock as we read:

"When representing the table of the categories we dispensed with the definition of every one of them, because at that time it seemed unnecessary for our purpose, which concerned their synthetical use only, and because entailing responsibilities which we were not bound to incur."

This is somewhat startling. It has a different tone from the words of transparent candor which won us away from our suspicions. But there is something more. He continues:

"This was not a mere excuse, but a very important prudential rule, viz., not to rush into definitions and to attempt or pretend completeness or precision in the definition of a concept, when one or other of its characteristic marks is sufficient without a complete enumeration of all that constitute the whole concept."

Matters now begin to get serious. It now begins to look as though bruin had regarded the time as fully arrived when he may safely cast off his disguise; accordingly the shining ivory begins to appear. The soft, purring accents are dispensed with and we hear

instead the sharp gritting of teeth. It is evident that our leader through the quagmires of his deduction considers that he has sufficiently blinded us with his meaningless verbiage and so confused matters that it is now perfectly safe to disclose the true state of the case. He had taken pains previously to pave the way for his *finale*. He had already in his confidence-winning manner told us "the deduction of the categories is beset with so many difficulties and obliges us to enter so deeply into the first grounds of the possibility of our knowledge in general, that I thought it more expedient, in order to avoid the lengthiness of a complete theory . . . . to add the following four paragraphs with a view to *preparing* rather than *instructing* (italics ours) the reader. After that only, I shall in the third section proceed to a systematical discussion of these elements of the understanding. *Till then the reader must not be frightened by a certain amount of obscurity which at first is inevitable on a road never trodden before, but which, when we come to that section, will give way, I hope, to a complete comprehension.* (Italics ours.) It is quite evident, then, that the postponement of the definition beyond the due time was for a purpose. It is equally evident that that purpose was to temporize, to gain time, in order to befog and bewilder the reader. The path was "beset with difficulties." In the midnight darkness through which the reader was being led the guide keeps calling to him "not to be frightened by the obscurity." The leader has deliberately led him around by a circuitous and dangerous path, instead of going directly to the point and facing whatever difficulties may present themselves. All this is manifestly for the bewilderment of the reader—that he may forget all about the categories or their definitions, or that in the obscurity he may be persuaded that a sufficient substitute for them has been provided, and that, consequently, they may be dispensed with. All the while, however, the assurance has been held out that the definitions are "easy and possible"—close at hand, even by the dictionary—full. And now when we have reached the promised land of "the third section" where we are assured of "a complete comprehension" of everything, where the clouds will lift and darkness disperse, the author changes his tone. He regards himself as safely out of the woods and throws off the mask. He doubtless believes that the reader is so befogged and bewildered by the darkness and the bypaths that it is perfectly safe to reveal to him the true state of things; for he is so "frightened" by the obscurity that he has forgotten even the necessity of these definitions. The reader thus "prepared," as Kant himself has put it, but not "instructed," is supposed to be ready to accept anything. Thus "prepared" and arrived at the trysting place for the "systematical discussion" and "complete

comprehension" of these concepts and their definitions, the whole atmosphere changes, and we are told that Kant's cautious postponement was prudent, for:

"When representing the table of the categories we dispensed with the definition of every one of them, because at that time it seemed unnecessary for our purpose, which concerned their synthetical use only, and because entailing responsibilities which we were not bound to incur. This was not a mere excuse, but a very prudential rule, viz., not to rush into definitions and to attempt or pretend completeness or precision in the definition of a concept, when one or other of its characteristic marks is sufficient without a complete enumeration of all that constitute the whole concept. Now, however, we can perceive that this caution had a deeper ground, namely, *that we could not have defined them even if we had wished.*"

This, then, was the true state of the case from the outset, and Kant has simply been playing the part of the artful dodger and deceiving his readers. It is with something of a shock we discover that the great philosopher's plea for a postponement of the required definitions was but the wily strategy of a mere trickster. He has led his readers through the dark valley for the simple purpose of awing them into humble and unquestioning submission. His plea is a mere makeshift, and the entire scheme has been a clever contrivance—which has been more or less successful—for the introduction of a philosophy which, if advocated on its merits and without recourse to mystery, the world would be slow to accept. Once introduced, however, Kant becomes confident and dogmatical. An apologetic word or two is introduced, indeed, in order to quiet any qualms that might linger to trouble right reason; and, like all revolutions where the usurper has awed the citizens into a belief in his spurious claims, all is quiet again. "It seems to be something strange and even illogical," he condescendingly admits—by way of conciliation of those whose reason has been outraged—"that there should be a concept which must have a meaning and yet is incapable of any explanation. But," he adds, with a sort of forced resignation, "the case of these categories is peculiar"—a sentiment in which his readers can without any scruple heartily join. His conscience, however, seems still to trouble him, and he finds it necessary to offer some explanation to his reason which he has outraged and subdued. From time to time he returns to the subject in order to quiet the claims of reason, and so we find him explaining to himself rather than to his readers that "they (these categories) are needed to define an object and cannot therefore be defined themselves." At times he seems to assume the rôle of the spiritualistic medium in matters philosophical where special powers are necessary



in order to be admitted to the arcana of transcendental philosophy and where a special interpreter is needed to reveal the mysterious secrets to the rest of mankind. The mystic screen, the necessary darkened room, the vague and meaningless expressions which may mean anything or nothing—it is simply the spiritualistic methods introduced into philosophy and the science of metaphysics. Thus in the second edition, which was prepared with such care, he again reverts to the question and tells us: "In one word, none of these concepts (the categories) admit of being *authenticated* (italics Kant's own), nor can their real possibility be proved, if all sensuous intuition (the only one which we possess) is removed, and there remains in that case a *logical* possibility only, that is, that a concept (a thought) is possible." (Parentheses Kant's.)

We thus find that Kant, in his dealings with the definitions of his categories on which his whole philosophy is based, resorts to petty fraud of the most despicable kind in order to hoodwink his readers—possibly himself. He first pretends to postpone the definitions. Next he declares that, although postponed, these definitions are not only possible, but easy. Finally, when he thinks he has persuaded his readers that the definitions can be dispensed with, he admits—what he knew from the outset—that definitions of them are impossible; and finally he seeks to justify his absurd position by undertaking to explain why an explanation of them is impossible. The sewers of philosophy might be searched in vain for ranker sophistry than that which Kant thus seeks to impose on us in relation to the defaulting definitions of his categories.

Alas, for the honor of philosophy, that we should be obliged to conclude that no one could be more fully aware of this than Kant himself! And the damning proof of this lies in the fact that it was Kant himself who took the pains to conceal the contradiction in his second edition. The reader searches in vain throughout the whole second edition for the evidence which has been just laid before him. Manifestly Kant discovered how damaging to his contention was the appearance of this contradiction in his first edition. He, therefore, took especial pains to wholly eliminate from the second edition everything that sounded like an admission that a definition of the categories is impossible. All statements to this effect he rigidly excluded. The words of promise indeed remain; but, as far as Kant is concerned, the reader of the second and subsequent editions will never know why this promise has not been fulfilled. Truth and honesty never resort to deceitful measures. No philosophy with which we are acquainted, has stooped to such tactics of deliberate fraud, duplicity and deceit, save and except the philosophy which claims to have revolutionized the world. The children of

deceit are wiser in their generation than the children of truth. In his second edition Kant retains, indeed, the words of promise of his forthcoming definitions; but he very sapiently omitted all allusion to the reasons why he failed to fulfill that promise.

Nor should the fact be overlooked here—although it belongs more properly to the intrinsic, rather the extrinsic, evidence—that from Kant's confessed inability to define his categories, there results not only an awkward, but a fatal situation for the Kantian philosophy. The fatal flaw invalidates the whole work; for it is fundamental and vital. The categories are the very corner-stone of the Kantian edifice. On them the whole structure rests. Without them the whole edifice crumbles to atoms. No one understood this better than Kant. He realized his difficulty when the time for definition arrived. He felt the necessity of a proper definition of them. He was well aware that unless he could furnish an explanation it could be retorted upon him that he did not understand the nature of the corner-stone on which he was building. Without such an understanding he was manifestly building at haphazard—for aught he knew on quicksand. If he himself could not understand his categories, how could he explain them to others? Definitions were, therefore, above and before all imperative. He is finally forced to confess, however, that they are likewise impossible. Consequently the categories may mean one thing or they mean just the opposite. The reader cannot explain them. The author cannot explain them. They are utterly inexplicable. And so the entire Kantian edifice is resting on a puffball. A beautiful basis for a new science, surely! The much-lauded "Critique of Pure Reason"—for all its imposing architectonics and airy transcendental grandeur—is but a swinging nest hanging by an unknown and indefinable thread—a somewhat strange support for a philosophy whose leading feature is the answer to the question: What can I know? It would seem like the irony of fate that its very foundation, as well as that of agnosticism, should be itself unknowable and indefinable.

In this article we have been merely introducing the subject of Kant's shortcomings. We have given but one instance of his duplicity—sophistry is too mild a term. His "Critique" teems, however, with instances of this kind; and this is but the extrinsic proof that Kant was a mere sophist. When we come to his arguments themselves—the intrinsic testimony—we shall find sophistry underlying every single argument. It is difficult to understand how the synthetic faculty should have such power over the minds of men that no matter how flimsy the edifice, how faulty the construction, or how tawdry the plan—provided it appears as one organic whole and has the semblance of novelty—it passes for the work of real

genius. The constructive faculty is indeed admirable. Synthetic power is eagerly to be desired; but the construction of a fool's paradise is a poor use to which to devote high gifts and talents, and the synthesis of a philosophy or a metaphysic which is either brimming over with fallacies or filled with obscurities—which not even the author can fathom—is sorry employment for a real or supposed genius. Certainly to construct a philosophy without being able to define the concepts on which it is based is the height of insanity. Without clear definition we cannot advance a single step in any science. Each step must blaze the way for the next; otherwise we are but as the blind leading the blind. Kant was fully aware of this. He made several vain attempts at definition of the categories, each time to be thrown back by the impossibilities of the task. He then resorts to sophistry, and even this failing to bring the desired result, he at last takes refuge in deception. Hence what he has given us as a philosophy has no more solid foundation than an empty air castle.

In the face of all this, what is to be thought of Kant's pompous manifesto in his second edition, where he speaks so egotistically of the magnificent bequest which he was leaving to posterity? The rich inheritance, the splendid treasure to be handed down to future generations, is a veritable golden mountain, an *ens imaginarium* or an *ens rationis*, as you may choose to take it—one of his four different kinds of nothing—a castle in the air—a philosophy without a foundation. Nevertheless, with a self-complacency which is exhilarating he says: "If, then, it may not be too difficult to leave a bequest to posterity, in the shape of a systematical metaphysic, carried out according to the critique of pure reason, such a bequest is not to be considered, therefore, as of little value, whether we regard the improvement received through the secure method of a science, in place of its groundless groping and uncritical vagaries, or whether we look to the better employment of the time of our inquiring youth"—and so on to the end of the chapter. If ever there was "groundless groping" or "uncritical vagary" in the realm of metaphysic, it surely is in the "Critique of Pure Reason," which is built on an unproved and unprovable hypothesis, instead of on sound and incontrovertible principles—a hypothesis so purely problematical that its author admits that he cannot define it, and then alarmed at the confession, takes pains to expunge every trace of the admission from all future editions. And yet in the face of all this—perhaps through ignorance of it—the schools have meekly accepted Kant's "bequest" and humbly admitted that they were grateful for the darkness in which they tried to persuade themselves that they were able to see, but in which they were only to enter

on a new era of "groundless groping" and "uncritical vagary." And this is "the secure method of a science" to which we are treated and for which we are expected to be thankful! We have merely glanced at one or two flaws in the foundation of the edifice; but these are not the only ones to be met with there. When we come to the superstructure we shall find that compared with it the foundation is sound and impregnable. Here we must stop for the present. We think, however, that we have said enough to show that if there be any pretentious work which stands in need of honest and just criticism it is that which to-day is made the basis of all the philosophy taught in our schools and colleges—the "Critique of Pure Reason."

SIMON FITZSIMONS.

Lima, New York.

LETTER OF OUR HOLY FATHER POPE PIUS X.

TO THE FRENCH ARCHBISHOPS AND BISHOPS.

*To our well-beloved sons Peter Hector Coullie, Cardinal Priest of the Holy Roman Church, Archbishop of Lyons; Louis Henry Luçon, Cardinal Priest of the Holy Roman Church, Archbishop of Rheims; Paulin Peter Andrieu, Cardinal Priest of the Holy Roman Church, Archbishop of Bordeaux; and to all our other venerable brothers, the French Archbishops and Bishops.*

PIUS X. POPE.

Venerable Brethren:

OUR apostolic office makes it a duty for us to watch over the purity of the faith and the integrity of Catholic discipline, and to preserve the faithful from the dangers of error and evil, especially when the error and evil are presented in attractive language, which, concealing vagueness of idea and equivocation of expression under the ardor of sentiment and the noise of loud-sounding words, may inflame hearts for seductive but fatal causes. Such were formerly the doctrines of the pretended philosophers of the eighteenth century, those of the Revolution and of liberalism, so often condemned; such are to-day also the theories of the Sillon, which, under brilliant and generous appearances, too often want clearness, logic and truth, and in this respect do not savor of the Catholic and French genius.

We have long hesitated, venerable brethren, to express our thoughts on the Sillon publicly and solemnly. Your anxieties had to swell ours to decide us to do so. For we love the courageous youth enrolled under the flag of the Sillon, and we believe them in many respects worthy of praise and admiration. We love their chiefs, in whom we are pleased to recognize elevated souls, superior to vulgar passions, and animated by the most noble enthusiasm for good. You have seen them, venerable brethren, penetrated by a lively sentiment of human fraternity, taking the lead of those who labor and suffer in order to lift them up, sustained in their devotion by their love for Jesus Christ and the exemplary practice of religion.

It was on the morning after the memorable encyclical of our predecessor, Leo XIII., of happy memory. The Church, through the mouth of her supreme head, had poured out on the humble and the lowly all the tenderness of her maternal heart and seemed to call earnestly for an ever-increasing number of champions of the restoration of order and justice in our distracted society. Did not the founders of the Sillon come at the opportune moment to place at

her service young and believing troops for the realization of her desires and her hopes? And as a matter of fact the Sillon raised amongst the working classes the standard of Jesus Christ, the sign of salvation for individuals and nations, nourishing its social activity at the sources of grace, imposing respect for religion upon classes the least favorable, accustoming the ignorant and the impious to hear the Word of God, and often, at controversial conferences, in the face of hostile audiences, rising up, provoked by a question or a sarcasm, to proclaim its faith proudly and determinedly. These were the happy times of the Sillon; this was its best side, which explains the encouragements and approbations it plentifully received from the Bishops and the Holy See, whilst the true character of the Sillonist movement was concealed by that religious fervor.

For it must be said, venerable brethren, our hopes have in great measure been deceived. A day came when the Sillon revealed to the eyes of those who could see clearly disquieting tendencies. The Sillon went astray. Could it have been otherwise? Its founders, young, enthusiastic and full of confidence in themselves, were not sufficiently armed with historic science, sound philosophy and solid theology to meet without danger the difficult social problems towards which they were drawn by their activity and their heart, and to fortify themselves on the ground of doctrine and obedience against liberal and Protestant infiltrations.

Counsels have not been wanting to them. Admonitions came after the counsels; but we have had the sorrow to see both advice and reproaches pass unnoticed and remain without result. Things came to this pitch that we should betray our duty if we kept silence any longer. We owe the truth to our dear children of the Sillon whom a generous ardor has carried away into a path as false as it is dangerous. We owe it to a great number of seminarists and priests whom the Sillon has drawn away, if not from authority, at least from the direction and influence of their Bishops; we owe it, in fine, to the Church in which the Sillon sows division and the interests of which it compromises.

First of all we must characterize severely the pretension of the Sillon to escape the direction of ecclesiastical authority. The leaders of the Sillon, in effect, maintain that they work upon a ground which is not that of the Church; that they pursue only interests of the temporal order and not those of the spiritual order; that the Sillonist is simply a Catholic devoted to the cause of the laboring classes, to democratic works, and drawing the energy of his devotion from the practice of his faith; but that he remains, neither more nor less than Catholic artisans, laborers, economists and politicians, subject to the rules of morality common to all without being bound

more or less than they are in any special manner by ecclesiastical authority.

The reply to these subterfuges is only too easy. For whom will they make believe that the Catholic Sillonists, that the priests and the seminarists enrolled in their ranks have in view in their social activity only the temporal interests of the working classes? In our opinion to maintain that would be to insult them. The truth is that the heads of the Sillon proclaim themselves unalterable idealists, that they pretend to raise up the laboring classes by first elevating the human conscience, that they have a social doctrine and religious and philosophic principles for the reconstruction of society upon a new plan, that they have a special conception of human dignity, liberty, justice and fraternity, and that in order to justify their social dreams they appeal to the Gospel interpreted in their own manner, and, what is still more serious, to a disfigured and diminished Christ. Moreover, they teach these ideas in their educational societies and inculcate them upon their comrades; they also transfer them to their works. They are, therefore, really professors of social, civic and religious morality; and whatever modifications they may introduce in the organization of the Sillonist movement we have the right to say that the object of the Sillon, its character and its action, belong to the moral domain, which is the proper domain of the Church, and that in consequence the Sillonists deceive themselves when they believe that they are working upon a ground on the limits of which expire the rights of the doctrinal and directive power of the ecclesiastical authority.

If their doctrines were free from error it would, nevertheless, be a grave failure in Catholic discipline to withdraw themselves obstinately from the direction of those who have received from heaven the mission to guide individuals and societies in the straight way of truth and of well-doing. But, as we have already said, the evil is more profound; the Sillon, impelled by an ill-understood love of the weak, has fallen into error.

In effect, the Sillon puts forward as a programme the elevation and regeneration of the working classes. But in this matter the principles of Catholic doctrine are fixed, and the history of Christian civilization attests their beneficent fruitfulness. Our predecessor of happy memory reminded them of this in masterly pages which Catholics occupied with social questions ought to study and keep always under their eyes. Notably he taught that Christian democracy ought "to maintain the diversity of classes which is assuredly a fitting characteristic of a well-constituted State, and to wish for human society the form and character that God, its Author, impressed upon it."<sup>1</sup> He denounced "a certain democracy which goes so far

in perversity as to attribute in society sovereignty to the people and to aim at the suppression and the leveling down of the classes." At the same time, Leo XIII. laid down for Catholics a programme of action, the only programme capable of replacing and maintaining society on secular Christian bases. But what have the leaders of the Sillon done? Not only have they adopted a programme and teaching different from that of Leo XIII. (which would of itself be a singularly audacious movement on the part of laymen thus taking up concurrent with the Sovereign Pontiff the attitude of directors of social activity in the Church), but they have openly rejected the programme traced by Leo XIII. and have adopted one diametrically opposed to it; moreover, they reject the doctrine set forth by Leo XIII. as to the essential principles of society, place the authority in the people, or gradually suppress it and strive, as their ideal, to realize the leveling down of the classes. In opposition to Catholic doctrine, therefore, they are proceeding towards a condemned ideal.

We know well that they flatter themselves with the idea of raising human dignity and the too despised condition of the working classes, of rendering the labor laws and the relations between employers and the employed just and perfect; in a word, of causing more complete justice and more charity to prevail on earth and of promoting in humanity, by profound and fruitful social movements, an unexpected progress. Certainly we do not blame these efforts, which would be excellent from every point of view if the Sillonists did not forget that a person's progress consists in his having strengthened his natural faculties by new energies and in his facilitating the play of their activities in the scale of and in conformity with the laws of his constitution; and that, on the contrary, in injuring their essential organs and in destroying the scale of their activity one moves him not towards progress, but towards death. This, nevertheless, is what they want to do with human society; it is their dream to change its natural and traditional bases and to hold out the promise of a future State built on other principles, which they venture to declare more fruitful and more beneficent than the principles upon which the actual Christian State rests.

No, venerable brethren—it is necessary to recall the fact energetically in these times of social and intellectual anarchy, when every one poses as a teacher and a legislator—they cannot build the State otherwise than God has built it; they will not build society if the Church does not lay its bases and does not direct the work; no, civilization has not yet to be found, nor has the new State to be built

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<sup>1</sup> *Disparet tuatur ordines, sane proprios bene constitutae civitatis; eam demum humano convictul velit formam atque indolem esse, qualem Deus auctor indidit.* (Encyclical "Graves de communi.")



in the clouds. It has been in existence; it is so; it is Christian civilization; it is the Catholic State. The only question is that of reestablishing it and restoring it without delay on its natural and divine foundations against the continually repeated attacks of wicked folly, revolt and impiety: "omnia instaurare in Christo."

In order not to be accused of judging too hastily and with unjustifiable rigor the social theories of the Sillon, we wish to review their essential points.

The Sillon is nobly solicitous for human dignity, but it understands that dignity in the manner of certain philosophers of whom the Church does not at all feel proud. The first element of that dignity is liberty, understood in the sense that, except in the matter of religion, each man is autonomous. From this fundamental principle it draws the following conclusions: to-day the people are in tutelage under an authority distinct from themselves; they ought to free themselves from it: *political emancipation*. They are dependent upon employers who hold their instruments of labor, exploit them, oppress them and degrade them; they ought to shake off the yoke: *economic emancipation*. Finally, they are ruled by a caste, called the directing caste, to whom their intellectual development gives an undue preponderance in the direction of affairs; they must break away from their domination: *intellectual emancipation*. The leveling down of conditions from this triple point of view will establish equality amongst men, and this equality is true human justice. A political and social organization founded upon this double basis, liberty and legality (to which will soon be added fraternity)—this is what they call democracy.

Still liberty and legality constitute only its negative side, so to speak. What properly and positively constitutes democracy is the largest possible participation in the government of public affairs. And this embraces a triple element, political, economical and moral.

First of all, in politics the Sillon does not abolish authority; on the contrary, it considers it necessary; but it wishes to divide it, or rather to multiply it in such a way that each citizen will become a kind of king. Authority, it is true, emanates from God, but it resides first of all in the people and is obtained from them by means of election, or, better still, selection, without at the same time leaving the people and becoming independent of them; it will be external but in appearance only; in reality it will be internal, because it will be an accepted authority.

Proportions being preserved, it will be the same in the economic order. Taken away from a particular class, the mastership will be so well multiplied that each workingman will himself become a sort of master. The system by which it is intended to realize this eco-

conomic ideal is not that of Socialism; it is the system of coöperation sufficiently multiplied to provoke a fruitful competition and to safeguard the independence of the workingmen who will not be bound down to any single one of the coöperative forces.

We come now to the principal element, the moral element. Since, as we have seen, authority is much reduced, another force is necessary to take its place and to supply a permanent reaction to individual egotism. This new principle, this force, is the love of professional interest and of public interest, that is to say, the very end of the profession and of society. Imagine a society in which in each one's soul, with the innate love of individual and family welfare, reigns the love of professional and public welfare, in which in each one's conscience these loves are so subordinate that the welfare of a superior character always takes its place before the welfare of an inferior—could not such a society almost do without authority and does it not offer the ideal of human dignity, each citizen having the soul of a king, each worker the soul of a master? Snatched away from the narrowness of private interests, and raised up to the interests of the profession, and, even higher, to those of the whole nation, nay, higher still, to those of humanity (for the horizon of the Sillon is not bounded by the frontiers of the country, it extends to all men, even to the ends of the earth), the human heart, enlarged by the love of the common welfare, would embrace all comrades of the same profession, all compatriots, all men. Here is human greatness and nobility, the idea realized by the celebrated trilogy, liberty, equality, fraternity.

These three elements, political, economic and moral, are subordinated one to the other, and, as we have said, the moral element is the principle. In effect, no political democracy can exist if it has not profound points of connection in economic democracy. In their turn, neither one nor the other is possible if they have not mutually their roots in a state of mind in which the conscience is invested with proportionate moral responsibilities and energies. But supposing the existence of this state of mind, so created by conscious responsibility and moral forces, economic democracy will naturally arise out of it by overt acts of that conscience and those energies; and, similarly and by the same way, out of the coöperative régime will arise political democracy: and political and economic democracy, the latter bearing the other, will find themselves fixed in the very conscience of the people on unshakable bases.

Such, in short, is the theory—we might say the dream—of the Sillon, and it is towards this that its teaching and what it calls the democratic education of the people tends, that is to say, towards raising to its maximum the conscience and the civic responsibility

of each one, whence will result economic and political democracy and the reign of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity.

This rapid explanation, venerable brethren, shows you clearly how much reason we have to say that the Sillon opposes doctrine to doctrine, that it builds its State on a theory contrary to Catholic truths, and that it falsifies the essential and fundamental notions which regulate social relations in all human society. This opposition will be still more evident from the following considerations.

The Sillon places public authority first of all in the people, from whom it then flows to rulers in such a manner, however, that it continues to reside in the people. But Leo XIII. formally condemned this doctrine of political government in his encyclical "Diuturnum illud," in which he says: "Modern writers in great number, following in the footsteps of those who called themselves philosophers in the last century, declare that all power comes from the people; that consequently those who exercise power in society do not exercise it from their own authority, but from an authority delegated to them by the people and on the condition that it can be revoked by the will of the people from whom they hold it. Quite contrary is the sentiment of Catholics who hold that the right of governing comes from God as its natural and necessary principle."<sup>2</sup> No doubt the Sillon holds that that authority, which it places first of all in the people, descends from God, but it holds that it descends in such a way "as to return from below upwards, whilst in the organization of the Church power descends from above downwards."<sup>3</sup> But besides its being abnormal for the delegation of power to ascend, since it is natural to it to descend, Leo XIII. refuted in advance this attempt to reconcile Catholic doctrine with the error of philosophism. "For," he continues, "it is necessary to remark here, those who preside over the government of the State may, no doubt, in certain cases be chosen by the will and the judgment of the multitude without repugnance or opposition to Catholic doctrine. But if this choice marks out the governor, it does not confer upon him the authority to govern; it does not delegate the power, it designates the person who will be invested with it."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Imo recentiores per plures, eorum vestigiis ingredientibus qui sibi superiore saeculo philosophorum nomen inscripserunt, omnem iniquitatem potestatem a populo esse; quare qui eam in civitate gerunt, ab his non uti suam gerit, sed ut a populo sibi mandatam, et hac quidem lege, ut populi ipsius voluntate a quo mandata est revocari possit. Ab his vero dissentiunt catholici homines, qui ius imperandi a Deo repunt veluti a naturali necessarioque principio.

<sup>3</sup> Marc Sangnier, "Discours de Rouen," 1907.

<sup>4</sup> Interest autem attendere hoc loco eos qui reipublicae praefuturi sint posse in quibusdam causis voluntate iudicioque deligi multitudinis, non adversante neque repugnante doctrina catholica. Quo sane delucto designatur princeps, non conferentur iura principatus, neque mandatur imperium, sed statuitur a quo sit gerendum.

For the rest, if the people are the holders of power, what becomes of authority? It is a shadow, a myth; there is no more law properly so called, no more obedience. The Sillon has recognized this; for in effect it demands, in the name of human dignity, triple emancipation, political, economic and intellectual; the future State in the formation of which it is engaged will have no masters or servants; the citizens will be all free, all comrades, all kings. An order, a command, would be an attack upon liberty; subordination to any superior power whatever would be a diminution of human rights; obedience would be a forfeiture of right. Is it in that way, venerable brethren, that the traditional doctrine of the Church represents to us social relations in even the most perfect State possible? Has not every society of creatures, independent and unequal by nature, need of an authority to direct their activity towards the common welfare and to impose upon it its law?

And if in society there are to be found perverse individuals (there will always be such), should not authority be all the stronger in proportion as the egotism of the wicked is more menacing? Can one believe, then, with a shadow of reason that there is incompatibility between authority and liberty, unless one greatly deceives oneself in the conception of liberty? Can one teach that obedience is contrary to human dignity and that the ideal would be to replace it by "accepted authority?" Had not the Apostle St. Paul in view human society in all its possible conditions when he bade the faithful be subject to every authority? Does obedience to men as the legitimate representatives of God, that is to say, in a word, obedience to God, degrade man and reduce him to a level beneath himself? Can the religious State, founded upon obedience, be contrary to the ideal of human nature? Were the saints, who were the most obedient of men, slaves and degenerates? Finally, can one imagine a social state in which Jesus Christ if he returned to the earth, would not give an example of obedience, and, further, would not say: Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's?

The Sillon, which teaches such doctrines and puts them in practice in its internal life, therefore, sows amongst your Catholic youth erroneous and fatal notions upon authority, liberty and obedience. The same is to be said with regard to justice and equality. It strives, it says, to attain an era of equality, which, owing to that fact alone, would be an era of greater justice. Thus to it every inequality of condition is an injustice, or at least a diminution of justice! A principle supremely contrary to the nature of things, productive of jealousy and injustice and subversive of all social order. Thus democracy alone will inaugurate the reign of perfect justice! Is it not an

insult to other forms of government which are thus degraded to the rank of wretched incapables? Moreover, the Sillon goes contrary to this point in the teaching of Leo XIII. It could have read in the encyclical on political government already quoted that "*justice safeguards; it is not forbidden to the people to choose for themselves the government which corresponds best with their character or the institutions and customs that they have received from their ancestors;*"<sup>8</sup> and the encyclical alludes to the well-known triple form of government. It supposes, then, that justice is compatible with each of them. And does not the encyclical on the condition of the workers affirm clearly the possibility of restoring justice in the actual organization of society, inasmuch as it indicates the means of doing so? Without any doubt Leo XIII. meant to speak not of any injustice, but of perfect justice. Therefore, in teaching that justice is compatible with the three forms of government referred to, it taught that in this respect democracy does not enjoy a special privilege. The Sillonists who contend to the contrary either refuse to hear the Church or form to themselves a conception which is not Catholic with regard to justice and equality.

The case is the same with respect to fraternity, the basis of which they lay in the love of the common interest or, beyond all philosophies and all religions, in the simple notion of humanity, encircling thus in the same love and an equal tolerance all men with all their miseries, intellectual, moral, physical and temporal. Now, Catholic doctrine teaches us that the first duty of charity does not lie in the toleration of erroneous convictions, however sincere they may be, or in indifference, theoretical or practical, regarding error or vice in which we see our brethren plunged, but in zeal for their intellectual and moral improvement not less than for their material well-being. This same Catholic doctrine teaches us also that the source of the love of our neighbor is to be found in the love of God, the common Father and the common end of the whole human family and in the love of Jesus Christ whose members we are, so that to comfort an unfortunate person is to do good to Jesus Christ Himself. Every other love is an illusion or a sterile and transient sentiment.

Assuredly we have human experience in pagan and lay society of all times to prove that at certain periods the consideration of the common interests or of the natural affinities has little weight in the face of the passions and the covetousness of the heart. No, venerable brethren, there is no true fraternity outside Christian charity, which true love for God and His Son Jesus Christ, our Saviour, embraces all men, consoling them all and leading them to the same

<sup>8</sup> *Quamobrem, salva iustitia, non prohibentur populi illud sibi genus comparare reipublicae, quod aut ipsorum ingenio aut maiorum institutis moribusque magis respondeat.*

faith and the same heavenly happiness. In separating fraternity from Christian charity thus understood democracy, far from constituting progress, would constitute rather a disastrous retrogression in civilization. For if one wishes to reach—and we desire to do so with all our heart—the highest possible summit of well-being for society and for each of its members by means of fraternity or, as it is called, by universal solidarity, there is needed the union of minds in the truth, the union of wills in morality, the union of hearts in the love of God and of His Son Jesus Christ. But this union is only attainable by Catholic charity, which alone, consequently, can lead the people in the march of progress towards the ideal of civilization.

Finally, at the base of all the falsifications of fundamental social views the Sillon places a false idea of human dignity. According to it, man will not be truly man, worthy of that name, except on the day when he shall have acquired a conscience enlightened, strong, independent, autonomous, able to do without a master, obeying only itself and capable of assuming and discharging the greatest responsibilities without any forfeiture of title. These are the big words by which the sentiment of human pride is exalted; this is the dream which draws man without light, without guide and without help into the way of illusion, where, whilst awaiting the illumination of the full conscience, he will be destroyed by error and passions. And when will this illumination come? Unless we change human nature (which even the Sillon cannot do), will it ever come? Had the saints, who carried human dignity to its highest point, that dignity to which we have referred? And would not the lowly of this earth who cannot rise so high and who are content to plough their furrow modestly in the rank that Providence has assigned to them, energetically discharging their duties in humility, obedience and Christian patience—would they not be worthy of the name of men—they whom the Saviour will take one day out of their obscure state to place them in heaven amongst the princes of His people?

We close here our consideration of the errors of the Sillon. Not that we have exhausted the subject, for there are other points equally erroneous and dangerous, to which your attention should be drawn, such as its way of understanding the coercive power of the Church. But we must now go on to observe the influence of these errors on the practical conduct and social action of the Sillon.

The doctrines of the Sillon do not keep within the domain of abstract philosophy. They are taught to Catholic young people and efforts are made to make them live. The Sillon regards itself as the nucleus of the State of the future and accordingly reflects it as closely as possible. Thus, there is no hierarchy of government in

the Sillon. The elite by whom it is directed emerge from the rank and file by selection, that is to say, they make their position by their moral authority and their qualities. People enter its ranks freely and leave them freely. Studies are carried on without a master, at the very most with an adviser. The study clubs are veritable intellectual coöperative societies, in which each member is at once both master and pupil. The most absolute fellowship reigns amongst the members and places their minds in the closest contact—hence the common soul of the Sillon. It has been defined as “friendship.” Even the priest, on entering, lowers the eminent dignity of his priesthood, and by a strange reversal of roles becomes a scholar, placing himself on a level with his young friends, so that he is no more than a comrade.

In these democratic customs and the theories on the ideal State inspired by them, you will see, venerable brethren, the secret cause of the lack of discipline with which you have so often had to reproach the Sillon. It is not surprising that we do not find among the leaders or their members, whether seminarists or priests, trained on these lines, the respect, docility and obedience which are due to your persons and authority; that you are conscious of an underlying opposition on their part, and that, to your sorrow, you see them withdraw themselves altogether from, or, if compelled under obedience, give themselves with distaste to works which are not those of the Sillon. You are the past; they are the pioneers of the civilization of the future. You represent the hierarchy, social inequalities, authority, obedience—worn-out institutions to which their minds, captured by another ideal, can no longer bow themselves. On this state of mind we have to witness facts so sad as to bring tears to the eyes; and we cannot, with all our patience, keep down a just feeling of anger. It has come to this: Our Catholic young people are inspired with distrust of the Church their Mother; they are told that for nineteen centuries she has failed to build up society on its true foundations; that she has not understood the social notions of authority, liberty, equality, fraternity and human dignity; that the great Bishops and Kings who have created and governed France so gloriously have not been able to provide their people with real justice or happiness because they had not the same ideal as the Sillon.

The breath of the Revolution has passed this way, and we may conclude that if the social doctrines of the Sillon are erroneous, its spirit is dangerous and its education disastrous.

And then what are we to think of its action in the Church—this organization whose Catholicism is so punctilious that a little more—unless care is taken not to embarrass its cause—and one would be

in its eyes an internal enemy of Catholicism and would understand nothing of the Gospel and of Jesus Christ? We think it well to insist upon this question because it is precisely its Catholic ardor which has secured for the Sillon until lately precious encouragements and distinguished support. Well, in the presence of words and facts, we are obliged to say that in its action as in its doctrine the Sillon does not give satisfaction to the Church.

In the first place, its Catholicism accommodates itself only to the democratic form of government which it considers the most favorable to the Church and, so to speak, confounds with her; it therefore binds down its religion in subjection to a political party. We have not to point out that the future of universal democracy does not concern the action of the Church in the world; we have already recalled the fact that the Church has always left to the nations the choice of the government they think most suited to their interests. What we wish to affirm once again, after our predecessor, is that it is an error and a danger to bind down Catholicism, by principle, to a form of government, an error and a danger which are all the greater when one associates religion with a kind of democracy the doctrines of which are erroneous. But this is the case with the Sillon, which, in fact and for a special political form, compromising the Church, divides Catholics, withdraws the youth and even priests and seminarists from purely Catholic action and wastes as a dead loss the living forces of a part of the nation.

And, behold, venerable brethren, an astounding contradiction. It is precisely because religion ought to dominate all parties—it is in invoking this principle—that the Sillon abstains from defending the assailed Church. Undoubtedly it is not the Church that has gone down into the political arena. They have dragged her down there to mutilate and despoil her. Is it not the duty, then, of every Catholic to use the political arms which he possesses to defend her and thus to compel politics to remain in their own domain and not to occupy themselves with the Church, except to give her that which is her due? Well, in presence of the Church thus attacked, one is often pained to see the Sillonists folding their arms, if they do not find it to their advantage to defend her; one often sees them dictate or maintain a programme which nowhere and in no degree savors of Catholic principle, a fact which does not prevent the same men, when fully engaged in political strife, from publicly proclaiming their faith in response to provocation. What does it mean if not that there are two men in the Sillonist: the individual who is a Catholic and the Sillonist, the man of action, who is neutral?

There was a time when the Sillon as such was formally Catholic. In the matter of moral force it recognized but one force, the Catholic



force, and it was wont to proclaim that democracy would be Catholic or would not exist at all. A moment came when it changed its mind. It left to each one his religion or his philosophy. It ceased to call itself Catholic, and for the formula "the democracy will be Catholic" it substituted this other, "the democracy will not be anti-Catholic," any more than it will be anti-Jewish or anti-Buddhist. It was the period at which the Sillon attained its highest influence. For the construction of the future State they appealed to all the workers of all the religions and all the sects. They asked them only to embrace the same social ideal, to respect all beliefs, and to bring with them a certain supply of moral force. Undoubtedly, they declared, "the leaders of the Sillon put their religious faith above everything. But can they deprive others of the right to draw their moral energy whence they can? They, on their part, wish that others should respect their right to draw their moral energy from the Catholic faith. They, therefore, ask all those who wish to transform present society in the democratic sense not to oppose one another on account of the philosophic or religious convictions which may separate them, but to march hand in hand, not renouncing their convictions, but trying to afford, on the ground of practical realities, proof of the excellence of their personal convictions. Perhaps on this ground of emulation between souls holding different religious or philosophic convictions union can be effected."<sup>6</sup>

These declarations and this new organization of the Sillonist action suggest very grave reflections.

Here we have founded by Catholics an interdenominational association to labor for the reform of civilization, a religious work first of all; for there is no true civilization without moral civilization and no true moral civilization without true religion: this is a demonstrated truth, a fact of history. And the Sillonists cannot pretend that they are only working "on the ground of practical realities," where differences of belief do not matter. Their chief feels so strongly this influence of mental conviction on the result of action that he invites them, whatever religion they may belong to, to "supply on the ground of practical realities proof of the excellence of their personal convictions." And rightly so. For practical results assume the character of the religious convictions, just as the members of the body, to their ultimate extremities, receive their form from the vital principle which animates them.

This being said, what must be thought of the promiscuousness in which young Catholics will be mixed up with heterodox and unbelieving folk of every kind in a work of this nature? Is it not a thousand times more dangerous for them than a neutral association?

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<sup>6</sup> Marc Sangnier, "Discours de Rouen," 1907.

What must we think of this appeal to all the heterodox and to all the unbelievers to prove the excellence of their convictions in the social sphere in a sort of apologetic competition, as if this competition had not lasted for nineteen centuries in conditions less dangerous for the faith of the faithful and was not all in honor of the Catholic Church? What must we think of this respect for all errors and of the strange indication addressed by a Catholic to all dissidents to strengthen their convictions by study and to make them sources, more and more abundant, of new forces? What must we think of an association in which all religions and even free thought can manifest themselves openly and at their ease, for the Sillonists, who, at their public conferences and elsewhere, proudly proclaim their individual faith, do not certainly know how to close the mouth of others and to prevent the Protestant from affirming his Protestantism and the skeptic from affirming his skepticism? Finally, what are we to think of a Catholic who in entering his educational club leaves his Catholicism at the door in order not to alarm his comrades, who, "dreaming of disinterested social action, are disinclined to make it safe for the triumph of interests, coteries, proven convictions, whatever they be." Such is the profession of faith of the new democratic committee of social action which has inherited the greatest task of ancient civilization, and which, it says, "removing the misunderstanding that arose respecting the Sillon in its greatest period both in reactionary and in clerical circles, is open to all men who respect moral and religious forces and who are convinced that no true social emancipation is possible without the leaven of a 'generous liberalism.'"

Alas! the misunderstanding is removed; the social action of the Sillon is no longer Catholic; the Sillonist, as such, does not work for a coterie, and "the Church," he says, "cannot in any sense benefit by the sympathies that his action may excite." Truly a strange insinuation! They fear lest the Church should profit by the social action of the Sillon for a selfish and interested end, as if everything that benefited the Church did not benefit humanity! A curious reversal of ideas! It is the Church which would benefit by social action! As if the greatest economists had not recognized and proved that it is social action which, if serious and fruitful, must benefit by the Church.

But, stranger still, alarming and saddening at the same time are the audacity and frivolity of men who call themselves Catholics and dream of reestablishing society under such conditions and founding on the earth, over and beyond the pale of the Catholic Church, "the reign of justice and of love," with workers come from all parts, of all religions and of no religion, with or without beliefs, provided

they forget what divides them—their religious and philosophic convictions—and that they share what unites them—a *generous idealism* and moral forces drawn “whence they can.” When we consider all the forces, science and supernatural virtues which were necessary to establish the Christian State, the sufferings of millions of martyrs, the light given by fathers and doctors of the Church, the devotion of all the heroes of charity, the powerful hierarchy, ordained of heaven, and the streams of divine grace—the whole built up, bound together, penetrated by the life and the Spirit of Jesus Christ, the wisdom of God, the Word made man—when we think, I say, of all this, one is dismayed to see new apostles eagerly attempting to do better by a common interchange of vague idealism and civic virtues. What are they going to produce? What is to come out of this collaboration? A mere verbal and chimerical construction in which we shall see mirrored, pell mell and in seductive confusion the words liberty, justice, fraternity, love, equality and human exaltation all based upon an ill-understood human dignity. It will be a tumultuous agitation which will be sterile for the end proposed and which will benefit the exploiters of the less Utopian masses. Yes, we can truly say that the Sillon escorts Socialism, having its eye fixed on a chimera.

We fear that there is still worse. The result of this promiscuousness and labor, the beneficiary of this cosmopolitan social action, can only be a democracy which will be neither Catholic nor Protestant, nor Jewish; a religion (for Sillonism, its chiefs state, is a religion) more universal than the Catholic Church, uniting all men, become brothers at last and comrades in the “Kingdom of God.” “One works for the Church; one works for humanity.”

And now, penetrated by the deepest sadness, we ask, venerable brethren, where is the Catholicism of the Sillon? Alas! this organization which formerly afforded such excellent hopes, this limpid and impetuous stream, has been mastered in its course by the modern enemies of the Church and now forms only a miserable affluent of the great movement of apostasy organized in all countries for the establishment of a universal Church which shall have neither dogmas nor hierarchy, neither rule for the mind nor curb for the passions, and which, under the pretext of liberty and human dignity, would bring back to the world, if it could triumph, the legal reign of cunning and of force, of the oppression of the weak—of those who suffer and toil.

We know only too well the dark workshops in which these mischievous doctrines, which ought not to seduce clear-seeing minds, are elaborated. The leaders of the Sillon have not been able to protect themselves against them; the exaltation of their sentiments, the

inconsiderate goodness of their hearts, their philosophic mysticism, partly mixed with illuminism, have drawn them towards a new Gospel in which they think they see the veritable Gospel of the Saviour, so that they dare to treat our Lord Jesus Christ with a familiarity supremely disrespectful, and their ideal being of the same type with that of the Revolution, they fear not to create between the Gospel and the Revolution blasphemous points of contact for which the excuse cannot be offered that they are due to some confused *extempore* idea.

We wish to direct your attention, venerable brethren, to this distortion of the Gospel and of the sacred character of our Lord Jesus Christ, God and man, customary in the Sillon and elsewhere. When the social question is considered it is the fashion in certain quarters to put aside first of all the divinity of Jesus Christ, and then to speak only of His sovereign clemency, of His compassion for all human miseries, of His pressing exhortations to the love of the neighbor and the brotherhood. Certainly Jesus has loved us with an immense, infinite love, and He came on earth to suffer and die in order that, united around Him in justice and love, animated by the same sentiments of mutual charity, all men should live in peace and happiness. But for the realization of this temporal and eternal happiness He has laid down, with supreme authority, the condition that one must belong to His flock, that one must accept His doctrine, that one must practice virtue and that one must allow oneself to be taught and guided by Peter and his successors.

Then, if Jesus was kind to those who went astray and to sinners, He did not respect their erroneous convictions, however sincere they might have appeared. He loved them all to instruct them, to convert them and to save them. If He called to Himself, in order to comfort them, those who were in trouble and suffering, it was not to preach to them jealousy of a chimerical equality. If He lifted up the humble, it was not to inspire them with the sentiment of a dignity independent and rebellious against the duty of obedience. If His heart overflowed with gentleness for the souls of those who were of good will, He also knew how to arm Himself with a holy indignation against the profaners of the house of God, against those miserable persons who scandalized the little ones, against the authorities who oppressed the people with heavy burdens without putting out a hand to lift them. He was as strong as He was gentle. He reproved, threatened, punished, knowing and teaching us that often fear is the beginning of wisdom and that sometimes it is well to cut off a member in order to save the body. Finally, He did not announce for future society the reign of an ideal happiness from which suffering would be banished; but by His lessons and by His example

He traced the path of happiness possible on earth and of perfect happiness in heaven: the royal way of the Cross. These are teachings that it would be wrong to apply only to individual life in view of eternal salvation; they are teachings which are eminently social, and they show in our Lord Jesus Christ something else besides a humanitarianism without consistency and without authority.

As for you, venerable brethren, continue actively the work of the Saviour of men by the imitation of His gentleness and His strength. Incline towards the wretched; let no sorrow escape your pastoral solicitude; let no complaint find you indifferent. But also preach their duties boldly to great and little; it is your business to form the conscience of the people and of the public authorities. The social question will be much nearer a solution when the one and the other, less exacting with regard to their mutual rights, shall fulfill their duties exactly.

Moreover, as in the conflict of interests and especially in the struggle with forces wanting in moral rectitude, a man's virtue, his sanctity even, does not always suffice to assure him daily bread, and as the social ranks ought to be organized in such a way that by the natural play of forces they should paralyze the efforts of the wicked and should enable every one of good will to gain a legitimate share of temporal happiness, we earnestly desire that you should take an active part in the organization of society for this object. And to this end, whilst your priests will devote themselves with ardor to the work of the sanctification of souls and the defense of the Church and also to works of charity properly so called, you will choose some of them who are active and of thoughtful disposition who possess doctors' degrees in philosophy and theology and who are thoroughly acquainted with the history of ancient and modern civilization, and you will set them to the study, less elevated, but more practical, of social science, so that you can place them at the proper time in charge of your Catholic social movement. But let not those priests allow themselves to be led astray in the maze of contemporary opinions by the mirage of a false democracy; let them not borrow from the rhetoric of the worst enemies of the Church and of the people an emphatic language full of promises as high-sounding as they are unattainable. Let them be convinced that the social question and social science did not arise yesterday, that at all times the Church and the State in happy concert have raised up fruitful organizations for this end, that the Church, which has never betrayed the happiness of the people by compromising alliances, has not to free herself from the past, and that it is enough for her to take up again, with the aid of true workers in social restoration, the organisms broken by the Revolution and to adapt them, in the

same Christian spirit that inspired them, to the new situation created by the material evolution of contemporary society: for the true friends of the people are neither revolutionaries nor innovators, but traditionalists.

We desire that the Sillonist youth, freed from their errors, far from offering any obstacle to this work, which is eminently worthy of your pastoral zeal, should bring to it a loyal and efficacious assistance in the proper way and with befitting submission.

We turn then towards the leaders of the Sillon with the confidence of a father who speaks to his children, and we ask them, for their own welfare and for the good of the Church and of France, to yield their place to you. We are aware of the extent of the sacrifice we demand of them, but we know they are generous enough to make it, and in advance, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, whose unworthy representative we are, we bless them for it. As to the members of the Sillon, we desire that they should be divided according to the dioceses, in order to work, under the direction of their respective Bishops, for the Christian and Catholic regeneration of the people at the same time that they work for the improvement of their own lot. These diocesan groups will for the moment be independent of one another; and in order to show clearly that they have broken with the errors of the past, they will take the name of *Catholic Sillons* and each of their members will add to his title as *Sillonist* the qualification *Catholic*. It is needless to say that every Catholic Sillonist will remain free to entertain his political preferences, provided they are purified of everything that is not in this respect entirely conformable to the doctrine of the Church. Should groups refuse, venerable brethren, to submit to these conditions, you should consider them as refusing in fact to submit to your direction; and then you will have to consider whether they confine themselves purely to politics or economy, or persevere in their former errors. In the former case, it is clear you will have no more to do with them than with the general body of the faithful; in the second place, you ought to take measures accordingly, with prudence, but with firmness.

The priests will have to keep themselves entirely outside dissident groups and shall content themselves with lending the aid of the sacred ministry individually to their members, applying to them in the tribunal of penance the common rules of morality relative to doctrine and conduct. As to the Catholic groups, the priests and the seminarists, whilst favoring and helping them, shall abstain from becoming members; for it is fitting that the Church's clerical troops should remain above the lay associations even when these are most useful and animated by the best spirit.

Such are the practical measures which we have deemed it necessary to embody in this letter on the Sillon and the Sillonists. From the bottom of our heart we pray that God may cause these men and these young people to understand the grave reasons which have called it forth, that He may give them docility of heart, with the courage to prove to the Church the sincerity of their Catholic fervor, and that He may inspire you, venerable brethren—since for the future they are to be yours—with sentiments of a quite paternal affection.

It is in this hope and to obtain these results, which are so desirable, that with all our heart we grant the Apostolic Benediction to you, your clergy and your people.

Given at St. Peter's, Rome, on the 25th August, 1910, the eighth year of our pontificate.

PIUS X., POPE.

MOTU PROPRIO  
OF  
OUR HOLY FATHER  
POPE PIUS X.

ESTABLISHING CERTAIN LAWS FOR THE DRIVING OUT OF THE  
DANGER OF MODERNISM.

**N**ONE of the Bishops, we believe, can have failed to observe how that most cunning class of persons, the Modernists, though unmasked by the encyclical letter "Pascendi dominici gregis," have not abandoned their designs on the peace of the Church. For they continue to enroll new associates and to band them together in a secret alliance, and with these they are now engaged in inoculating into the veins of the Christian people the poison of their opinions by means of books and pamphlets published anonymously or under false names. To those who read again and more closely the document just mentioned, it will be clear that this climax of audacity, which has caused us such grief, proves that these men are really as we described them, and enemies all the more to be feared by reason of their proximity, and who abuse their ministry to catch by their poisoned bait those who are not on their guard and who are liable to be led astray by a semblance of science which contains the germs of all errors.

But as this pest is spreading in a part of the field of the Lord from which the fairest fruits were to be expected if it is the duty of all the pastors to labor for the defense of the Catholic faith, and to use the utmost vigilance that the Divine deposit suffer no hurt, upon us especially rests the charge of realizing the commands of Christ the Saviour, who said to Peter, whose supreme authority we, unworthy though we are, have received: "Confirm thy brethren." And this is why we deem it well in the present conflict to recall to memory the following teachings and rulings contained in our letter above mentioned:

"We beg and conjure you to see to it that in this most grave matter nobody will ever be able to say that you have been in the slightest degree wanting in vigilance or zeal or firmness. And what we ask of you and expect of you we ask and expect also of all other pastors of souls, of all educators and professors of clerics and in a very special way of the superiors of religious institutions.

"I. In the first place, with regard to studies, we will and ordain that scholastic philosophy be made the basis of the sacred sciences.



It goes without saying that 'if anything is met with among the scholastic doctors which may be regarded as an excess of subtlety, or which does not square with later discoveries, or which is altogether destitute of probability, we have no desire whatever to propose it for the imitation of present generations.<sup>1</sup> And let it be clearly understood above all things that the scholastic philosophy we prescribe is that which the Angelic Doctor has bequeathed to us, and we, therefore, declare that all the ordinances of our predecessor on this subject continue fully in force, and, as far as may be necessary, we do decree anew, and confirm, and ordain that they be by all strictly observed. In seminaries where they may have been neglected let the Bishops impose them and require their observance, and let this apply also to the superiors of religious institutions. Further, let professors remember that they cannot set St. Thomas aside, especially in metaphysical questions, without grave detriment. 'A small error at the beginning,' to use the words of Aquinas, 'becomes great in the end.'

"On this philosophical foundation the theological edifice is to be solidly raised. Promote the study of theology, venerable brothers, by all means in your power, so that your clerics on leaving the seminaries may admire and love it and always find their delight in it. 'For in the vast and varied abundance of studies opening before the mind desirous of truth, everybody knows how the old maxim describes theology as so far in front of all others that every science and art should serve it and be to it as handmaidens.'<sup>2</sup> We will add that we deem as worthy of praise those who with full respect for tradition, the Holy Fathers, the ecclesiastical magisterium, undertake, with well-balanced judgment and guided by Catholic principles (which is not always the case), seek to illuminate positive theology by throwing the light of true history upon it. Certainly more attention must be paid to positive theology than in the past, but this must be done without detriment to scholastic theology, and those are to be disapproved as of modernist tendencies who exalt positive theology in such a way as to seem to despise the scholastic.

"With regard to profane studies suffice it to recall here what our predecessor has admirably said: 'Apply yourselves energetically to the study of natural sciences: the brilliant discoveries and the bold and useful applications of them made in our times, which have won such applause from our contemporaries, will be an object of perpetual praise for those that come after us.'<sup>3</sup> But do this without interfering with sacred studies, as our predecessor urges in these

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<sup>1</sup> Leo XIII., *Enc. Aeterni Patrie*.

<sup>2</sup> Leo XIII., *Lett. In magna*, 10 December, 1889.

<sup>3</sup> Leo XIII., *Alloc. ap.*, 7 March, 1880.

most grave words: 'If you carefully search for the cause of these errors you will find that it lies in the fact that these days, when the natural sciences absorb so much study, the more severe and lofty studies have been proportionately neglected—some of them have almost passed into oblivion, some of them are pursued in a half-hearted or superficial way, and, sad to say, now that they are fallen from their old estate, they have been disfigured by perverse doctrines and monstrous errors.'<sup>4</sup> We ordain therefore that the study of natural science in the seminaries be carried on under this law.

"II. All these prescriptions and those of our predecessor are to be borne in mind whenever there is question of choosing directors and professors for seminaries and Catholic universities. Anybody who in any way is found to be imbued with modernism is to be excluded without compunction from these offices and those who already occupy them are to be removed. The same policy is to be adopted towards those who favor modernism either by extolling the Modernists or excusing their culpable conduct, or by criticizing scholasticism and the Holy Fathers, or by refusing obedience to ecclesiastical authority in any of its depositaries; and towards those who show a love of novelty in history, archæology, Biblical exegesis, and finally towards those who neglect the sacred sciences or appear to prefer to them the profane. In all this question of studies, venerable brothers, you cannot be too watchful or too constant, but most of all in the choice of professors, for as a rule the students are modeled after the pattern of their masters. Strong in the consciousness of your duty, act always prudently but vigorously.

"Equal diligence and severity are to be used in examining and selecting candidates for holy orders. Far, far from the clergy be the love of novelty! God hates the proud and the obstinate. For the future the doctorate of theology and canon law must never be conferred on anybody who has not made the regular course of scholastic philosophy; if conferred, it shall be held as null and void. The rules laid down in 1896 by the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars for the clerics, both secular and regular, of Italy concerning the frequenting of the universities we now decree to be extended to all nations. Clerics and priests inscribed in a Catholic institute or university must not in the future follow in civil universities those courses for which there are chairs in the Catholic institutes to which they belong. If this have been permitted anywhere in the past, we ordain that it be not allowed for the future. Let the Bishops who form the governing board of such Catholic institutes or universities watch with all care that these our commands be constantly observed.

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<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*

"III. It is also the duty of the Bishops to prevent writings infected with modernism or favorable to it from being read when they have been published, and to hinder their publication when they have not. No book or paper or periodical of this kind must ever be permitted to seminarists or university students. The injury to them would be equal to that caused by immoral reading; nay, it would be greater, for such writings poison Christian life at its very fount. The same decision is to be taken concerning the writings of some Catholics, who though not badly disposed themselves, but ill-instructed in theological studies and imbued with modern philosophy, strive to make this harmonize with the faith, and, as they say, to turn it to the account of the faith. The name and reputation of these authors causes them to be read without suspicion, and they are therefore all the more dangerous in preparing the way for modernism.

"To give you some more general directions, venerable brothers, in a matter of such moment, we bid you do everything in your power to drive out of your dioceses, even by solemn interdict, any pernicious books that may be in circulation there. The Holy See neglects no means to put down writings of this kind, but the number of them has now grown to such an extent that it is impossible to censure them all. Hence it happens that the medicine sometimes arrives too late, for the disease has taken root during the delay. We will, therefore, that the Bishops, putting aside all fear and the prudence of the flesh, despising the outcries of the wicked, gently by all means, but constantly, do each his own share of this work, remembering the injunctions of Leo XIII. in the Apostolic Constitution 'Officiorum: Let the Ordinaries, acting in this also as delegates of the Apostolic See, exert themselves to proscribe and to put out of reach of the faithful injurious books or other writings printed or circulated in their dioceses.' In this passage the Bishops, it is true, receive a right, but they have also a duty imposed on them. Let no Bishop think that he fulfills this duty by denouncing to us one or two books, while a great many others of the same kind are being published and circulated. Nor are you to be deterred by the fact that a book has obtained the 'imprimatur' elsewhere, both because this may be merely simulated and because it may have been granted through carelessness, or easiness, or excessive confidence in the author, as may sometimes happen in religious orders. Besides, just as the same food does not agree equally with everybody, it may happen that a book, harmless in one place, may on account of the different circumstances be hurtful in another. Should a Bishop, therefore, after having taken the advice of prudent persons, deem it right to condemn any of such books in his diocese, we not only

give him ample faculty to do so, but we impose it upon him as a duty to do so. Of course, it is our wish that in such cases the proper regards be used, and sometimes it will suffice to restrict the prohibition to the clergy; but even in such cases it will be obligatory on Catholic booksellers not to put on sale the books condemned by the Bishop. And while we are on this subject of booksellers, we wish the Bishops to see to it that they do not through desire for gain put on sale unsound books. It is certain that in the catalogues of some of them the books of the Modernists are not unfrequently announced with no small praise. If they refuse obedience, let the Bishops have no hesitation in depriving them of the title of Catholic booksellers; so, too, and with more reason, if they have the title of Episcopal booksellers, and if they have that of Pontifical, let them be denounced to the Apostolic See. Finally, we remind all of the XXVI. article of the above-mentioned Constitution 'Officiorum.' All those who have obtained an apostolic faculty to read and keep forbidden books are not thereby authorized to read books and periodicals forbidden by the local Ordinaries, unless the apostolic faculty expressly concedes permission to read and keep books condemned by anybody.'

"IV. But it is not enough to hinder the reading and the sale of bad books—it is also necessary to prevent them from being printed. Hence let the Bishops use the utmost severity in granting permission to print. Under the rules of the Constitution 'Officiorum' a great many publications require the authorization of the Ordinary, and in some dioceses it has been made the custom to have a suitable number of official censors for the examination of writings. We have the highest praise for this institution, and we not only exhort, but we order that it be extended to all dioceses. In all episcopal Curias, therefore, let censors be appointed for the revision of works intended for publication, and let the censors, to be chosen from both ranks of the clergy, be men of age, knowledge and prudence, who will know how to follow the golden mean in their judgments. It shall be their office to examine everything which requires permission for publication according to Articles XLI. and XLII. of the above-mentioned Constitution. The censor shall give his verdict in writing. If it be favorable, the Bishop will give the permission for publication by the word 'Imprimatur,' which must always be preceded by the 'Nihil obstat' and the name of the censor. In the Curia of Rome official censors shall be appointed just as elsewhere, and the appointment of them shall appertain to the Master of the Sacred Palaces, after they have been proposed to the Cardinal Vicar and accepted by the Sovereign Pontiff. It shall also be the office of the Master of the Sacred Palaces to select the censor for each writing. Per-

mission for publication shall be granted by him as well as by the Cardinal Vicar or his vicegerent, and this permission, as above prescribed, must always be preceded by the 'Nihil obstat' and the name of the censor. Only on very rare and exceptional occasions, and on the prudent decision of the Bishop, shall it be permissible to omit mention of the censor. The name of the censor shall never be made known to the authors until he have given a favorable decision, so that he may not have to suffer annoyance either while he is engaged in the examination of a writing or in case he should deny his approval. Censors shall never be chosen from the religious orders until the opinion of the provincial, or in Rome of the general, have been privately obtained, and the provincial or the general must give a conscientious account of the character, knowledge and orthodoxy of the candidate. We admonish religious superiors of their solemn duty never to allow anything to be published by any of their subjects without permission from themselves and from the Ordinary. Finally, we affirm and declare that the title of censor has no value and can never be adduced to give credit to the private opinions of the person who holds it.

"Having said this much in general, we now ordain in particular a more careful observance of Article XLII. of the above-mentioned Constitution 'Officiorum.' It is 'forbidden to secular priests, without the previous consent of the Ordinary, to undertake the direction of papers or periodicals.' This permission shall be withdrawn from any priest who makes a wrong use of it, after having been admonished. With regard to priests who are 'correspondents' or 'collaborators' of periodicals, as it happens not unfrequently that they write matter infected with modernism for their papers or periodicals, let the Bishops see to it that this is not permitted to happen, and should it happen, let them warn the writers or prevent them from writing. The superiors of religious orders, too, we admonish with all authority to do the same, and should they fail in this duty, let the Bishops make due provision with authority delegated by the Supreme Pontiff. Let there be, as far this is possible, a special censor for newspapers and periodicals printed by Catholics. It shall be his office to read in due time each number after it has been published, and if he find anything dangerous in it, let him order that it be corrected. The Bishop shall have the same right even when the censor has seen nothing objectionable in a publication.

"V. We have already mentioned congresses and public gatherings as among the means used by the Modernists to defend and propagate their opinions. In the future Bishops shall not permit congresses of priests except on very rare occasions. When they do permit them, it shall only be on condition that matters appertaining to

the Bishop or the Apostolic See be not treated in them, and that no motions or postulates be allowed that would imply a usurpation of sacred authority, and that no mention be made in them of modernism, presbyterianism or laicism. At congresses of this kind, which can only be held after permission in writing has been obtained in due time and for each case, it shall not be lawful for priests from other dioceses to take part without the written permission of their Ordinary. Further, no priest must lose sight of the solemn recommendation of Leo XIII.: 'Let priests hold as sacred the authority of their pastors, let them take it for certain that the sacerdotal ministry, if not exercised under the guidance of the Bishops, can never be either holy, or very fruitful, or respectable.'<sup>5</sup>

"V. But of what avail, venerable brothers, will be all our commands and prescriptions, if they be not dutifully and firmly carried out? And in order that this may be done, it has seemed expedient to us to extend to all dioceses the regulations laid down with great wisdom many years ago by the Bishops of Umbria for theirs:

"'In order, they say,' 'to extirpate the errors already propagated and to prevent their further diffusion and to remove those teachers of impiety through whom the pernicious effects of such diffusion are being perpetuated, this sacred assembly, following the example of St. Charles Borromeo, has decided to establish in each of the dioceses a council consisting of approved members of both branches of the clergy, which shall be charged with the task of noting the existence of errors and the devices by which new ones are introduced and propagated, and to inform the Bishop of the whole, so that he may take counsel with them as to the best means for nipping the evil in the bud and preventing it spreading for the ruin of souls, or, worse still, gaining strength and growth.'<sup>6</sup> We decree therefore that in every diocese a council of this kind, which we are pleased to name 'The Council of Vigilance,' be instituted without delay. The priests called to form part of it shall be chosen somewhat after the manner above prescribed for the censors, and they shall meet every two months on an appointed day under the presidency of the Bishop. They shall be bound to secrecy as to their deliberations and decisions, and their function shall be as follows: They shall watch most carefully for every trace and sign of modernism, both in publications and in teaching, and, to preserve from it the clergy and the young, they shall take all prudent, prompt and efficacious measures. Let them combat novelties of words, remembering the admonitions of Leo XIII.:<sup>7</sup> 'It is impossible to approve in Catholic publications

<sup>5</sup> Lett. Encyc. Nobilissima Gallorum, 10 February, 1884.

<sup>6</sup> Acts of the Congress of the Bishops of Umbria, November, 1849, Tit. 2, Art. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Instruct. S. C. NN. EE. EF., 27 January, 1902.

of a style inspired by unsound novelty which seems to deride the piety of the faithful and dwells on the introduction of a new order of Christian life, on new directions of the Church, on new aspirations of the modern soul, on a new vocation of the clergy, on a new Christian civilization.' Language of this kind is not to be tolerated either in books or from chairs of learning. The councils must not neglect the books treating of the pious traditions of different places or of sacred relics. Let them not permit such questions to be discussed in periodicals destined to stimulate piety, neither with expressions that savor of mockery or contempt, nor by dogmatic pronouncements, especially when, as is often the case, what is stated as a certainty either does not pass the limits of probability or is merely based on prejudiced opinions. Concerning sacred relics, let this be the rule: When the Bishops, who alone are judges in these matters, know for certain that a relic is not genuine, let them remove it at once from the veneration of the faithful; if the authentications of a relic happen to have been lost through political disturbances or in some other way, let it not be exposed for public veneration until the Bishop has verified it. The argument of prescription or well-founded presumption is to have weight only when devotion to a relic is commendable by reason of its antiquity, according to the sense of the decree issued in 1896 by the Congregation of Indulgences and Sacred Relics; 'Ancient relics are to enjoy the veneration they have always enjoyed except in those individual instances when there are clear arguments that they are false or supposititious.' In passing judgment on pious traditions be it always be borne in mind that in this matter the Church uses such prudence that she does not permit traditions of this kind to be narrated in books except with the utmost caution and with the insertion of the declaration imposed by Urban VIII.; and even then she does not guarantee the truth of the fact narrated: she simply does not forbid belief in things for which human arguments are not wanting. On this matter the Sacred Congregation of Rites thirty years ago decreed as follows: \* 'These apparitions have neither been approved nor condemned by the Holy See, which has simply allowed that they be believed on purely human faith, on the traditions that relate them, corroborated by testimonies and documents' 'worthy of credence.'" Anybody who follows this rule has no cause for fear. For the devotion based on any apparition, in as far as it regards the fact itself, that is to say, in as far as it is 'relative,' always implies the hypothesis of the truth of the fact; while in as far as it is 'absolute,' it must always be based on the truth, seeing that its object is the persons of the saints who are honored. The same is true of relics. Finally, we entrust to the

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\* Decree, May 2, 1877.

Councils of Vigilance the duty of overlooking assiduously and diligently social institutions as well as writings on social questions, so that they may harbor no trace of modernism, but obey the prescriptions of the Roman Pontiffs.

"VII. Lest what we have laid down thus far should fall into oblivion, we will and ordain that the Bishops of all dioceses a year after this publication and every three years thenceforward furnish the Holy See with a diligent and sworn report on all the prescriptions contained in them, and on the doctrines that find currency among the clergy, and especially in the seminaries and other Catholic institutions, and we impose the like obligation on the generals of religious orders with regard to those under them."

To all this, which we fully confirm under pain of temerarious conscience upon those who refuse to hearken to our words, we now add some special instruction concerning ecclesiastical students in the seminaries and aspirants in religious institutes. In the seminaries all the parts of the institutions must be directed to the formation of priests worthy of the name. For it must not be thought that such institutions are destined merely for study or for piety—they combine both these; they are the training schools in which the army of Christ is built up by a long course of preparation. In order that a host thoroughly equipped may come forth from them, two things are fundamentally necessary: doctrine for the culture of the mind, virtue for the perfection of the soul. The former of these demands that ecclesiastical students be highly enlightened in those branches which are closely connected with the studies of divine things; the latter demands a special degree of virtue and constancy. Let the superiors of discipline and piety, therefore, note what promise the individual students give of themselves and study their characters—whether they give themselves up unduly to their natural bent, whether they show worldly tendencies; whether they are docile to obey, given to piety, not having an exalted idea of themselves, observant of discipline; whether they are led to aspire to the priesthood by a right aim or by human motives; whether their lives are marked by the holiness and doctrine suitable to their state, or at least, if there be any defect in this respect, do they endeavor sincerely and willingly to acquire it. Nor does this investigation present excessive difficulties; for the lack of virtue referred to is speedily produced by a hypocritical performance of the offices of religion and by the observance of discipline through fear rather than at the dictates of conscience, and the person who observes discipline through servile fear, or violates it through levity of mind or through contempt is very far from offering a guarantee of living worthily in the priesthood. For it is not easy to believe that he who despises



domestic discipline will not fall away from the public laws of the Church. When a superior of sacred youth finds one of them in this frame of mind and after warning him once or twice notes no change for the better after a year of trial, he should expel him in such a way as to render it impossible for such a student to be again received either by himself or by any Bishop.

Two things, therefore, are primarily necessary in promoting clerics: innocence of life joined with soundness of doctrine. Nor must it be forgotten that the precepts and admonitions addressed by the Bishops to those whom they are initiating in sacred orders are meant as much for themselves as for the candidates; as, for instance, when it is laid down: "Care must be taken that heavenly wisdom, upright life and long observance of justice commend the elect for this office. . . . Let them be upright and ripe at once in knowledge and in works . . . let the form of all justice shine forth in them."

With regard to probity of life it would not be necessary to say more were it possible to separate this easily from the doctrines and opinions which a man takes it upon him to defend. But, as we read in the Book of Proverbs: "A man shall be known by his doctrine," and as the Apostle teaches: "Whosoever continueth not in the doctrine of Christ hath not God." How much of effort is to be spent in acquiring knowledge of many and various things may be seen from the very conditions of the age which proclaims that the light of progressing humanity is the most glorious of achievements. All the clergy, therefore, who wish to perform their duties in a manner worthy of the time, fruitfully "to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers" to devote the resources of intellect to the utility of the Church, must acquire a knowledge of things beyond the common and approach as closely as possible to the perfection of doctrine. For the fight is one with enemies not lacking in skill, whose polished studies are not unfrequently united with a science full of wiles and whose specious and vibrant sentences are made up of impetuous and sounding phrases, so as to make it appear that they contain something entirely new. Hence we must carefully prepare our arms, that is, a rich fund of doctrine is to be acquired by all those who are preparing themselves in retirement for the holiest and most arduous of tasks.

But since the life of man is circumscribed within such limits that it is barely possible for one to learn cursorily something of the immense fund of things that are to be known, the thirst for knowledge must be regulated and the sentence of Paul be acted upon "not to be more wise than it behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety." Hence as clerics are already sufficiently burdened with the

many important studies imposed upon them relating to sacred literature, to the points of faith, morals, the science of piety and offices known as ascetics, to the history of the Church, canon law and sacred eloquence, in order that the students may not waste their time in the pursuit of other questions and be distracted from the main objects of their studies, we absolutely forbid that any journals or periodicals, however excellent, be read by them, binding the consciences of the superiors to take care scrupulously that this does not happen.

To remove all suspicion of the secret introduction of Modernism, we not only will the absolute observance of the prescriptions contained in No. 2 above, but we ordain, moreover, that the individual professors before inaugurating their lectures at the beginning of the year shall present to the Bishop the text they propose to use in teaching or the questions or theses which are to be treated; then that the teaching of each of them be examined during the year, and should it appear that this is not in harmony with sound doctrine, the fact shall be held sufficient to have the professor removed there and then. Finally, in addition to the profession of faith, each professor shall take an oath according to the formula given below before his Bishop and shall sign his name to it.

This oath, after the profession of faith, in the form prescribed by our predecessor, Pius IV., of holy memory, has been made, together with accompanying definitions of the Vatican Council, shall be taken in presence of the Bishop by:

I. Clerics who are to be initiated in major orders: to each of whom a copy shall be previously presented both of the profession of faith and of the form of oath, so that they may know accurately what they are, and with them the penalties incurred by violation of the oath.

II. Priests appointed for hearing confessions and sacred preachers, before they receive faculties for exercising these sacred offices.

III. Parish priests, canons, holders of livings, before they enter on possession of their benefices.

IV. Officials in the episcopal curias and ecclesiastical tribunals, not excepting the vicar general and the judges.

V. Lenten preachers.

VI. All officials in the Roman Congregations or Tribunals before the Cardinal Prefect or Cardinal Secretary of the same.

VII. The superiors and professors of religious families and congregations, before they enter on office.

The formula of the profession of faith, mentioned above, and of the oath are to be kept in special frames in all episcopal curias as well as in the different offices of the Roman congregations. And

should anybody dare, which may God forbid, to violate the oath, he is to be delated at once to the Holy Office.

"I . . . firmly hold and accept each and every definition of the unerring teaching of the Church, with all she has maintained and declared, but especially those points of doctrine which expressly combat the errors of our time. In the first place, I profess my belief that God, the beginning and end of all, can be surely known and also proved to exist by the natural light of reason from the things that are made, that is, from the visible works of the creation as a cause from its effects. Next I recognize and acknowledge the external arguments of revelation, that is, divine facts, especially miracles and prophecies, as the surest signs of the divine origin of the Christian religion, and I hold that these are specially suited to the understanding of every age and of all men, even of our times. Thirdly, I likewise hold with firm faith that the Church, the guardian and exponent of the revealed Word, was proximately and directly founded by Christ Himself, the true person of history, while He dwelt amongst us, and that she was also built upon Peter, the Prince of the Apostolic Hierarchy, and upon his successors to the end of time. Fourthly, I sincerely receive the teaching of faith as transmitted in the same sense and meaning right down to us; and, therefore, I wholly reject the heretical notion of the evolution of dogmas, which pass from one sense to another alien to that the Church held from the start; and I likewise condemn every error whereby is substituted for the divine deposit, entrusted by Christ to His spouse and by her to be faithfully guarded, a philosophic system or a creation of the human conscience, gradually refined by the striving of men and finally to be perfected hereafter by indefinite progress. Fifthly, I hold for certain and sincerely profess that faith is not a blind religious sense making its way out of the hidden regions of the subliminal consciousness, morally tinged by the influence of heart and will, but is a true assent of the intellect to truth received from without by hearing, an assent whereby we believe to be true, because of the authority of the all true God, whatever by the personal God, our Creator and Lord, has been spoken, testified and revealed.

"I further, with all due reverence, submit and with my whole mind adhere to all the condemnations, declarations and directions contained in the encyclical letter 'Pascendi' and in the decree 'Lamentabili,' particularly regarding what is called the history of dogma.

"I also reject the error of those who allege that the faith proposed by the Church may be in conflict with history and that Catholic dogmas in the sense in which they are now understood cannot be harmonized with the more truthful 'origins' of Chris-

tianity. Moreover, I condemn and reject the opinion which declares that a Christian man of better culture can assume a dual personality, one as believer and another as historian, thus taking it to be permissible for the historian to hold fast what his faith as a believer contradicts, or to lay down premises from which there follows the falsity or the uncertainty of dogmas, provided only that these are not directly denied. Likewise I reject that method of estimating and interpreting Holy Writ which, setting aside the Church's tradition and the analogy of faith and the rules of the Apostolic See, adopts the rationalists' principles and with equal arbitrariness and rashness considers criticism of the text the one only supreme rule. In like manner I reprobate the opinion of those who hold that a teacher of the science of historical theology or the writer on the subject must first put aside the notions previously conceived about the supernatural origin of Catholic tradition or about the divine aid promised for the perpetual preservation of each revealed truth; then that the writings of individual fathers must be interpreted solely by the data of science, without any reference to sacred authority, and with the freedom of judgment wherewith every profane record is usually examined.

"Finally and in general, I declare myself to be far removed from the error of the modernists who hold that in sacred tradition there is nothing inherently divine; or who—far worse still—admit it in a pantheistic sense: thus there would remain only a bare simple fact equal to the ordinary facts of history, viz., that the school started by Christ and His Apostles still finds men to support it by their energy, their shrewdness, their ability. Wherefore most firmly I retain and to my last breath will I retain the faith of the Fathers of the Church concerning the sure endowment of truth, which is, has been and ever will be in the succession of the episcopate from the Apostles (St. Irenæus IV., c. 26); not in such a way that we may hold what seems best and most fitting according to the refinement of each age, but that we never in any different wise understand the absolute and unchangeable truth preached from the beginning by the Apostles. (Præscript, c. 28.)

"All this I promise that I will faithfully, entirely and sincerely keep and inviolably guard, and from this never in teaching or howsoever by word or writing in the least depart. So I promise, so I swear, so help me God, etc."

Since long experience has taught us that the zeal of the Bishops in providing for the preaching of the Divine Word has not produced its proper fruit, not, we think, on account of the negligence of the hearers, but on account of the vanity of preachers whose words are the words of men rather than of God, we deem it well

to reproduce here in Latin and to recommend to the Ordinaries the document issued at the command of our predecessor, Leo XIII., of happy memory, by the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars on July 31, 1894, and sent to the Ordinaries of Italy and to the superiors of religious families and congregations:

1. "And in the first place as regards the ornament of virtue, which should above all distinguish sacred orators, let the Ordinaries and the superiors of religious families take good care never to entrust this holy and salutary mission of the Divine Word to those whose piety towards God and love of His Son Christ our Lord does not shine forth. For if the preachers of Catholic doctrine be lacking in these qualities, they will never be anything but 'a sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal' (I. Cor. xiii., 1), and they will always be destitute of that which forms the whole strength and efficacy of evangelical preaching, that is, zeal for the glory of God and the salvation of souls.

"And this piety, so necessary for sacred orators, must shine forth even in their external conduct in order that their lives may not be in opposition with the Christian precepts and institutions which they extol in their discourses and that they may not destroy by their acts what they build up by their words. Again, there must be nothing profane in this piety, but rather let it be instinct with that gravity which reveals them as 'the ministers of Christ and the dispensers of the Divine mysteries.' (I. Cor. iv., 1.) For otherwise, as the Angelic Doctor well says, 'if the doctrine is good and the preacher bad, the latter is an occasion of blasphemy against the doctrine of God.'

"But piety and the other Christian virtues must have knowledge as their inseparable companion, since it is obvious and clearly proved by long experience that the Word cannot be suitably and fruitfully preached by men destitute of knowledge, especially sacred knowledge, who, trusting to a certain natural facility in elocution, boldly ascend the pulpit without any preparation. Such as they beat the air, and all unconsciously expose Divine revelation to derision and contempt and put themselves on a level with those of whom the Divine words were spoken: 'Because thou has rejected knowledge, I will reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priesthood to me.' (Os. iv., 6.)

2. "Therefore Bishops and superiors of religious communities must not entrust the ministry of the Divine Word to any priest who has not proved himself to be sufficiently endowed with piety and knowledge. They are to take great care, too, that only subjects worthy of sacred eloquence be treated in the pulpit. These have been indicted by our Lord when He said: 'Preach the Gospel.'

(Mark xvi., 15.) Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you' (Matt. xxviii., 20), words which are thus suitably explained by St. Thomas: 'Preachers must enlighten in faith, direct in works, point out what is to be avoided, and by threats and promises lead men to truth and goodness.'<sup>9</sup> And the Council of Trent adds: 'Let them preach the extirpation of vice and the practice of virtue to avoid eternal punishment and gain the glory of heaven,<sup>10</sup> in development of which Pius IX., of happy memory, has written: 'They must preach not themselves, but Christ crucified; let them, then, announce to the people, clearly and simply, with grave and persuasive eloquence and according to the doctrine of the Catholic Church and of the Fathers, the dogmas and precepts of our most holy religion; let them carefully explain to the people the special duties of each, turn them from vice and kindle them in charity, so that the faithful, healthily strengthened by the Word of God, may abandon vice, practice virtue and thus be enabled to avoid eternal punishment and win the glory of heaven.'<sup>11</sup>

"From all this it will be clear that the proper subjects for preaching are the Apostles' Creed, the Ten Commandments, the precepts of the Church, the sacraments, the virtues and vices, the duties of one's state of life, the four last things and other eternal truths of the same kind.

3. "But to-day the ministers of the Divine Word only too often pay but small attention to this rich and important mine of subjects; they neglect it and almost reject it as something useless and superannuated. Knowing well as they do that the topics we have just enumerated are little calculated to win popular applause, for which they are so eager, and 'seeking their own interests and not those of Jesus Christ' (Philip. ii., 21), they thrust aside these topics even during Lent and the most solemn seasons of the year. And changing names as well as things, they substitute for the old instructions a new and not very intelligible kind of discourse, which they call 'conferences,' far better adapted to flatter intellect and thought than to control the will and reform conduct. They do not reflect that while moral instructions are useful for all, conferences are so only to a few, and that even these few, if the orator occupied himself more with their conduct by frequently inculcating chastity, humility of heart, obedience to the authority of the Church, would thus be freed from their prejudices against the faith and receive the light of truth with better dispositions. For if there are many, especially in Catholic countries, who have false ideas regarding re-

<sup>9</sup> Comm. in Matt. v.

<sup>10</sup> Sess. V., cap. 2, De Reform.

<sup>11</sup> Lit. Enc., IX November, MDCCCXLVI.

ligion, the fact is to be attributed to the unchecked passions of the heart rather than to aberration of the mind, according to the Divine sentence: 'From the heart come forth evil thoughts . . . blasphemies.' (Matt. xv., 19.) Thus St. Augustine, referring to the words of the Psalmist: 'The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God' (Psalms xiii., 1) says: 'It is the heart, not the mind, that speaks here.'

4. "This does not imply, however, that discourses of this kind are to be absolutely condemned, for when they are well done they may often prove very useful and even necessary to refute errors contrary to religion. But it is necessary to banish absolutely from the pulpit that elaborate style of address which concerns theory more than practice, which concerns the civil more closely than the religious order and which is more notable for its external show than for the fruit that follows from it. All that elaboration which is better suited for meetings or learned gatherings is quite out of touch with the majesty of the house of God. As regards lectures or conferences which aim at the defense of religion against attack, very necessary as they are in certain cases, they are not within the capacity of all, but only of the best equipped; and even the best speakers should not hold these conferences except when time and place and the condition of the hearers render them necessary and there is some hope of their doing good—and this, it will be clear to all, is a point which must be left to the legitimate verdict of the Ordinary. In these discourses, too, the power of conviction should be based rather on sacred doctrine than on the words of human wisdom, and that the exposition should be made with force and clearness, so that error may not make a deeper impression than truth on the minds of the hearers and objections be not stronger than the answers given to them. But above all things, care must be taken that the frequency of such discourses shall not diminish that of moral instructions, and that the importance of the latter be not minimized as though, being of an inferior order, they were less worthy of respect than the others and were therefore to be left to ordinary preachers and hearers; for the truth is, on the contrary, that moral instructions are absolutely necessary for the majority of the faithful and are not less in dignity than apologetic dissertations, so that even the best orators, at least from time to time, and before the best classes of hearers should devote themselves with the greatest care to this kind of sermons. If a contrary practice is followed, the faithful are forever being obliged to listen to discourses about errors from which the majority of them are immune and never of the faults and vices they really possess.

5. "But if there is reason to complain about the choice of subjects,

there are other reasons and grave ones as regards the style and form of the sermons preached. St. Thomas well teaches that to be really 'the light of the world' the preacher of the Divine Word must possess three things: first, solidity, so that he may not fall away from the truth; second, clearness, so that he may not teach it obscurely; third, a useful aim, so that he may seek God's glory and not his own.<sup>12</sup>

"Too often the style of contemporary eloquence is not only at variance with the clearness of that evangelical simplicity which it should possess, but is mostly made up of clashing words and recondite thoughts beyond the grasp of the people. This is deplorable and to be lamented in the words of the Prophet: 'The little ones asked for bread and there was no one to break it for them.' (Thren. iv., 4.) But even more lamentable still is the fact that so many sermons are destitute of the religious spirit, the atmosphere of Christian piety, that Divine force and virtue of the Holy Spirit which appeals to the soul and leads it gently to what is right—a force and virtue which should always assimilate preaching to the words of the Apostle: 'My speech and my preaching was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in showing of the Spirit and power.' (I. Cor. ii., 4.)

"But those who place their reliance in the persuasive words of human wisdom rarely if ever have recourse to the Divine sources and to the Sacred Scriptures, that contain those living waters which are the most fruitful and abundant matter for sacred preaching, as His Holiness Leo XIII. eloquently explained recently in these grave words: 'Herein is to be found the proper and special virtues of the Scriptures, from the Divine breath of the Holy Spirit, who confers authority on the preacher, endows him with apostolic liberty of speech and inspires him with forceful and triumphant eloquence. Such a speaker reproduces the spirit and force of the Divine Word, his preaching "is not in word only, but in power also, and in the Holy Ghost and in much fullness."' (I. Thess. i., 5.) Hence it must be said that inconsistent and thoughtless is the conduct of those who deliver addresses on religion and announce the Divine commandments in the mere words of human science and prudence instead of availing themselves of the only means that are divine. Their language, empty of the fire of the Word of God, necessarily languishes and grows cold and possesses nothing of that divine virtue which shines forth in the Divine Word. "The Word of God is living and effectual and more piercing than any two-edged sword, and reaching unto the division of the soul and the spirit." (Heb. iv., 12.) Thinking men must recognize that there is in the sacred writings

<sup>12</sup> *Loc. cit.*



an eloquence truly wonderful and varied and worthy of the great things it expresses. Augustine understood this and expatiated on it with skill; and experience shows that the greatest sacred orators, and they have recognized it themselves, owe their reputation to their assiduous use and pious meditation of the Bible.<sup>13</sup>

"The Bible is, therefore, the chief source of sacred eloquence. But preachers eager after new models instead of going to the 'living source,' turn deplorably to 'the broken cisterns of human wisdom,' and neglecting the divinely inspired doctrine of the Fathers of the Church and the councils, lose themselves entirely in quoting the names and phrases of modern and still living profane writers—phrases which very often give rise to very dangerous interpretations or misunderstandings.

"They offend again by speaking of religion as if they wished to measure everything according to the standard of the goods and advantages of this ephemeral life, with hardly any reference to a future and eternal life; but dilating on the fruits which the Christian religion has brought to human society, but omitting to dwell on the duties which it imposes; by exalting the charity of Christ the Saviour, but without speaking of His justice. Hence the small fruit derived from such preaching, from which the profane hearer rises with the impression that he can, without changing his conduct, be a Christian merely by saying: 'I believe in Jesus Christ.' But what care they for the fruits of their preaching—it is not of these they are thinking. Their one great care is to flatter their hearers by tickling their ears. It is enough for them that the churches are full, even if the hearts of the people in them are empty. Hence they never make any mention of the remission of sins, of the four last things and of other capital questions; they speak only to please and they think only of extracting cries of admiration and applause by a profane eloquence better fitted for speech-makers than for those engaged in the apostolic and sacred ministry. Against such as these St. Jerome writes: 'When you teach in the church, let the people utter not exclamations, but groans; let the tears of your hearers be your praise.'<sup>14</sup> Hence it happens that these instructions, both within and without the precincts of the church, take on a theatrical appearance and lose all efficacy and all semblance of holiness; hence, too, the ears of the people and even of many of the clergy no longer find the pleasure which the Divine Word would give; hence a source of scandal for the good, little or no profit for the erring, who even when they crowd to hear fine language, drawn especially

<sup>13</sup> De Doctr. Christ, iv., 6, 7.

<sup>14</sup> Ad Nepotian.

by big words about human progress, patriotism, recent discoveries of science, a hundred times repeated, punctuate the periods of the orator with prolonged applause, but leave the temple no better than they entered it, like those 'who admired, but were not converted.'<sup>15</sup>

"This Sacred Congregation, therefore, wishing, by order of the Holy Father, to remove all these deadly abuses, obliges all the Bishops and superiors general of religious communities and ecclesiastical institutes to employ all their apostolic zeal and energy to extirpate them. Remembering the prescription of the Council of Trent, 'they are to select men suitable for this office of preaching.'<sup>16</sup> Let them perform this duty with the utmost zeal. In the case of priests of their own dioceses the Ordinaries must not admit them to this office until they have received a certificate of good life, knowledge and conduct,<sup>17</sup> that is, until their capacity has been tested by an examination or in some other way. And in the case of priests from other dioceses, they must not allow them into the pulpit, especially on the principal solemnities, until they receive from their Ordinary or religious superior a written attestation of their good conduct and of a sufficient preparation.

"The superiors of all religious orders, societies and congregations must not admit to the office of preaching, still less recommend to the Ordinaries, any of their subjects until they have assured themselves of the upright life and suitable preparation for sacred oratory of the candidates. And if after having given letters of recommendation to a preacher, they find that his sermons are not in harmony with the directions given in this letter, they must at once call him to a sense of his duty, and if he refuse to obey, they must interdict him from the pulpit, even using, when necessary, the canonical penalties which the circumstances may require."

If we have thought it necessary to repeat and reproduce these prescriptions, ordering them to be religiously observed, the reason is that we are forced to it by the gravity of an evil which is increasing every day and which it would be extremely dangerous not to arrest immediately. For we have not now, as in the beginning, to deal with contradictors who present themselves in sheep's clothing, but with open and declared enemies—and in addition internal enemies, who in alliance with the chief enemies of the Church are aiming at the ruin of the faith. The audacity of these rises up each day against the wisdom which comes from heaven, arrogating to themselves the right to amend it as though it had become cor-

<sup>15</sup> Ex Aug. in Matth. xix., 25.

<sup>16</sup> Sess. V., c. 2, De Reform.

<sup>17</sup> Sess. V., c. 2, De Reform.

rupted, to rejuvenate it as though it had become effete, to enlarge it and adapt it to the tendencies, progress and interests of the age, as though it were opposed not to some superficial minds, but to the welfare of society. Against these attacks on the teaching of the Gospel and sacred ecclesiastical tradition those who have received the sacred deposit of faith can never offer too vigilant and severe an opposition.

As to the admonitions and prescriptions which, with certain knowledge, we have laid down in the present "Motu proprio," we will and ordain that they be religiously observed, both by all the Ordinaries of the whole Catholic Church and by the superiors general of the regular orders and ecclesiastical institutes and that they be efficaciously applied, all things to the contrary notwithstanding.

Given at Rome at St. Peter's, September 1, 1910, in the eighth year of our pontificate.

PIUS X., POPE.

## DECREE

## ON THE AGE OF ADMITTANCE OF CHILDREN TO FIRST HOLY COMMUNION.

THE pages of the Gospels plainly testify to the special love which Christ showed whilst on earth to the little ones. It was His delight to be in their midst. He laid His hands upon them. He embraced and blessed them. He was indignant when they were repulsed by His disciples and reprimanded the latter in the following words: "Suffer the little children to come unto Me and forbid them not; for of such is the kingdom of God" (Mark x., 13, 16). How highly He prized their innocence and simplicity of soul He shows when calling a little one He said to His disciples: "Amen I say to you, unless you be converted and become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child, he is the greater in the kingdom of heaven. And he that shall receive one such little child in My name, receiveth Me" (Math. xviii., 3, 4, 5).

Bearing this in mind, the Catholic Church from the beginning took care to bring Christ to the little ones through Eucharistic Communion, which was given even to the sucklings. This, as was prescribed in almost all the ancient rituals till the thirteenth century, was done at baptism, and the same custom prevailed for a long time in some places; it is still in vogue with the Greeks and Orientals. But to avoid all danger, lest the children should spit out the consecrated Host, the custom obtained from the beginning of giving the Holy Eucharist under the species of wine alone.

The infants did not, however, receive Holy Communion only at baptism, but they frequently afterwards partook of the divine repast. For it was the custom in many churches to give Communion to the children immediately after the clergy, in others to dispense to them the small fragments left over after the Communion of the adults.

Later on this custom became obsolete in the Latin Church, neither were children permitted to approach the Holy Table before the dawn of the use of reason and before having some knowledge of the August Sacrament. This new discipline, already accepted by several particular councils, was solemnly confirmed in the Fourth Lateran Œcumenical Council by promulgating the celebrated XXI. Canon, in which the reception of the Sacraments of Penance and Holy Communion is prescribed to all the faithful having arrived at the use of reason in the following words: "All the faithful of both sexes, after coming to the use of reason, shall confess all their

sins alone to their proper priest at least once a year, strive to fulfill the enjoined penance as far as possible, devoutly receiving Holy Communion at least at Easter time, unless by the advice of the priest and for some reasonable cause he should deem it well to abstain for a while."

The Council of Trent, in no way disapproving of the ancient discipline of giving Holy Communion to children before they have attained the use of reason confirmed the decree of the Lateran Council and pronounced anathema on those who hold a contrary opinion. (Sess. XXI. de Communionem, c. 4. Sess. XIII. de Eucharistia, c. 8, can. 9.) "If any one shall deny that all the faithful of both sexes, who have attained the use of reason, are obliged to receive Communion every year, at least at Easter time, according to the precepts of Holy Mother Church, let him be anathema."

Therefore, in virtue of the aforesaid decree of the Lateran Council still in force, the faithful as soon as they arrive at the years of discretion are obliged to receive the Sacraments of Penance and Holy Communion at least once a year.

But in establishing the year when children come to the use of reason many errors and deplorable abuses have crept in in the course of time. There were those who considered one age necessary for the Sacrament of Penance, another for Holy Eucharist. For the Sacrament of Penance they judged that age necessary in which one can distinguish right from wrong, hence can commit sin; for Holy Eucharist, however, they require a greater age in which a deeper knowledge of matters of faith and a better preparation of the soul can be had. And thus, according to the various customs of places and opinions of men, the age of ten years was fixed for receiving First Holy Communion in some places, in others fourteen years and even more were required, in the meanwhile forbidding all those children under the required age from receiving Holy Communion.

This custom, by which, under the plea of safeguarding the August Sacrament, the faithful were kept away from the same, was the cause of many evils. It happened that the innocence of childhood, torn away from the embraces of Christ, was deprived of the sap of interior life; from which it also followed that youth destitute of this strong help, surrounded by so many snares, having lost its candor, fell into vice before ever tasting of the sacred mysteries. Even though a more thorough preparation and an accurate sacramental confession should precede First Holy Communion, which does not happen everywhere, yet the loss of first innocence is always to be deplored and might have been avoided by receiving the Holy Eucharist in more tender years.

Not less is the custom, which exists in many places, to be con-

demned, according to which children are not allowed to receive the Sacrament of Penance before they are admitted to Communion, or else absolution is not given to them; thus it happens that burdened perhaps with mortal sins they remain a long time in great danger.

But the worst of all is that, in some places children not yet admitted to First Holy Communion are not permitted to receive the Sacred Viaticum, even when in danger of death, and thus, dying and being buried as infants, they are not helped by the prayers of the Church.

Such injury is caused by those who insist on an extraordinary preparation for First Holy Communion, more than is reasonable, not realizing that this kind of precaution proceeds from the errors of the Jansenists, who maintain that Holy Eucharist is a reward, not a remedy for human frailty. The Council of Trent holds a different opinion when it teaches that it is "an antidote by which we are freed from daily faults and preserved from mortal sins" (Sess. XIII. de Eucharistia, c. 2), which doctrine has lately been inculcated by a decree given on the 26th day of December, 1905, in which daily approach to Communion is opened to all, both old and young, two conditions only being required, the state of grace and a right intention. Neither does it appear reasonable that whilst formerly even sucklings received the remnant of the sacred particles, at present an extraordinary preparation should be required from the children, who are in the happy state of innocence and candor, and greatly need this heavenly food on account of the many temptations and dangers of our times.

The abuses which we condemn may be traced to the fact that those who demand a certain age for penance and another for Holy Eucharist have neither wisely nor rightly defined the required age. The Lateran Council requires one and the same age for both sacraments, since it imposes a joint obligation of penance and Communion. Therefore, since the age of discretion required for penance is that at which right can be distinguished from wrong—namely, when one comes to the use of reason—so also for Communion that age is required which can distinguish the Eucharistic Bread from the common, which in turn is the age at which a child attains the use of reason.

Nor did the principal interpreters of the Lateran Council and those who lived at that time think differently. From the history of the Church it is evident that many synods and Episcopal decrees, beginning with the twelfth century, shortly after the Lateran Council, admitted children of seven years of age to Holy Communion. There is, moreover, a testimony of the greatest authority, St. Thomas Aquinas, which reads: "When children begin to have some use of

reason so that they can conceive some devotion towards the sacrament (Eucharist), then this sacrament can be given to them." The same is explained by Ledesma as follows: "I say with the consent of all, that Holy Eucharist should be given to all having the use of reason, no matter how soon they may acquire the same; even though the child should have but a confused idea of what it is doing." Vasquez explains the same passage in the following words: "As soon as a child attains the use of reason it is obliged by divine law so that not even the Church can dispense it from the same." The same is taught by St. Antoninus, writing: "But when a child is capable of wrongdoing—that is, of committing mortal sin—then he is subject to the precept of confession and consequently Communion" (P. III., tit. XIV., c. 2, p. 5). The Council of Trent also forces us to the same conclusion. For whilst it declares that "infants, lacking the use of reason, are not obliged to receive Holy Communion," it assigns as the only reason, because they cannot commit sin (Sess. XXI., c. 4): "Since," it says, "at that age they cannot lose the acquired grace of the children of God." From which it is evident that the Council believed the children obliged to receive Communion as soon as they could lose grace by sin. The words of the Roman Council, held under Benedict XIII., agree with this teaching that the obligation of receiving Holy Eucharist begins "after the boys and girls have come to the use of reason, to that age, namely, in which they are capable of distinguishing this sacramental food, which is no other than the true Body of Jesus Christ, from common and profane bread, and know how to approach the same with the proper devotion and religion." (*Istruzione per quei che debbono la prima volta ammettersi alla S. Communione*, Append. XXX., p. 2.) The Roman catechism, however, says: "At what age Holy Communion should be given to children, no one can judge better than the father or the priest to whom they confess their sins. For theirs is the duty to find out and to inquire of the children if they have acquired some knowledge of this admirable sacrament and a taste for the same."

From all this it follows that the age of discretion required for Holy Communion is that at which the child can distinguish the Eucharistic from common material bread and knows how to approach the altar with proper devotion.

A perfect knowledge of the articles of faith is, therefore, not necessary, as a few elements alone are sufficient; nor is the full use of reason required since the beginning of the use of reason, that is, some kind of use of reason, suffices. Wherefore, to put off Communion any longer or to exact a riper age for the reception of the same is to be rejected absolutely, and the same has been repeatedly

condemned by the Holy See. Thus Pius IX., of happy memory, in the letters of Cardinal Antonelli to the Bishops of France given on the 12th day of March, 1866, severely condemned the growing custom existing in some dioceses of putting off Holy Communion to a maturer age and rejected the number of years as fixed by them.

The Sacred Congregation of the Council, on the 15th of March, 1851, corrected a chapter of the Provincial Council of Rouen, in which children under twelve years of age were forbidden to receive Holy Communion. This same Congregation on the Discipline of Sacraments, acting in a similar manner in a case proposed to it from Strassburg on March 25, 1910, in which it being asked whether children of twelve or fourteen years could be admitted to Holy Communion, answered: "Boys and girls are to be admitted to Holy Communion when they arrive at the age of discretion or attain the use of reason."

Having seriously considered all these things, the Sacred Congregation on the Discipline of Sacraments at a general meeting held on the 15th of July, 1910, in order that the above mentioned abuses might be removed and the children of tender years become attached to Jesus, live His life and obtain assistance against the dangers of corruption, has judged it opportune to lay down the following norm for admitting children to First Holy Communion to be observed everywhere:

I. The age of discretion required both for confession and Communion is the time when the child begins to reason, that is, about the seventh year, more or less. From this time on the obligation of satisfying the precept of both confession and Communion begins.

II. Both for first confession and First Communion a complete and perfect knowledge of Christian doctrine is not necessary. The child will, however, be obliged to gradually learn the whole catechism according to its ability.

III. The knowledge of Christian doctrine required in children in order to be properly prepared for First Holy Communion is that they understand according to their capacity those mysteries of faith which are necessary as a means of salvation, that they be able to distinguish the Eucharist from common and material bread, and also approach the Sacred Table with the devotion becoming their age.

IV. The obligation of the precept of confession and Communion which rests upon the child falls back principally upon those in whose care they are, that is, parents, confessors, teachers and their pastor. It belongs to the father, however, or to the person taking his place, as also to the pastor, to admit the child to First Holy Communion.

V. The pastors shall take care to announce and distribute general Communion once or several times a year to the children, and on these occasions they shall admit not only first communicants, but also



others who, with the consent of their parents and the pastor, have already been admitted to the Sacred Table before. For both classes several days of instruction and preparation shall precede.

VI. Those who have the care of children should use all diligence so that after First Communion the children shall often approach the Holy Table, even daily if possible, as Jesus Christ and Mother Church desire, and that they do it with a devotion becoming their age. They should bear in mind their most important duty, by which they are obliged to have the children present at the public instructions in catechism, otherwise they must supply this religious instruction in some other way.

VII. The custom of not admitting children to confession, or of not absolving them, is absolutely condemned. Wherefore the Ordinaries of places using those means which the law gives them shall see that it is done away with.

VIII. It is an utterly detestable abuse not to administer Viaticum and Extreme Unction to children having attained the use of reason and to bury them according to the manner of infants. The Ordinaries of places shall proceed severely against those who do not abandon this custom.

These resolutions of the eminent fathers, the Cardinals of this Sacred Congregation, have been approved by our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius X. in an audience given on the 7th day of the current month, and he has commanded the present decree to be edited and promulgated. He has commanded all the Ordinaries that the present decree should be made known not only to the pastors and the clergy, but also to the people, to whom it shall be read yearly at Easter time in the vernacular language.

The Ordinaries themselves will be obliged at the end of every five years (together with the other affairs of their diocese) to give an account of the observance of this decree to the Holy See, together with the other affairs of their diocese.

Everything else to the contrary notwithstanding.

Given in Rome at the residence of the same Sacred Congregation on the 8th day of August, 1910.

D. CARD. FERRATA, Prefect.  
PH. GIUSTINI, Secretary.

## HOW THE BATTLE OF JENA AFFECTED PRUSSIAN EDUCATION.

FROM time to time speculative philosophy amuses itself with inquiries as to the most decisive of the world's great battles, in regard to the religious, the political or the commercial destinies of our planet. It is comparatively useless to pursue such a line of inquiry in regard to the remote past, save in cases wherein great migrations of defeated peoples or vast outpourings of the conquering ones have altered territorial configurations or displaced the centres of political gravity of ancient growth. Our more modern era has been productives of results easily followed and readily understood, when some titanic war closes with a decisive victory which effaces a dynasty or changes the features of a continental chart. Waterloo was one of these momentous strokes of overmastering destiny, in the realm of European hegemony; Sedan was not less so politically as well as territorially. But no great conflict of the Napoleonic era was so fraught with consequences of high import to the cause of advancement, in many directions, as the disastrous battle of Jena—the humiliation that awakened the latent energies and genius of rulers and people in the kingdom of Prussia.

For many centuries previous to the invasion of Prussia by Napoleon's armies, feudalism, in the shape of serfdom and crippling limitations on trade and personal freedom, prevailed in Prussia. The barbarous system known as the junker privilege—i. e., the predominance of the military caste in all public and even private affairs of the people at large—had brought about a sullen and unpatriotic spirit among the population, and the soldiers who went forth to fight for the defense of the territory had no heart for the task, but rather hatred of those who led them in the field of battle, in very many cases. Ignorance, discontent and bitter hatred of the junker system were the characteristics of the mass of the people from whose ranks the conscripts for military service were drawn. It was the existence of such conditions that made the twin disasters of Jena and Auerstadt possible. Those disasters were so frightful in their extent as to be almost equivalent to national extinction. This was perhaps fortunate, for the terms of peace announced by Talleyrand to the unhappy Prussian King (Frederick William III) were so ruinous as to drive him to seek what he had for years sought to avoid—an alliance with the Czar. This was the step which in the ultimate result brought ruin to the haughty conqueror and chained him to the rock of St. Helena. The catastrophe of Jena had the effect, likewise, of awakening the Prussian King to the frightful condition of his own people, and the intimate relation which that condition

had to the misfortunes which had overtaken himself and the great heritage which his renowned father, Frederick the Second, had handed down to him.

Fortunately there were in Prussia at that painful crisis men who were able to perceive and had the courage to point out to the King the real causes of the great collapse. The rottenness, they saw, began at the top, and percolated thence through all the strata below. They advised him that serfdom must go if the nation was to be saved from death; that the people, to be reliable, must be not only free, but educated and taught the nobility of self-respect; that the peasant that toiled in the field and the mechanic at his bench must have the feeling that he was safe from dishonor and insult in his home; that the shackles must be stricken from the limbs of trade and labor, and that justice, not the will of the junker, but the law of the kingdom must prevail. The men who gave this counsel were the two able Cabinet Ministers, Stein and Hardenberg, who successively held the office of Minister of State during the decade which followed the defeat of the Prussian armies in the frightful period of the French invasion. The result of their advice was the abolition of the system of serfdom, the compulsory expropriation of the landholders and the creation of a system of peasant proprietary which makes the kingdom rest on a basis of security to the monarchy and to the social fabric as a whole that cannot be disastrously shaken by either external or internal convulsion.

It is useful for the student to read of the causes which brought about disasters like that of Jena and Sedan. It is still more useful for statesmen and men in power and charged with the responsibility of high office to read them and ponder on them well and often. Long success in conquest is apt to dazzle and make blind the most self-contained imitator of Alexander; brutal abuse of the advantage obtained by superior force in war is certain to arouse in the breasts of a despairing people the fierce spirit of the man who has lost all but life, and is reckless of that. The Prussian people were in just such a mood when Bonaparte attempted to destroy their power once for all. Blücher was one of those who had been taken prisoner in the war, and he said to Bourienne, Napoleon's confidant: "I reckon much on the public spirit of Germany, on the enthusiasm which reigns in our universities. Success in war is ephemeral, but defeat itself contributes to nourish in a people the principles of honor and a passion for national glory. Be assured when a whole people are resolved to emancipate themselves from foreign domination they will never fail to succeed. I have no fears for the result. We shall end by having a Landwehr such as the slavish spirit of the French could never produce. . . . The population of

Prussia makes the common cause with its government; the safety of our hearths is at stake; and reverses, when such a spirit is abroad, destroy armies without breaking the spirit of a nation." The speaker was himself one of the instruments, under Providence, of bringing about a realization of his keen-sighted forecast. His arrival on the field, at the crucial moment of Waterloo, was the death blow to the career of the man who had so dismally humiliated his country nine years before.

No nation in Europe had ever fallen so low as Prussia did when it was obliged to pass under the yoke of the conqueror. Before the beginning of hostilities against Bonaparte it had a population of nine millions and an army of a quarter of a million. Its annual revenue was estimated at \$36,000,000 (about \$27,000,000 of present American money); and it had in the treasury a reserve fund of \$17,000,000. The material condition of the country had been so prosperous that the people had become demoralized, in a great measure, like the soldiers of Hannibal by the pleasures and luxuries of Capua. The decline of a martial spirit had been accompanied, it was remarked, by a weakened sense of national honor, so that the majority were strongly in favor of a policy of peace at any price. Thus, Austria had been left to continue the war against France, undertaken by the allied powers because of the frightful excesses of the Revolution, unaided, so far as Prussia was concerned. Under the sinister influence of Count Haugwitz, the most trusted of his Cabinet Ministers, the King declined to enter into the new coalition against Bonaparte which Austria, Russia and Britain found it necessary for their self-preservation to form. This was fatal to Prussia's progress, and, soon afterward, almost brought about her extinction. Public opinion, however, at the time, supported the King and his adviser, Haugwitz, in the mistake. The great English statesman, Charles James Fox, denounced Prussia's refusal, and her acceptance of the treaty of Schoenbrun, in terms of scathing scorn. It is said that even Napoleon himself regarded it as contemptible. The punishment of Prussia for that mistake was dreadful, for the conqueror who had despised soon showed that he was as merciless as he was scornful, and Jena and Auerstadt drove home to the weak Frederick William the tremendous folly of listening to the counsels of dishonor and cowardice. It was at such a melancholy juncture that the Prussian monarch—a monarch almost without either crown or territory then—summoned Count Stein to his counsels and gave a congé to Prince Hardenberg, who had been carrying on the languid affairs of the dismembered kingdom as best he might. The dismissal of Hardenberg was not owing, however, to any fault which the distracted monarch had to find with

his efforts to straighten the tangle, but was mainly owing to the pressure of the French autocrat, who hated the Minister because of his persistent opposition to his political scheming in regard to the other Continental powers. Stein was no less antagonistic to the Corsican's ideals of aggrandizement than Hardenberg, but inasmuch as he had acquiesced in the game of duplicity by means of which Holland was transferred to Prussia as a makeweight for Prussia's neutrality during the coalition war, he was less objectionable to Bonaparte. It was on his shoulders the titanic task of putting the mangled country into something like orderly shape, after the overthrow of Jena and Auerstadt, ultimately devolved. He was perhaps the very ablest statesman of his age. He came of an illustrious and gifted race, who had been settled from the beginning of the thirteenth century on the lands of Nassau, on the Lahn, and fought in the battles of the Fatherland, as well as the internecine feudal quarrels, down to the period of the Reformation (to which they adhered) and the Thirty Years' War. In the final outcome of this long conflict they lost so much of their wide landed possessions that young Stein had been obliged to seek employment in civil life, while his elder brothers entered on the easy task of dissipating the meagre remnant of the family possessions, in the manner so picturesquely described by Thackeray in two of his lectures on "The Four Georges." He was only twenty-seven years old when he was dispatched by the King to negotiate with the Elector of Mayence with a view to the adhesion of that powerful prince to the Confederation of the German Principalities. In this delicate business he was so successful that his future career was assured. When the *débauche* of 1805 came he was the one man whom the King could look to for a solution of the dreadful problem of a ruined country, a drained exchequer and a moral collapse unprecedented. Hardenberg had been in power for some time. He was a statesman of equal genius and experience, but he was inimical to Napoleon, and no business could be transacted with that haughty despot unless by means of having a *persona grata* in the Prussian Cabinet. It was a frightful task that Stein was called upon to begin—something similar to that which Thiers undertook more than sixty years later when the Prussians had turned the tables and gained their revenge for Jena by conquering the French armies under another but a different sort of Napoleon and overrunning all the French territory between the Vosges and the Loire. By the treaty of Tilsit the richest provinces of Prussia had been torn from the kingdom, and those remaining to her had been so desolated by war as to be next to worthless. While her seaports had been closed to the commerce of England by the decree of a blockade of Napoleon,

she was compelled to pay a heavy contribution to France, while all the time maintaining a large French army. The money exacted from the unhappy monarchy during the frightful period of French occupation was no less in amount than twenty-five millions of pounds English—equal to five times the entire annual revenue of Prussia at the time of its greatest prosperity. The Crown lands were the **first resources** which presented themselves to Stein. On the security of these, on the monarch's consent, he established a system of "territorial banks," similar to that of the "Credit Foncier" in France later on. The agrarian laws had been so modified by the legislation introduced and carried by his predecessor, Hardenberg, that the peasants became possessors of the lands on which they had formerly drudged as serfs or feudal tenants, the landlords being compelled to assent to the change, with a guarantee of monetary compensation spread over a long period of years. This great measure had converted a horde of sullen, dumb-driven, mutinous-minded clods into an army of *men*, filled with the ambitions of men and the determination of men to defend their firesides and their Fatherland against all invaders, be they whomsoever they might.

The reforms inaugurated by those far-seeing and progressive statesmen, Stein and Hardenberg, were the most comprehensive and sweeping that were even entered upon. The history of reforms in other countries is one of gradual and even timid advance. In Prussia, however, it was that of *reform per saltum*. So desperate was the case there, however, that there was no hope for the patient unless by heroic surgery, and Stein did not balk at the application of the knife. His first step was the reorganization of the army. A summons to arms was served upon the whole male population of an age capable of carrying the musket. Military instruction was made compulsory in all the schools. The greatest honors were paid to the military profession. Thorough instruction in the science of war was insisted on in every case where officers were receiving their education. The profession of arms, and promotion for merit, was thrown open to every man, while formerly these were the privileges of the junker class. The duty and the nobility of patriotism was inculcated in all the schools. The poetry and the literature of the time rang with the praises of the patriot and the soldier. Körner, the minstrel warrior, wrote his famous "Song of the Sword," and it fired all hearts as he sang it on the march, the refrain being taken up all over the extent of the Fatherland. The thoroughness of the rejuvenation was such that in a few years the army that had been pulverized at Jena and Auerstadt was on its feet again, ready to spring at its old antagonist and be in at the death when the day of retribution came around.

Napoleon by no means was pleased with the regeneration of Prussia under the guidance of her two great statesmen. He denounced the course of Stein as that of an enemy of France and demanded that he be arrested and his estates confiscated. Stein fled from the kingdom and took refuge in Austria, but he became more formidable to the Corsican while in exile than he had been in his freedom. He guided the action of Russia, with the aid of the Emperor Alexander, in such a way as to prepare for the terrible coup of 1812 which reddened the skies of Moscow and strewed the snow-covered plains with the corpses of a magnificent French host.

The most important step taken by Germany under the advice of her statesmen, at this time, was the formation of a great political confederation of the various Rhenish States, as well as Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony and Hanover, the Emperor of Austria being the President. This was an alliance offensive and defensive, directed chiefly against France. This confederation, which at the beginning looked most promising for the welfare of the various component States, did not eventuate as anticipated, for the spirit of unrest and revolution was abroad very soon after its formation, and it culminated in 1848, simultaneously in France and Germany, and the monarchs who held out against it were compelled to capitulate and grant the political reforms which the proletariat in either country demanded.

In the means taken by Baron Stein for the resuscitation and reorganization of Prussia the university and the school were the foremost agencies upon which he relied. The broad and perspicuous mind of Stein clearly recognized that without education an army is only a mob, and without freedom a nation is no better than a Tartar horde. His views on these points are forcibly developed in a paper laid by him before the Ministerial Council. The following passage from this document is characteristic of the man: "The legislation of a nation is defective so long as it is founded only on the views and ideas of its officials and of scholars. The first of these classes are so much occupied with details that they become unable to take a comprehensive view of affairs, and they are so attached to routine and matter of fact that they are unable to fulfill the necessities of common business. When a nation has risen above the condition of barbarism, when it has acquired a considerable mass of information and enjoys a moderate degree of the liberty of thought, it should naturally turn its attention toward its own internal and local affairs. A share in the management of these affairs will produce the most beneficial manifestation of patriotism and public spirit; but if every participation in them is refused to it, discontent

will spread, which must either break out in dangerous manifestations or else be suppressed by violent and discouraging measures. The character of the working and middle classes must become lowered, as their activity is exclusively devoted toward gain and enjoyment; and the upper classes must sink in public esteem by their idle and dissipated manner of life. Speculative sciences must acquire an undue value, and subjects of public utility be neglected."

Sound and far-seeing as were the measures taken for securing an educational system which would in a short time put Prussia on her feet again, it was not until a good many years had elapsed that the pedagogue was enabled to coöperate effectively with the drillmaster in the formation of a scientific fighting machine. The brave and clear-headed Queen, Marie Louise, at once fell in with the ideas of Stein as to the relations of the school to the victorious army, and she lost no time in the endeavor to bring them into practical effect, so far as she could see her way. So soon as the decree placing the large cities under autonomous rule went forth, and the schools were thus placed under local control, the Queen introduced the famous system of teaching laid down by Pestalozzi into the schools of all the kingdom. This step was taken two years after the defeat of Jena. Eleven years later on there was issued a Ministerial order making school attendance compulsory and decreeing uniformity in regulations for attendance and discipline for all the schools. A subsequent decree provided for the abolition of tuition fees in the ordinary schools; and in 1850 this was followed by the adoption of the Constitution of King William IV. regarding schools and colleges and the teaching of religion therein. Under this famous instrument the following laws were put into effect throughout Prussia:

"Article 20: Science and the teaching of science are free.

"Article 21: For the education of the young, public schools shall be established and maintained. Parents and guardians must not leave their children or wards without that instruction which is prescribed for the public schools.

"Article 22: To give instruction and to establish schools is allowed to every one who can prove to the State authorities moral, scientific and technical capability.

"Article 23: All public and private educational institutions are under the supervision of the State authorities. Teachers of public schools have the rights and duties of officers of the State.

"Article 24: Religious instruction is left to the respective religious societies. [This passage was amended subsequently so as to intrust the school teachers with that duty.] The external management of schools is left to the civil communities, while the State employs



the teachers and provides for the necessary number and training of teachers.

"Article 25: The means for establishing, maintaining and extending the public school system are furnished by the communities, and only in cases of inability does the State furnish the means. [This was subsequently amended. The State now bears from 25 to 33½ per cent. of the cost of maintaining the public elementary schools and about 50 per cent. of that of the secondary schools.] Rights acquired by private grants in behalf of education shall be inviolate. The State guarantees public school teachers a fixed income. Instruction in the public schools is free of charge."

It is comparatively easy to issue decrees and codes of rules, but the general adoption of them in so large a State as Prussia is quite a different matter. Many difficulties arose, and many fierce party battles were fought in the Diet and the House of Deputies ere the system which now prevails was finally agreed upon and installed all over the kingdom. There had been a protracted struggle over the question of ecclesiastical supervision versus the supervision of the lay professorial element. The Falck Laws, passed in the heat of the Bismarckian Kulturkampf, under the "blood and iron" pressure of Bismarck, marked the triumph of the university professors over the clergy; but after a few years the great Bismarck had to "go to Canossa" and sue for peace.

In 1905 political conditions were so altered by reason of the failure of the Kulturkampf and other Bismarckian policies that Doctor Studt, the Minister of Instruction, had not much difficulty in pressing a new school bill toward its passage—first, because the liberal parties were hopelessly in the minority, and, moreover, divided; and, secondly, because he could rely upon the steadfast adherence to the bill of all the Catholic members, it being in harmony with the aspirations of the clergy. Still another reason was the fact that he did not attempt in the bill to cover every feature of school education, the course of study and the inner working being left, as previously, in the hands of the Minister, but he submitted the bill as only partial school legislation. The bill received the assent of the two Houses of Parliament in July of the following year and the royal assent immediately. One of its most remarkable provisions is that where a given locality is unable from local causes to maintain its local schools, the State comes to its aid with the amount that is found, on examination of the case, to be really necessary. This provision is also embodied in the present English school law. This is the most interesting feature of the Prussian law, from a financial point of view; but from a religious one the chapter which deals with the denominational difficulty is far more absorbing.

The provisions seem to have been drawn up with the most painstaking care to do justice, both in cases which are clear and cases that are open to uncertainty. The chapter is fourth on the list, and it were well indeed that all who regard the religious problem as one which must be evaded in the United States, because of its apparent impossibility of solution, should be enabled to see what has been done by a State which has been made to know that a solution on equitable terms to all parties was an absolute necessity in the case, and that "where there's a will there's a way." Hence we make bold to reproduce the leading provisions of this remarkable specimen of the art of real statesmanship, as contradistinguished from our own slipshod substitute for solid work:

"DENOMINATIONAL CONDITIONS.

"Sec. 33. The public elementary schools shall, as a rule, be so organized that Protestant children shall be taught by Protestant teachers and Catholic children by Catholic teachers.

"Sec. 34. No child shall be denied admission to the public elementary school of his home place solely on account of denominational confession.

"Sec. 35. In public elementary schools of only one school-room [ungraded schools] the teacher shall always be a Protestant if his predecessor was a Protestant, or a Catholic if his predecessor was a Catholic.

"In place of a Protestant teacher, should his position become vacant, a Catholic teacher shall, as a rule, be appointed if for five successive years at least two-thirds of the children attending the school, exclusive of guest children, have been of the Catholic faith, and if during that time the number of Protestant children has been less than twenty. Under similar circumstances, as a rule, a Catholic teacher shall be replaced by a Protestant. The change requires the sanction of the Minister of Instruction.

"Sec. 36. In a school in which, according to its particular organization, both Protestant and Catholic teachers have been simultaneously employed, the practice may be continued. In a school district which has had only schools of this kind, new schools can be established only upon the same principle. A change may be made for sufficient reasons by the authorities of the school district only with the sanction of the supervisory authority.

"If in any school district there have been heretofore, besides schools of the kind described in paragraph 1, also such as have had only Protestant or only Catholic teachers, the establishment of new schools shall be according to the principle of separate denominational schools as far as possible.

"The preceding rule is not applicable to schools in which the difference in the denomination of the teachers is caused solely by making it possible that pupils of one denomination be offered religious instruction.

"If a school has had during the last five successive years more than 60, or in cities and rural communities of over 5,000 inhabitants more than 120 pupils of the Protestant or of the Catholic denomination, the parents or guardians of these 60 or 120 pupils, respectively, may petition the supervisory authority to arrange the schools so as to make them denominational, *i. e.*, have teachers employed who are either Protestant or Catholic, as the case may be, provided there is not in that district any school of denominational character to which such children might be sent.

"Sec. 37. If in any public elementary school staffed exclusively with Protestant or with Catholic teachers there are found twelve pupils, residents of the district, of a different denomination, separate religious instruction shall be provided for them.

"With reference to the pecuniary demands made according to Section 1 of the law of May 26, 1887, the necessity of providing pupils with separate religious instruction shall not be denied from considerations of the needs of the school, nor from considerations of the ability to pay of those who support the school.

"Whenever any such provision for extra religious instruction is met with great difficulties, a Protestant or a Catholic teacher may be employed for that purpose, who may also be entrusted with the instruction in other branches.

"Sec. 38. For all other elementary schools requiring several teachers only Protestants or only Catholics shall be employed. In employing additional teachers in schools hitherto taught by only one teacher, only candidates of the same denomination shall be considered.

"Protestant teachers in schools of several grades shall be replaced by Catholics if during five consecutive years at least two-thirds of the pupils residing in the district (exclusive of guest children) have been of the Catholic faith, and if during that period the number of Protestant children has been less than forty. Under similar conditions Catholic teachers shall be replaced by Protestants. The change requires the sanction of the Minister of Public Instruction.

"Sec. 39. If in a school district containing schools staffed exclusively with Catholic teachers the number of Protestant children obliged to attend school has been, during five consecutive years, more than 60, or in towns and rural districts of over 5,000 inhabitants more than 120, the parents and guardians of these 60 or 120 children, respectively, may petition the supervisory authority to provide schools exclusively with Protestant teachers.

"Sec. 40. For the establishment, maintenance and management of public schools for Jewish children, staffed exclusively with Jewish teachers, the regulations heretofore followed shall continue in force, only that Section 67, No. 3, of the law of July 23, 1847, concerning Jews, shall henceforth be applicable for the whole monarchy.

"If the public schools mentioned in Sections 35 and 39 are attended by Jewish children, the present regulations concerning the expenditures for Jewish religious instruction, and those concerning the employment of Jewish teachers in such schools for both purposes, *i. e.*, to give religious instruction and to teach other branches, shall remain in force. If in any school, staffed with Protestant or Catholic teachers, as many as twelve Jewish children belonging to the district are in attendance, a teacher shall be appointed to give religious instruction to these twelve."

The passing of such a sweeping law as this was a fact of deeper significance than might appear on the surface. It was not only a political event of the highest moment, but a moral victory of transcendent importance as well. It meant a triumph of the religious ideal over the secularist one. The National Teachers' Association—a body with a membership of 110,000—had fought hard to have its view of the means and the aim of the pedagogue impressed on the bill as it was being hammered into shape in Parliament. But the Government, thoroughly aroused over the growing power of Socialism, threw all its influence into the scales, and the outcome was a junction of the National Liberals with the different groups of the Conservatives to produce a law which was deemed necessary to create an impassable rampart against Socialism in the future. The Government succeeded, but not without arousing a feeling so bitter that it may yet work out in some subtle mischief and achieve the objects of the secularists by devious and subterranean ways. The rancor of the liberalist teachers was forcibly expressed in their press and on their platforms and in the university halls. One of the leading Berlin journals, the "Pädagogische Zeitung," gave the keynote, saying, *inter alia*:

"It is plain that the new regulation of school support was planned to submit public school education to extensive changes, for the question of financial support alone might have been solved in a law of a few paragraphs. But through the medium of this law the Government, safely supported by a majority of Conservatives and orthodox elements, intended to make the Church again, as in former centuries, the teacher of the people and the clergyman of the parish the general school superintendent. The aspirations of the laboring classes, their material demands, their claims upon equal political rights and other currents of thought and action in modern times

had awakened the conviction among the privileged classes of the nation that a dam should be erected against these ever-increasing claims from below. This, it was thought, could be done by having the road that leads to education regulated by the Church. In the highest layers of the social fabric of the Prussian State the belief in the social-political importance of the Church was reawakened. Police and criminal court, as experience showed, could not avail against increasing criminality, hence religion should aid to strengthen the moral stamina of the nation. Upon this background of social politics the essential features of the new school law became plainly visible."

Those chagrined secular teachers had fought hard to have a pet idea of their own, the "Simultan-Schule," or common school, set up in place of the denominational one, but against this proposal the whole weight of the Catholic clergy was exerted. They published a general protest, drawn up by the pastors of Bavaria, and got it published in many of the German religious papers. It was a document that largely influenced the final decision, it may well be conjectured, so well arranged were the reasons it advanced for the acceptance of the Government's bill. Here are a few of its points:

"The opposition to the Christian school is getting fiercer and more general. In late years it is advocated to separate the Church entirely from the school by establishing schools common to all denominations, in which temporarily religious instruction is to be given in separate classes, but from which religion will disappear in future. The abolishment of the denominational school will, as in France, result in the establishment of schools completely without religion, and even hostile to religion. School is not only to instruct, but also to educate the young to become not merely men and citizens, but also Christians and members of the Church; not only for the present fleeting life, but also for the future eternal life. In education, therefore, religion must occupy the first place as the most important and most effective means. That is not possible in the common school. The arguments advanced in favor of the common school are spurious. . . .

"The adherents of the common school are, partly at least, people who have broken off connection with Christianity, and who reject all revealed religion; people who are declared enemies of Christianity, outspoken freethinkers and infidels. Hence all faithful Christians, Catholics and Protestants, clergymen and laymen, should firmly adhere to the denominational school, and the thousands who demand the common school should be met by hundred thousands and millions with the demand for denominational schools. . . .

"In closest connection with the question of common schools is

that of professional supervision. He who combats the Christian school must necessarily oppose ecclesiastical school supervision. The friends of the common school have heretofore raised the demand that the Church should be excluded entirely from supervision of the schools, and that only members of the teaching profession, *i. e.*, laymen, be entrusted with that supervision. In some countries this has already been carried into effect, at great cost, without gain to instruction and with great loss to education. However much believing Christians, and especially priests, desire the promotion of the school system, since good instruction will aid the material and moral welfare of the people, the demand for professional supervision must be rejected at all times. All the arguments in favor of denominational schools are applicable to the participation of the Church and its representatives in the direction and supervision of the schools."

In considering the significance of the provisions of the new school law it should be borne in mind that the conditions of the teaching profession in that forceful country differ vastly from those which are the rule in the United States to-day. Men are largely in preponderance in the personnel of the teaching staffs. As much as 85 per cent. of the elementary schools are members of the sterner sex, and nearly 100 per cent. of those of the secondary schools also. These teachers are men of standing and influence in nearly every case. They are men of thought and political leading. They are voters, and men who can influence voters—not corruptly, as too often is the rule here, but by force of reason, coolness of procedure and good conduct in life. They have to play a great part in making of the new law a success, and their own individual success depends largely on the sincerity and thoroughness which they show in the discharge of the honorable trust given them now by the new law. Their conduct will be closely scanned as the scheme develops, and it is highly improbable that any considerable number of them will fail to recognize what they owe to the State and the society of the future in a very grave crisis in the moral position of the entire world.

It must be borne in mind that to-day Germany is, in every department of modern life, by far the most powerful nation in the European family. It possesses, in the solidarity of its various States, a combination as irrefragable as that of the bank safe which is the despair of scientific burglars and boldest cracksmen. The political instinct of its ruler and his advisers seems to be as unerring as that of the highest type of the intuitive animal in creation in pursuit of its natural and peculiar enemy. It is feared and it is at the same time imitated, which proves that it is no less admired than feared. To us

here in the United States it has given of its best in intellect, but for the most part that of its wrongly best—its materialistic and its falsely speculative. Will it now set us thinking whether its example in raising dams and fortifications, when the tide is rising all along the far-stretching coast line of civilization, ought to inspire us with monition rather than fill us with mere wonder?

A French observer of the German system of education and its results ("Q. V.") has summarized his conclusions in the issue of *America* of the 10th October last. He compares the influence of the respective school systems in France and Germany on the teaching staffs, to the disadvantage of his compatriots. He says:

"Our teachers are more concerned with politics than with teaching. In Germany there is none of that. The teacher, conscious of the dignity of his work, is concerned solely with his school, and leaves politics for the few hours of leisure that are at his disposal. When he is assigned to a post, he has to continue to work. He has to pass two examinations, on which his advancement and his proportionate increase of salary depends. His examinations call for continual study, and while keeping him, so to speak, breathless, they encourage him to acquire a more profound respect for his profession.

"What struck me most in German teachers was their patriotism. You never meet among them any followers of d'Herve, or even Socialists. For the most part they are very patriotic. As regards military life, they are obliged to only one year's service (formerly it was six months). Most of them endeavor to become officers of the Reserves, and in Germany that costs a good deal, both in money and in work. Whereas the simple reservist has to serve twenty-eight days, the man who is striving to be an officer is assigned fifty-six days, part of which is spent in camp.

"This ardent patriotism is not superficial. It is down deep in their hearts, and in the schools they communicate it to their pupils. They teach them songs where the words God, Kaiser and Fatherland recur at each moment, and in which the patriotic sentiments seemed to me were somewhat excessive."

Is there not food for thought in this survey?

JOHN J. O'SHEA.

Philadelphia.

## Book Reviews

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LA RESURRECTION DE JESUS, suivie de deux Appendices sur la Crucifixion et l'Ascension, par l'Abbé E. Mangelot, consultant de la commission biblique, professeur d'Exégèse du Nouveau Testament à l'Institut Catholique de Paris. In 16 double couronne de 404 pp. 3 fr. 50. Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie, Rue de Rennes 117, Paris.

In this admirable volume M. Mangelot has grouped together in an improved and complete form the eight articles which he had published on the all-important subject of the Resurrection of Jesus and which appeared in the *Revue Pratique d'Apologétique* in the course of the years 1908 and 1909. He has inserted also in their proper place the two articles on the burial of our Saviour, which had appeared in the same review in 1907. All the articles were carefully reviewed and improved by the author before being republished in the present volume. His work is more on the lines of criticism than on those of exegesis, the author having followed his adversaries along the ground of literary and historical criticism occupied by them in making their attacks upon the dogma. Hence he has in the first part exposed the teaching of St. Paul upon the resurrection before studying in the second part those parts of the Gospel narrative which are particularly discussed and attacked. The Apostle's teaching, as given in his epistles admitted as authentic by all serious critics, has an incontestable historic value. It bears not only on the very fact itself of the resurrection of the Saviour on the third day after His death and burial, which fact is, moreover, confirmed by the testimony of the Scriptures, but also on six apparitions of the risen Christ, the last of which effected the conversion of Saul near Damascus, and on the corporeal reality of the transformed and spiritualized body of the risen Saviour. Thus the testimony of St. Paul, taken alone, suffices to establish historically the resurrection of the Saviour, which is the solid basis of Christian faith. The Gospel narratives attest it also. They successfully withstand all the attacks of rationalistic and modernistic criticism and they furnish two historic proofs of the resurrection of the Divine Master. The first proof is the discovery of the empty tomb, which is of value, although it be only an indirect proof, since the narrative of St. Mark is no more a legend than is that of our Lord's burial in the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea, and since all attempts hitherto made to explain the event by natural causes have miserably failed. The second proof, which is direct, is derived from the apparition of the risen Saviour to His disciples both in Jerusalem and in Galilee. These two traditions, the one of Jerusalem, the other of Galilee, far from excluding each other, as is alleged, only tend to support and complete each other admirably. The Gospel accounts



finally contain precise details upon the nature and qualities of the glorified body of our Lord, and this doctrine is not borrowed from those popular ideas which are said to have prevailed amongst our Lord's contemporaries. The work of M. Mangenot treats in masterly style all these questions and is assuredly more than any other book of the time in close touch with all modern objections against the resurrection of Jesus, which it refutes directly and victoriously. It is an apologetic work of the first class. Two unedited appendixes are inserted, which prove respectively the reality of the crucifixion of Jesus under Pontius Pilate, which had recently been denied by M. Salomon Reinach in his *Orpheus*, and the fact, circumstances and nature of our Saviour's ascension.

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LECONS DE PHILOSOPHIE SOCIALE, par le R. P. Schwalm, des Frères Prêcheurs.  
I. Introduction. Lan famille ouvrière. Préface de M. Gabriel Melin, chargé du cours de Science Sociale à l'Université de Nancy. 1 vol. in 12, xx. + 427 pages. Prix, 4 francs. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

To-day every one desires to become familiar with the science of social problems. To satisfy this most reasonable demand until the present time, we have been unable to find a text-book which was at once clear, simple, well informed and containing sure doctrine with wide and well established information. Just such a book is now furnished in this new publication of the Rev. P. Schwalm. What must captivate the student in the study and perusal of this work is the solidity of the principles combined with the largeness of view, which characterizes its teaching and which is due to the author's exact knowledge of social facts. Closely intermingled and crossing one another at every page, as it were, we find the data of social science, whose methods L. Schwalm thoroughly possessed, and those of St. Thomas' philosophy, drawn from their very sources—commentaries on ethics and politics, "De Regimine Principum," various works on social ethics, the two *Summas*, the "Disputed Questions," etc. The book contains a masterly study of all those questions which preoccupy public opinion in our day, such as the family, education, labor, property, wages, associations, syndicates, the State, socialism, etc. This extensive study displays such a talent for exposition and such an ease of style as to render these subjects accessible to the most unprepared students.

The work will render valuable service to young priests who seek enlightenment before undertaking the apostolic work to which their zeal urges them. Numbers of laymen, too, will be directed by it in the great work of fulfilling well their part in the social world and protected by its maxims from many a false step and from disad-

vantageous methods. Courses of study especially find here a guide that will prove secure, well informed and of a scientific and practical character. In a word, the book is on the whole an original and solid work, where social science, being brought back to its principles, appears to be completely transformed and rejuvenated.

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LA VERITE DU CATHOLICISME, par *J. Bricout* (de la collection Etudes de philosophie et de critique religieuse). Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

In this volume the author does not pretend to furnish a complete course of apologetics with such an entirety and in such a style as might recall even distantly such works as the "Discours Sur l'Histoire les Pensées," or "l'Essai Sur l'Indifference." What it aims at is to offer a collection of articles, which appeared for the first time in the *Revue du Clergé Français*, and which are here reproduced in such a modified or improved form as to make them appear as parts of a whole, members as it were of one body, or chapters of one book. Such questions are handled as the following: What are the difficulties of belief chiefly found by our contemporaries? What was the system of apologetics followed by the late regretted Mgr. d'Hulst in the pulpit of Notre Dame? What is the historic value of the Gospels, on which our apologetics chiefly rely? How may we victoriously answer the challenge offered us by M. Loisy to defend Catholicism on the ground of history? What conception of dogmatic development may be reconciled at once with historic science and with the teaching of the Church? Finally, in what way a man can love his century and his country without being an "Americanist" or "Modernist" and without ceasing to be scrupulously orthodox. In the study of these questions one by one, as presented in this volume, the reader will not experience the painful impression caused by the sight of a badly constructed house or of a picture done up in incongruous colors. Its pages will assuredly furnish or suggest excellent material to the Catholic apologist and will serve to restore quiet to many a restless mind, a twofold fruit most devoutly to be wished by every sincere reader.

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L'ENSEIGNEMENT CATHOLIQUE DANS LA FRANCE CONTEMPORAINE. Etudes et discours, par *Mgr. Baudrillart*, recteur de l'Institut catholique de Paris. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris. 1 vol. in 8—de VIII.—704 pages. Prix, 7 fr. 50.

Under this general title and under the three following headings—  
 "Le Réveil des Etudes: Apologistes et Maîtres Chrétiens," "Les Principes Chrétiens dans l'Enseignement et l'Education: Nécessité de l'Enseignement Libre," "La Viè, le Rôle et l'Œuvre des Uni-

versités Catholiques"—Mgr. Baudrillart presents to the world nearly forty essays and lectures, whose object is to remind both friends and foes of what the French Catholics have aimed at and accomplished for the past century in their public and private teaching. Though the volume is not a history of Catholic teaching, it is indispensable to any one who wishes to write a history. Of this sufficient proof is found in the alphabetical index (men, institutions, works), containing no less than one thousand five hundred names. Almost all the great educators and professors of the last century—Abbé Bautain, Frédéric Ozanam, Père Gratry, Mgr. Perrand, l'Abbé de Broglie, Mgr. d'Hulst, M. de Lapparent, Père Olivaint, Père Joubert, Père Didon, Abbé Thenon, Abbé de Lagarde, etc., etc.—are passed in careful review and studied, together with the various types of Christian educational houses, including Catholic universities.

Though not a theoretical or didactic work, the book leaves untouched not one of those questions whose principles provoke discussion in nearly all degrees of ecclesiastical and lay teaching of the present time. The most contemporaneous problems, such as modernism, intellectual crisis now rife amongst both clergy and laity, etc., are boldly and fearlessly met by the author. A genuine service has been rendered to many classes of men—educators, orators, public men in the political world—by the laborious efforts of Mgr. Baudrillart, which have successfully brought together and classified in one volume so many studies, essays and lectures which would otherwise have remained scattered far and wide in a vast number of small pamphlets.

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LE POSITIVISME CHRETIEN, par *André Godard*. Edition augmentée et entièrement revue. Prix, 3 fr. 50. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

M. André Godard's works are destined to occupy henceforth a preëminent place in the apologetics of the day; the author has succeeded in avoiding the two shoals of modernism and of routine. His pamphlet on Progrès actuels de l'Eglise offers a resumé of his ideas on religious philosophy, and in its Italian edition has been privileged with the approbation of two consultors of the Index. Moreover, he has opened out new perspectives on those problems which still block the way before unbelievers or disconcert some Catholics; for instance, what is the spiritual destiny of non-Christians, how can we harmonize free-will with divine foreknowledge or the dogma of the Incarnation with the plurality of inhabited stars. On the ground of exegesis the author of "Le Positivisme chrétien" proves the exact parallelism of archæological and philological discoveries with the authenticity of the Holy Books. In other works he refutes the transformist hypothesis on the strength of biology. On the

first appearance of "Positivisme chrétien," M. Charles Vincent pointed out this new volume as having indicated the greatest degree of progress in apologetics which had been achieved for the last fifty years. M. Brunetière made mention of it in a lecture and François Coppeé devoted to it a long article, which ended as follows: "Every reader hungering for truth will find himself carried away by conviction in turning over these luminous pages, in which the author, whilst never desisting from a course of reasoning of inflexible rigor, sometimes seizes upon the favorite weapon of his adversaries, viz., that sparkling and cold irony in the use of which he is a consummate master." This new edition has been reinforced by the addition of striking studies on recent supernatural events, and will excite the most keen interest not only in the clergy, but in all laymen who are zealous for the defense of Christian truth.

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LA RELIGION DE L'ANCIENNE EGYPTE, par *Philippe Virey*. Beauchesne et Cie, rue de Rennes 117, Paris.

This volume is the grouping together in one publication of seven conferences delivered in 1909, at the Catholic Institute of Paris, on different subjects relating to the ancient religion of Egypt.

It does not pretend to offer an outline or systematic exposition of Egyptian religion under all its manifestations, but rather aims at presenting a general survey of the religious ideas of ancient Egypt, such as the author apprehends them.

The most interesting problems of this religion—namely, the questions relating to the unity or to the multiplicity of the Divine Being, to the meaning and the virtue of sacrifice, to the origin of animal-worship, of polytheism, etc.—are surely not the least easy of solution. These questions, however, are not evaded by the author. For each of them he has proposed such solutions as he considers probable or, at least, acceptable, though not always as certain, since the handling of the subject does not admit of a claim to infallible authoritativeness on the part of the lecturer.

The chief part of the author's attention was directed to the dogmatic question and the religious thought of the Egyptians rather than the outward manifestations of it. But little is said of the temples, the priesthood and the ceremonial details of the worship. The general signification of these ceremonies is dwelt upon. In regard to religious literature, also, but little is said. Frequent mention, however, is made of the most important and most ancient books, especially the Book of the Dead and the texts of the Pyramids.

The book comprises in all seven chapters, as follows: I., "Ancienneté de la Religion Egyptienne—L'Adam Egyptien, Etc." II., "Com-

ment les Egyptiens Conçurent et Définirent la Divinité, Etc." III., "L'Union du Ciel and de la Terre, Etc." IV., "Quelques-unes des Divinités, Etc." V., "Mythologie Panthéistique, Etc." VI., "Idées de l'Ancienne Egypte sur la Survivance de la Personnalité Après la Mort." VII., "Caractère des Cérémonies, Etc."

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LA DIFESA DEL CRISTIANESIMO per l'Unione delle chiese—*Nicola Franco*, Sacerdote di Rito Greco. Prezzo L. 250. Roma, M. Bretschneider, Via del Fritone 60.

This able volume in 227 pages forms a powerful appeal for the union of the churches, in order thereby to secure the defense of Christianity. After a general survey of the world-wide war waged upon the Christian religion, the author lays down in strong argument the necessity of the uniting of the Eastern and Western Churches for the defense of Christianity. He proves from the very institution of the Church by its Divine Founder the necessity of a central direction in matters of dogma and government. He then points out where, according to the intentions of Christ and by His appointment this central direction of the Universal Church must reside.

The author shows how the Oriental Churches may join in unity of faith and government with the Catholic Church without changing the rites and the discipline consecrated by the venerable traditions of the holy fathers of the East, who are venerated in the Western as well as the Eastern churches. In advocating the reunion of the West and East the author deals largely with the difficulties to be met with from various sources, such as the peculiar characteristics of the orthodox churches, the preoccupations inevitable in dealing with the orthodox church of Russia, the question of the sovereignty of the Church, Latinism, nationalism, etc., etc. The publication is certainly a most valuable contribution to all those whose zeal prompts them to unite their efforts in the attainment of this grand object, viz., the reunion of all nations under one shepherd and in one fold.

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LES IDEES MORALES DE MADAME DE STAEL, par *Maurice Souriau*, professeur à l'Université de Caen. 1 vol. in 16. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

To appreciate the ideas of any writer on questions of morality it is very useful to question his or her life and to place side by side the doctrines taught and the practice followed. Especially is this comparative study indispensable in the case of a woman writer, and above all, when the writer is no other than Madame de Staël. Her opinions have varied with her friendships; her heart always supplied more powerful reasons than did her intelligence and judgment for such

variations. Michelet refuses to her the rare attribute, genius, but grants her the possession of a great and immense talent, whose source lay in her heart. The two characteristics of genius, profound naivete and powerful invention are never to be found in her. Her moral standards are not well balanced and her ideas seem to manifest the effects of those troubles and agitations which she underwent in her private life and of those political storms which caused the upheaval of everything around her.

Her history presents a powerful character, which was essentially good and honest and earnest in the pursuit of righteousness and which appeared better at the end than at the beginning of her career, but still showing no regularity in its moral progress. M. Souriau's book comprises five chapters, embracing the successive stages of her life before 1789, during the Revolution, under the Directory, under the empire and finally after the Restoration. A succession of the most interesting pictures are presented by the author in the numberless passages quoted from her writings and in the exciting variety of events which he is obliged to pass in review.

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UN EPISODE DE LA FIN DU PAGANISME. La Correspondance d'Ausone, et de Paulin de Nole, avec une étude critique, des Notes et un Appendice sur la question du christianisme d'Ausone, par *Pierre de Labriolle*, professeur à l'Université de Fribourg. 1 vol. in 16 de la collection chefs d'oeuvre de la littérature religieuse, No. 561. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

It can be said that no one was more sadly astonished than Ausonius at the news of the striking conversion of Paulinus. Ausonius had been the teacher of Paulinus at the University of Bordeaux. In him the eminent professor had found his chief satisfaction, his best hopes, and he had ever remained bound to him by an affectionate interchange of letters, of poetry and of presents. And now came the time so little expected, so little dreamt of, when this beloved Paulinus abdicated the worldly life, abandoned Aquitaine, to bury himself in Spain, and sold his vast possessions for the relief of the poor. But what more? Did he also renounce the intellectual delights hitherto enjoyed—the task of resuming Suetonius, writing poetry, turning over the masterpieces of the classic authors, cultivating his mind and fancy with the literature of the Latins and Greeks? Ausonius was unable to bear up against the feeling of suspense, doubt and uneasiness he endured, aggravated as they were by the silence of Paulinus. He decided to write to him and beseech him to speak, to explain and to retrace his steps. Such was the starting point of the correspondence which was carried on between these two famous men. It possesses incontestably the greatest degree of psychological and historical interest. The delight experienced in

its perusal is vastly enhanced by the fine and erudite commentaries of M. de Labriolle.

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L'ETAT MODERNE ET LA NEUTRALITE SCOLAIRE, par *George Fonsegrive*, 1 vol. in 16. Bloud et Cie, édit, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

Is the State of the present day, whose organ is the school teacher, duly qualified for giving a moral education? Is it bound to give it? Can it give it? Such is the important problem taken up and attempted to be solved by M. Fonsegrive. Needless to say that the eminent philosopher remains within the domain of ideas in discussing his point and makes his whole appeal to logic alone. Nevertheless his verdict on the question is in the negative. He establishes the spiritual incompetence of the State. The business of the State is to protect and to promote the interests of the economic and material order in human affairs, but outside of this domain it has no authority, and it should leave untouched what belongs to the spiritual order. Consequently if we wish to maintain the moral rights of the family and of the Church, we have only one line of conduct to follow, and this is to accept or take for granted the fact of neutrality and of laicization and to ascertain clearly what that fact implies, viz.: First, the avowal of the powerlessness of the State in educational matters; second, the consequent necessity of confining the State within the limits of its acknowledged incompetence; third, draw out of that incompetence all the fruits of liberty, whose germ it contains. Such is the conclusion reached by the author. It remains for Catholics to study it in all its bearings and to establish on this strong foundation the whole plan of their just claims.

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LA PHILOSOPHIE MINERALE par *A. de Lapparent*. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1910. Pp. vi.+316.

The fame of the eminent sayant, some of whose miscellaneous essays are unified under the above title, rests, of course, on his researches in the field of geology. But no great scientist can confine himself to a single department of knowledge. The natural force of his intelligence, as well as the very demands of his specialty impel him beyond its borders. The results of this urgency were embodied in the present case in various scientific periodicals, and out of these the editors of the volume at hand have gathered them and given them permanent shape. The title is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace essays that deal not only with the subject-matter to which it specially belongs—covering as it does the opening paper—but also the allied topics—theories on the constitution of matter, crystallography, vicissitudes of speculations on prehistoric subjects,

the antiquity of man and the glacial period. Upon all these subjects the distinguished savant discourses, it need hardly be said, with his wonted fecundity of thought and masterly control of facts and theories. The book is one which will appeal almost equally to the philosopher and the scientist, while the apologist will find in it effective arguments. The treatment is not so technical but that the average intelligent reader can profit by it, aided as he will find himself by the author's characteristically lucid style and method.

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**HEAVENWARDS.** By *Mother Mary Loyola*, of the Bar Convent, York. Edited by Father Thurston, S. J. 12mo., pp. 292, with illustrations. P. J. Kenedy, New York and Philadelphia.

The list of devotional works by Mother Loyola has been growing for several years, until now it occupies a page of the book before us. They have all been warmly welcomed because they exhale the simple faith that fills them and communicates it to those who use them. More books of devotion and fewer books of controversy would spread the true faith faster. We probably make the mistake too often of presuming that people in general are antagonistic to the eternal truths and that we must fight with them. We should probably be nearer the truth if we assumed that almost all those who are trying to lead good lives have faith, though perhaps not clearly defined, and that they wish to know the truth. For such persons generally the mere statement of the truth with a description of the beauties of religion would be sufficient. They are hungry with a natural hunger for God and all that leads to them, and we have but to feed.

In "Heavenwards," as the title indicates, Mother Loyola tries in a series of essays or meditations to lead the soul up to God. They are simple and full of devotion, and they ought to do a great deal of good.

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**COMMENT IL FAUT PRIER**, par *A. Martin*, 1 vol. in 16 de la collection Science et Religion, nos. 565-566. Prix, 1 fr. 20. Librairie Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

This little book comprises two parts. The first teaches by extracts from the New Testament and Church literature how we must pray. The second affords an excellent instruction on the liturgy, under the form of an essay on the Holy Mass, its origin and the meaning of the different ceremonies it contains. The book is planned upon a practical method and for a practical object and is therefore a manual of piety drawn up especially for the use of the young. Far from being a simple collection of formulas, it is really a volume full of life itself and admirably suited to intensify religious life in all readers who will make it their habitual companion.



